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Abstract 
 This dissertation outlines comparative philosophical approaches to understanding the 
contemporary problem of homelessness in Hawaiʻi. It also offers a methodology for an applied 
comparative philosophical project. I provide examples of specific contributors to the problem of 
homelessness and bring in various Chinese and Western sources that contribute ways of 
understanding and contextualizing this issue. I build the themes successively from the necessity 
of constitutive interpersonal relationships, to the supportive and nurturing relationships among 
people and their natural surroundings, to the psychological response necessary to promote 
sympathy and solidarity, to a broad and inclusive awareness of the world. At each stage, I bring 
in my formulation of existential destitution to define and describe how these types of flourishing 
may fail to come about.  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Chapter One. The Problem of Homelessness in Hawaiʻi 
 In People of the Abyss, Jack London describes his experiences living in the East End, the 
poorest district in London, at the beginning of the 20th century. The story begins as he hires a 
carriage and instructs the driver to take him to the East End. The driver pauses, incredulous of 
this well-dressed foreigner, but he eventually agrees to the fare. London describes the sloping 
changes he sees outside the carriage, and on arriving he immediately seeks more fitting, that is, 
stained and itchy, clothes. He slept rough for months among the destitutes and drunks, though he 
occasionally crossed back over into more prosperous neighborhoods to bathe and eat a warm, 
prepared meal. The world of the East End, as he described it, was intentionally distanced from 
the world of functioning, thriving London. The people there knew little else about the city than 
the ubiquitous squalor, cold, hunger, disease, and death that framed their lives. They’d been left 
buried in the grime of the Industrial Revolution and relegated to the lesser class of human beast. 
They were out of sight, swept with the day’s trash into a vast gutter at the end of the city.  
 A little over a century later, such stark, geographical boundaries that separate homeless 
populations from the rest are less rigid. Homelessness now dots all areas, rural, urban, and 
suburban, in a way that is difficult to make invisible. While poverty continues to proliferate in 
historically poor areas, a clear indication of its genealogical inherence, it is increasingly visible 
irrespective of social geography. The reality of homelessness remains just as unintelligible from 
the perspective of those who are housed. Proximity has done little to facilitate compassion or 
understanding. Instead, the question of what to do with them now that they are here is a divisive 
political question asked and answered primarily by those who ignored, imprisoned, and de-
humanized them in the first place.  
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Homelessness in Hawaiʻi 
 Homelessness is a global problem.  Although the number of unsheltered individuals has 1
decreased nationwide,  the number of unsheltered individuals is growing in urban Hawaiʻi,  2 3
which now has the highest per capita percentage of homelessness of any state in the United 
States.  There is no universally applicable protocol for alleviating homelessness. What is needed 4
are local solutions.  In the United States, the trend has been to follow federally mandated 5
agendas with seemingly little awareness of the types of persons comprising local homeless 
populations, for example, whether they are primarily indigenous peoples, religious or racial 
minorities, veterans, or felons, and the unique problems they each face. The proliferation of 
people experiencing homelessness whose lives are unwittingly public has instead induced the 
redoubling of efforts to help, house, or hide the roughly half-million of them in the United States. 
 “Homelessness is a global human rights crisis that demands an urgent global response.” United Nations 1
General Assembly Human Rights Council Thirty-first session “Report of the Special Rapportuer on 
adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-
discrimination in this context.” Accessed on 4/22/2016 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/
AnnualReports.aspx 
 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Community Planning and 2
Development “2015 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress.” November 2015. 
Accessed on 4/22/2016 https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2015-AHAR-Part-1.pdf
 “City and County of Honolulu Homeless Point-in-time Count 2015.” submitted to The U.S. Department 3
of Housing and Urban Development in April 2015. Accessed on 4/22/2016 
 http://humanservices.hawaii.gov/bessd/files/2012/12/PIT-Oahu-2015-PIT-Report-Rev-4.18.15.pdf
 This data relies on the HUD assessment, which is based on the state’s point-in-time count, and the 4
United States Census Bureau count of individuals residing in Hawaii. It is unlikely that this count 
includes homeless individuals, though a small percentage who temporarily reside with family, friends, and 
acquaintances at the time of census might be counted.
 This viewpoint is significantly influenced by Zygmunt Bauman, especially Wasted Lives: Modernity and 5
Its Outcasts (Polity: Oxford, 2004).
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Hawaiʻi currently has a rate of 465 homeless individuals per 100,000 people,  and even with 6
efforts to reduce their numbers and millions of dollars spent, the number of unsheltered 
individuals has increased over the last five years. But this increase is difficult to quantify because 
homelessness metrics rely on non-comprehensive factors. The number of homeless individuals is 
an amalgam figure of the number of people who request services from providers such as the 
Institute for Human Services (IHS), those who visit the islands’ shelters for meals and/or 
accommodations, those included in the annual point-in-time count, and those who can produce 
no home address when cited by law enforcement officers or completing hospital emergency 
room paperwork. Getting an accurate count is not possible without communication and 
cohesiveness among service providers, but as Hawaiʻi continues to mold its policies surrounding 
homelessness, which depend largely on yearly allotted budgets, the solidification of purpose and 
strategy has been slow to materialize.  
There are three basic, non-exclusive ways to address homelessness from the policy level 
in the United States today: fund programs that aim to end homeless by providing resources, 
education, or housing; provide aid for daily needs such as food, water, and basic medical care; 
and employ punitive measures to deter unsheltered individuals from inhabiting certain areas or 
from undesirable, antisocial behaviors. Citizens’ and taxpayers’ opinions and beliefs regarding 
the unsheltered tend to polarize around the issue of whether and how much material aid ought to 
be provided. One pole is characterized by the liberal, Protestant, capitalist ethic of meaningful, 
gainful employment, personal responsibility and repentance for one’s own shortcomings, which 
 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Community Planning and 6
Development “2015 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress.” November 2015. 
Accessed on 4/22/2016 https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2015-AHAR-Part-1.pdf
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tends toward conservatism on the modern U.S. political spectrum in its preference for liberty.  7
The other pole is a socially-oriented, post-Darwinian view that forefronts equality and empathy 
in constructing a modern society, which characterizes the modern progressive tack and its 
preference for justice.  Progressive agendas tend to favor more public spending for programs that 8
support those suffering from poverty and homelessness, and conservative agendas push for 
creating jobs and incentivizing labor, which often leads to support of punitive measures against 
what is seen as an unproductive and unmotivated segment of the population.  
 The implementation of policies from either side of this ideological spectrum is snarled by 
the intersectional diversity of homelessness. Homeless individuals form a complex group. 
Unsheltered individuals are those who do not have a protected, secure dwelling for daily life 
activities or restful sleep. Homeless, sheltered individuals reside within emergency shelters or 
transitional housing. According to the point-in-time counts, which are performed on one night in 
January by volunteer workers who physically count homeless individuals, sheltered and 
 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney at the first Presidential Debate, October 2, 2012: 7
“My plan is not like anything that's been tried before. My plan is to bring down rates but also bring down 
deductions and exemptions and credits at the same time, so the revenue stays in, but that we bring down 
rates to get more people working. My priority is putting people back to work in America.” Cutting 
spending often refers to government entitlement programs. A severe example is the phasing out of 
Medicaid, which covers or supplements medical costs for the lowest-income Americans, in the 
Republican-authored American Health Care Act of 2017. For the House bill: https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1628.
 2016 Democrat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, by all accounts the loudest voice in progressive 8
politics in the U.S., at the 2016 Democratic National Convention: “Election days come and go. But the 
struggle of the people to create a government which represents all of us and not just the one percent - a 
government based on the principles of economic, social, racial and environmental justice - that struggle 
continues.” 
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unsheltered homeless individuals each comprise about half of the total.  This number, however, 9
does not include those considered housed but who are at risk of becoming homeless, including 
individuals and families living temporarily with friends, family, members of a religious 
community, or in motels and hostels. Those who are considered chronically homeless are defined 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development as homeless for at least one year or at 
least four separate occasions in the last three years where the combined length of time homeless 
in those occasions is at least twelve months and have a disability.  They are eligible for different 10
types of services than those who are not considered chronically homeless, as will be discussed 
later. Hawaiʻi is unique among the United States because those who identify as Hawaiian and 
Pacific Islander comprise the majority of homeless individuals.  Hawaiʻi also has a relatively 11
high number of homeless families and a relatively low number of homeless veterans. These 
 “HUD Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance Programs Homeless Populations and Subpopulations” 9
Point-in-time count for Hawaiʻi: 2015, 2016.
 From the HUD “ Notice for Housing Inventory Count (HIC) and Point-in-Time (PIT) Data Collection 10
for Continuum of Care (CoC) Program and the Emergency Solutions Grants (ESG) 
Program,” issued November 18, 2015. https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/Notice-
CPD-15-010-2016-HIC-PIT-Data-Collection-Notice.pdf accessed 7/22/17.
 The point-in-time count presents that data as follows: 3,374 Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders and 1,948 11
Multiple Races. Researchers at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa utilize a more specific ethnicity 
classification code that accounts for part-Hawaiians and mixed Pacific Islander, and their findings 
indicate that the population of Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders ought to be closer to 60% of the total 
homeless population in Honolulu. See Tai Dunson-Strane and Sarah Soakai, “The Effects of City Sweeps 
and Sit-Lie Policies on Honoluluʻs Homeless,” Curriculum Project for PLAN 604: Qualitative Methods, 
Instructor: Professor Karen Umemoto, Ph.D. Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the 
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa (June 2015). 
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factors complicate the responses to homelessness in the state, which are typically aimed at 
individuals experiencing homelessness and have been favorable to veterans.  12
 For those living in Honolulu, the capital and largest city, the experience of homelessness 
is a part of everyday life, whether lived or encountered. Hawaiʻi has received millions in U.S. 
federal aid to address the myriad issues that result in and sustain homelessness, but the number 
of unsheltered individuals continues to rise.  I hope to show that the primary reason that the 13
policies have not had satisfying results is that they often do not take into consideration the 
aspects that are unique to Hawaiʻi. These concerns stem from the elements of Hawaiian culture 
that differ from contemporary American ways of living: the effects of enforced American laws 
and standards that legislate public as well as private life and the distrust and enmity toward not 
only American people but also those seen as assimilating American behaviors.   14
Contributing Factors to Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders Experiencing Homelessness 
 How do we talk about the issues that Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders face and 
how these issues contribute to their overrepresentation among the homeless population in 
 President Barack Obama (term: 2008-2016) made veteran homelessness a priority, and the Veterans 12
Administration began its program in 2009 to end veteran homelessness. A handful of states, including 
Utah and Virginia, and cities such as Houston and New Orleans, claimed to have ended veteran 
homelessness as a result of these policies and national awareness. 
 Whether the increase speaks to more people becoming unsheltered, more unsheltered individuals 13
arriving in Honolulu with few or no resources, or more unsheltered individuals being counted due to more 
comprehensive census techniques is contested among entities serving the unsheltered, local government 
officials, and local news media, as well as residents and tourists in Honolulu.
 William C. Rezentes III, Ka Lama Kukui: Hawaiian Psychology: An Introduction (ʻAʻaliʻi Books: 14
Honolulu, 1996), 77.
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Hawaiʻi? The typical American stereotypes of unsheltered people as lazy and apathetic are more 
sharply toothed for populations still reeling from colonialism’s powerful effect on Pacific Island 
cultures, people, ecologies, and environments. William Rezentes, a practicing psychologist in 
Hawaiʻi, has novel diagnoses and techniques for treating Native Hawaiian patients that focus on 
the difficulties and hardships they encounter in the transition to American ways of living. The 
Kaumaha Syndrome describes a feeling of being tired and weighed down, symptomatically 
similar to Western diagnoses of depression, that is “rooted in a collective sadness and moral 
outrage felt by many Hawaiians” who “were coerced into submitting to foreign institutions, laws, 
and cultures and forced to either give up or be punished for practicing their traditional culture.”  15
Not only were their cultural practices discouraged or even banned since the U.S. annexed 
Hawaiʻi as a trust territory at the end of the 19th century,  the shame they were made to feel has 16
been internalized and preserved through generations, “leading to disease, poverty, homelessness, 
imprisonment, and cultural and spiritual disintegration.”  The organic ties between psychology, 17
history, and culture are kept intact in this diagnosis. Culturally, Native Hawaiians emphasize the 
supportive cohesiveness of the community in maintaining individual wellbeing, so treatments 
that are designed to treat individual, private maladies are not as effective. I think the same is true 
 Rezentes, Ka Lama Kukui, 37. According to the Hawaiian Dictionary Nā Puke Wehewehe Ōlelo 15
Hawaiʻi, the literal meaning of kaumaha is a weight, heavy, or heaviness, and its figurative meaning 
relates to wretchedness, troubled, depressed, tragic, etc. The dictionary may be accessed at 
www.wehewehe.org.
 For example, the most charitable institution serving Native Hawaiians, the Bishop Estate, initially 16
banned hula on all campuses of Kamehameha Schools. Roth and King’s Broken Trust: Greed, 
Mismanagement & Political Manipulation at America’s Largest Charitable Trust (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 2006).
 Rezentes, Ka Lama Kukui, 37.17
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of policies that aim to decrease homelessness in Hawaiʻi. Many policies in the US emphasize the 
treatment of individuals, and understandings of homeless issues that inform directives are not 
based in community interconnectedness. In order to address the hardships of Native Hawaiians 
and Pacific Islanders that result in homelessness, one must realize that situations that result in 
solitariness are already deeply troubled and that improvement of individual circumstances will 
likely require the repair of community dynamics.  
 Kaumaha syndrome does more than describe a psychological condition. It addresses the 
structural problems that have negatively affected Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders. It 
acknowledges the limitations they encounter and the devaluation of the richness of their culture 
by powerful political, economic, and social forces. It also suggests that for these reasons, those 
who suffer from this condition can be destructive and disruptive. According to Rezentes, those 
with psychological problems should be guided to “become more aware of their Hawaiian-ness 
and enhancing their self-identity through recognition of Hawaiian values.”  The realization they 18
will come to is that colonial powers buried the seeds of self-resentment in the minds of 
Hawaiians that have sprouted into psychiatric limitations that add to issues surrounding 
economic poverty.  
 Rezentes gives an appraisal of the psychological contributors to conditions including 
homelessness among Native Hawaiians. He repeatedly reminds his readers and his clients that 
 These pivotal aspects of Hawaiian identity include inoa, the meaning of one’s name, which is a 18
powerful signifier of one’s character; ʻohana, one’s family and genealogy, which determines the 
connections among people and to Hawaiian culture; ʻāina, the land to which Hawaiians are rooted for 
nutritional and spiritual nourishment; lōkahi, the natural balance and harmony of the world; and aloha, 
literally “the sharing of one’s inner self through one’s breath.” Aloha is the opening up of oneself to others 
that promotes unity and cohesiveness in the community. Rezentes, pp. 89-93.
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much of the suffering he sees in his clients is caused by the discord between Hawaiian and 
American self-understanding. This ought to have an impact on how homelessness is addressed 
from the policy level, given the overrepresentation of Native Hawaiians, but the views and biases 
of policy-makers and voters in many cases seem to favor Western approaches. This comes as no 
surprise because American politics are grounded significantly in Western, European political 
thought. Philosophers like Kant, Locke, Hobbes, Rawls, and the early American philosopher-
politicians Jefferson and Franklin, emphasized individuality and liberty, rationality and justice. 
These views have been used to justify imperial expansionism and racism, which have contributed 
to the overrepresentation of indigenous Americans and people of color in prisons, in poverty, 
unsheltered, and suffering from psychological and drug addiction disorders. Native Hawaiians 
have a difficult decision to make. Do they insulate themselves inside culturally homogenous 
Hawaiian communities with little chance for self-governance and material self-sufficiency as 
long as they are living under U.S. laws and economic structures? If not, how far are they willing 
to assimilate into American cultures and norms, and at what cost? I suggest something more 
radical. In this dissertation, I will consider a different philosophical tradition to frame new 
perspectives and approaches, rather than searching for better strategies among the Western 
conceptual structures that girded the policies which created these problems in the first place.    
Using Chinese Philosophical Approaches to Understand Homelessness Among Native 
Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders 
 The understanding of self as located within family and community nexus in specific and 
significant places in the Chinese philosophical tradition has notable similarities to Hawaiian 
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epistemologies and social arrangements. They each emphasize relationality and the importance 
of traditional understandings and rituals. I will use Chinese philosophical perspectives to mediate 
the differences permeating United States and Hawaiian relations. I choose this approach for 
several reasons. First, concern for navigating the vicissitudes of alternatingly brackish and clear 
disclosures of fate permeates Chinese philosophy, where the world is conceived as neither fixed 
nor conducive to altogether new beginnings. The world unfolds in ways that disclose opportunity 
as well as calamity. Creativity, then, is not creation ex nihilo but adaptivity and awareness. A life 
well-lived is both scripted and responsive, like tango dancing or surfing. There are learned ways 
of moving and reacting, but the prescience bestowed by ingrained habits goes beyond what is 
scripted to become spontaneous and unbidden. In Hawaiian epistemology, this understanding has 
a counterpart in heʻe nalu “ocean knowing.” The relationship between Native Hawaiians, or 
Kānaka Maoli, and the ocean provides productive metaphors of endless change and the “unseen 
yet present” that give context to the human lives inextricable from her boundaries.  Karin 19
Amimoto Ingersoll writes:  
Seascape epistemology engages a discourse about place that recognizes the 
ocean’s transient and dynamic composition; waves are constantly formed and 
broken, sucked up from the very body that gave it life. No part of this liquid body 
is ever stable. Yet something does endure within this space and time: relationships 
that draw together the sea’s collective components through an engagement such as 
 The phrase “unseen yet present” is attributed to Keoni James Kuoha in Karen Amimoto Ingersoll, 19
Waves of Knowing: A Seascape Epistemology (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 22.
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he’e nalu. Seascape epistemology is movement’s sound, its taste and color, and it 
is the fluctuation of a process that joins the world together.  20
The suitability for comparison with Chinese philosophy is clear. They both privilege process, 
relationships, and embodied knowing. But as to why I think mediating Hawaiian and dominant 
United States discourses about poverty and homelessness is necessary or preferred, my main 
concern in writing about these issues is to preserve complexity in the face of dominant 
reductionist, binary mindsets of Western ethical and economic orientations. As long as the U.S. is 
able to ‘other’ Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, just as, Ingersoll argues, they have ‘othered’ the 
sea,  and exclude the middle ground where empathy and compassion may find their footing, any 21
policy failings can be attributed to irresolvable differences and, likely, dispirited efforts on behalf 
of a colonized people to properly assimilate. The binary interaction between the colonizer and 
colonized, which takes place in a graveyard of identities and promises on once-sacred land, 
necessitates a mediator. And in the face of power and historical inertia, it is only right that this 
mediator be biased, slanting the ground so that waves pound the shore with the force to shift the 
sand.  
 The plight of Kānaka Maoli is bared in the black and white of U.S. government reports as 
well as the houseless people settled on the sidewalks and parks like hunks of dead coral tossed 
by waves onto the beach. Each is dissolved from the collectivities that sustained them, and the 
forces that rendered this result inevitable are both varied and uniform. While Western modes of 
understanding and arguing depend on distinctions and oppositions, definitions and some degree 
 Ingersoll, Waves of Knowing, 20.20
 Ingersoll, in Waves of Knowing, writes, “The ocean was perceived as Other, justifying Westerners’ 21
desire to control and colonize both the seascape and those encountered within the seascape.” 144.
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of objectivity, which all contribute to the binary of one and many, Hawaiian and Chinese 
perspectives do not seek to distinguish the primacy of one or many. The result is a folding of 
difference into diverse unities, the broadening of knowledge to include connections among 
seemingly disparate events, and an emphasis and respect for the not-yet-disclosed. So, 
contemporary discussions about the houseless and unsheltered in Hawaiʻi ought also to preserve 
the complex, non-reducible, lived experiences of those experiencing it. Homelessness is both an 
immense, unwieldy problem and a quantum assortment of discrete but knotted issues. 
 Additionally, the Chinese philosophies I refer to frame a nuanced discussion about 
poverty that has no counterpart in Hawaiian mythology or pre-contact history.  Contact with 22
American missionaries and businessmen planted a seed, which like most invasive species 
flourished and destroyed the delicate balance of the islands’ sustainable ecosystems. The 
ravaging of Hawaiʻi included the introduction of extreme poverty, with its concomitant lack of 
efficacy and choice. Polynesian cultures were known to be culturally homogenous, self-
sufficient, and governed by a sacred ruling class and through ritual. Poverty in this historical 
context can be described as the condition of all of the common folk in the lowest class, but this 
undermines the importance of political and spiritual hierarchy in Polynesian cultures and 
arrogantly applies contemporary, Western conception of poverty as a lack of material resources. 
One could say that those who lacked spiritual connectedness to others, the ancestors, or the land 
 Chinese philosophy is not a monolith. Rather, there is a discourse that orients different philosophies to 22
speak to common themes. Hence the plural, Chinese philosophies, is used to indicate the different 
perspectives and contexts for approaching philosophical problems.
#
were poor because they lacked what Polynesians value.  But attempting to locate dysfunctional 23
inequality in a cultural history that emphasizes pre-contact harmony leaves little room for 
discussions of poverty that are not themselves harmful to contemporary Polynesian identities. 
However, the Chinese philosophical tradition has never shied from discussing poverty and has 
even glorified it at various times throughout its long history. Early Chinese philosophy lends a 
nuanced definition of poverty, in terms of both economic and existential limitation, that will be 
fruitful in discussing poverty and homelessness in Hawaiʻi today. 
Chinese philosophy and Human Limitation: The Character qiong 窮 
 I rely heavily in this dissertation on the Chinese character qiong 窮, which contributes 
two sets of ideas. The first set combines economic and existential poverty. The result is a 
crushing maelstrom of external forces and cannot be fully attributed to personal, individual 
choices, or reduced to discrete social, political, or economic systems. Much like the Kaumaha 
Syndrome discussed above, when suffering from this kind of poverty, one feels like one is at a 
dead end and has nowhere to turn. I believe much of the public discourse surrounding 
homelessness has focused on economic poverty and psychological conditions that sabotage 
economic self-sufficiency with little regard for existential needs.  
 This value is illustrated in the Hawaiian concept of pono. Pono is one of the central themes for 23
describing morality in Hawaiian culture. It is described as “the integration of self with your environment, 
in the way you relate to people.” And this practice “ conveys the meaning of goodness, purity, wellness, 
integrity, righteousness, perfection and success.” This according to educators interviewed in Manulani 
Aluli Meyerʻs book Hoʻoulu: Our Time of Becoming: Hawaiian Epistemology and Early Writings 
(Honolulu:ʻAi Pōhaku Press, 2004), 153, 200. They affirm that this way of life was disrupted by the 
arrival of Western colonists, who banned many Hawaiian practices as well as the Hawaiian language, and 
that this disharmony is yet to be remedied.
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 The second set of meanings of the character qiong relates the positive and negative 
connotations of the relationship between humans and limits. One may encounter a limit that 
prevents one from going further, which is the imminent danger of poverty, but one may also 
reach the limit of what is possible, or the full expression of one’s actions and desires. Qiong in 
this sense describes a person who probes the world with a pinnacle of acuity and discernment, a 
sage in the Confucian tradition. A sage does not encounter limitation, or perhaps does not 
consider shortages of economic resources and social capital limiting. According to the Xunzi, the 
encompassing (qiong) knowledge of the sage is spread among the people when things are as they 
should be (天下正), but when no one is listening to the sage, these aspects of perfection are 
hidden (ming qiong 冥窮).  24
 The meaning of qiong may be translated most simply as “exhaust.”  The sages exhaust 25
the inexhaustible (qiong wuqiong 窮無窮), while those who are not sages but are exemplary or 
distinguished, the junzi 君子, will exhaust themselves striving for such a lofty goal. The Xunzi 
advises that one set attainable goals by recognizing one’s limits to avoid being an “unwitting 
plodder” (不識步道者).  In addition to heeding the limit of what one is capable of achieving, 26
 Xunzi, 正名: 說行則天下正，說不行則白道而冥窮。24
 There are several facets to the meaning reflecting the component radicals of its construction, its 25
placement as a complementary-opposite pair, its grammatical function, and the time-period of the texts it 
appears in. 
 Burton Watson trans. Xunzi: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 29.26
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one must continue to self-cultivate even when they are in poverty (qiong).  There is the hope 27
that one’s personal limitations (qiong) are not exacerbated or perpetuated by hard times (qiong) 
that prevent one from reaching (qiong) one’s goals. To maintain this hope, all that needs to be 
done, according to the Xunzi, is to do appropriate and responsible things like respect the old and 
win the respect of the old and young alike, do not “press those who are already hard pressed 
(buqiong qiong不窮窮),”  and win the favor of the poor and rich alike, and do not be prideful or 28
boastful, and the sages and regular folk will rally round.  This may not prevent falling on hard 29
times, but it prescribes a way of life that is beneficial for everyone if put into practice. This is the 
message of Confucian self-cultivation also included in the Mengzi chapter 7A9, which describes 
the upstanding scholar/bureaucrats (shi 士) who when poor better themselves in private and 
when successful put their efforts into bettering the world.  This way of speaking about poverty 30
contributes to its understanding as a systemic problem, rather than an isolated occurrence. It also 
indicates the difficulty of achieving exemplary moral consistency while living in dire straits. The 
contribution of these insights to contemporary understandings of homelessness and poverty 
 Xunzi 修身： 故良農不為水旱不耕，良賈不為折閱不市，士君子不為貧窮怠乎道。ICS 27
Concordance to the Xunzi. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2006) 14.18/74/27. A good farmer does 
not give up plowing just because of flood or drought; a good merchant does not stop doing business just 
because of occasional losses; a gentleman (junzi) does not neglect the Way just because of poverty and 
hardship. Watson, Xunzi, 28.
 Watson, Xunzi, 32.28
 Xunzi 修身： 老老而壯者歸焉，不窮窮而通者積焉，行乎冥冥而施乎無報，而賢不肖一焉。ICS 29
Concordance to the Xunzi.
 Mengzi 盡心上：窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下。ICS Concordance to the Mengzi. v. 15. (Hong 30
Kong: The Commercial Press, 2006) 14.18/74/27.
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benefits from the understanding of issues as interconnected and complex. When considering 
these issues in localized and specific circumstances, as I do in my attempt to present the issues 
surrounding and contributing to homelessness in Hawaiʻi, one must resist the urge to simplify 
and generalize these knotty social issues. 
Issues Contributing to the Prevalence of Homelessness in Hawaiʻi 
 Pre-Qin and Han Dynasty Chinese philosophy presumes inviolable connections between 
the state, each person, and the world. This holistic political ecology affects each person’s ability 
to thrive. Applying the lessons of Chinese philosophy to contemporary issues is useful because 
the myriad causes of poverty are kept intact, rather than being reduced to primary causes. In the 
current political climate in the United States, for example, it is not uncommon for poor and 
unsheltered individuals to be blamed for their plight because of laziness and poor decisions.  31
This gross oversimplification ignores the many factors that result in increasing numbers of 
unsheltered individuals. In this chapter, I describe three issues that must be considered in order to 
understand the problem of homelessness in Hawaiʻi and come up with effective solutions. 
 The issues I discuss are 1) the sit-lie ordinance, a measure passed by the City and County 
of Honolulu that criminalizes sitting or lying down on public sidewalks during certain times; 2) 
the Housing First initiative, which allocates state and federal funding toward programs that 
connect those experiencing homelessness directly to housing opportunities and rental assistance 
programs. This implementation of this program has clashed with the lack of affordable housing 
 This is shown to be especially true among Protestant Christian communities in the US. See for example 31
“Christians are more than twice as likely to blame a person’s poverty on lack of effort,” Julie Zauzmer, 
The Washington Post, 08/03/2017.
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and the high cost of living in urban areas of Honolulu; and 3) the impact of the Compacts of Free 
Association, which allow for the free movement of citizens from the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau to the United States. I believe that 
the issues I have chosen to address indicate the uniqueness of the state of affairs in Hawaiʻi and 
may serve to explain the high number of unsheltered individuals. Applying the lessons of 
Chinese philosophy requires that the complexity of this situation be held intact, which means that 
everyone is culpable for the injustices and imbalances in the society and world we share. Chinese 
philosophy directs us to consider both internal and external circumstances in assessing social ills. 
This chapter discusses the external, socially and broadly enforced laws and expectations while 
occasionally dwelling on philosophical perspectives of these issues. In later chapters, I address 
the internal, psychological circumstances that prevent self-improvement and success as well as 
comparative interpretations of the social realities that have given way to visible and 
unsustainable homelessness in Hawaiʻi. 
The Sit-Lie Ordinances 
 Over 8,600,000 tourists visited Hawaiʻi in 2015.  Its relative isolation and consistent 32
trade winds contribute to high air quality, the tides to clear beach waters, and its balmy year-
round temperatures and reputation for hospitality make for a relatively care-free holiday for these 
visitors. The mid-Pacific location of the islands draws significant numbers of tourists from 
Japan, China, and Australia, in addition to those from the United States. This enormous transient 
 Annual Visitor Visitor Report. Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism Visitor 32
Statistics, Accessed 2/2/2017, http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/visitor/visitor-research/2015-annual-visitor.pdf
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population of folks on-island who do not participate in local politics but demand a homelessness-
free vacation experience contributed to the first unique aspect homelessness in of Hawaiʻi that I 
will discuss.  
 In the district of Waikīkī, the tourist hub on the south shore of Oahu, unsheltered 
individuals clash unsettlingly with denizens of the high-end fashion outlets, hotels, and faux-tiki 
eateries dotting the shore. Tourism is the primary driver of the urban island economy with 
spending of about $15 billion annually.  The desk of Honolulu Mayor Kirk Caldwell, who took 33
office in January 2013 and was reelected in 2016, is purportedly littered with personalized letters 
from visitors expressing their dismay at the presence of unsheltered individuals in Waikīkī.  34
These letters describe frightening and violent encounters, and there are several reasons for these 
occurrences. Unsheltered individuals who do not utilize shelter services are more likely to suffer 
from mental disorders and drug dependency disorders.  Most of the shelters in Hawaiʻi have 35
strict policies about drug use and mental health treatment, and those who are not accommodated 
by or who have no choice but to refuse these services frequent populated areas so that they can 
ask for money and search for redeemable recyclables. This combined with the closures of public 
rest areas on public beaches, especially in the evening, has created a malodorous, roving, raving 
 Annual Visitor Visitor Report. Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism Visitor 33
Statistics, Accessed 2/2/2017, http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/visitor/visitor-research/2015-annual-visitor.pdf
 “Dear Mayor: Complaints about the Homeless Pour Into Caldwell’s Office.” Sophie Cocke. The Civil 34
Beat, Accessed 2/2/2017, http://www.civilbeat.org/2014/11/dear-mayor-complaints-about-the-homeless-
pour-into-caldwells-office/
 According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “In January 2014, one 35
in five people experiencing homelessness have a serious mental illness, and a similar percentage had a 
chronic substance abuse disorder,” Accessed 2/2/2017, https://www.samhsa.gov/homelessness-housing
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population of underserved individuals inhabiting the center of a district created to deliver the 
paradise experience. 
 In September 2014, the Mayor approved three bills for ordinances aimed at decreasing 
the number of unsheltered individuals in Waikīkī. Two made the act of urinating or defecating in 
public illegal in Waikīkī and public areas. The other prohibited sitting and lying on the sidewalks 
in Waikīkī except from eleven p.m. to five a.m., when people are allowing to rest on the 
sidewalk. Under this ordinance, anyone reclining on the sidewalk will be asked to move or 
receive a warning or citation from a law enforcement officer and potentially charged with a petty 
misdemeanor.  These city ordinances cite the need for safe public sidewalks that are free from 36
obstructions for all citizens and especially children and the elderly. They also express the need 
for unfettered access to all businesses whose main entry abuts the public sidewalks. In December 
2014, the law was expanded to ban sitting and lying on public sidewalks in most of Honolulu’s 
districts extending westward to Hawaiʻi Kai, as well as the windward towns of Waimanalo, 
Kailua, and Kaneohe, and the central island town of Wahiawa.  The Mayor dug in his heels and 37
vetoed an expansion on this ordinance that would include more areas in Honolulu as well as 
update the ordinance to include areas near public sidewalks, termed the “extended sidewalk 
area.”  But on June 3, 2015, the City Council voted to approve Bill 6 to ban sitting and lying in 38
the areas surrounding public sidewalks and increased the number of sites affected by the 
 City and County of Honolulu Bill for Ordinance 14-26, Accessed 2/18/2016, http://36
www4.honolulu.gov/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-152425/ORD14-26.PDF
 City and County of Honolulu Bill for Ordinance 14-35, Accessed 2/18/2016, http://37
www4.honolulu.gov/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-153805/DOC002%20(45).PDF
 City and County of Honolulu Bill for Ordinance 15-14, Accessed 2/18/2016, http://38
www4.honolulu.gov/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-166012/DOC002%20(19).PDF
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ordinance. In early 2015, Mayor Caldwell signed another bill to extend the ban to select public 
malls and open outdoor pedestrian areas in downtown Honolulu and Chinatown.  Yet, when a 39
new bill was put forward relating to this ordinance that would increase the number of outdoor 
malls where the ban would be enforced, the Mayor vetoed it. His statement included the 
following: 
Rather than attempting to expand the sit-lie laws, we should focus our collective energies 
and attention to working together to find, create, and provide affordable housing for all 
the people of the City, so that those less fortunate persons who live on the public rights-
of-way have other options than simply moving into different public rights-of-way as 
more laws are passed.  40
The ordinances did not include predictions or hopes for the fate of those forced to vacate the 
areas where the sit-lie ban was enforced, so it is not possible to say whether the results have been 
a success. By all counts, the number of unsheltered individuals has gone up, even though their 
presence has been all but erased in the areas most frequented by visiting tourists to the islands.  
It was concerning to watch them being driven from the most heavily populated areas of Honolulu 
to nowhere in particular. The neighborhoods they migrated into were understandably frustrated 
as they were forced to absorb the increasingly beleaguered lot. This was of course aggravated by 
the size of the Hawaiian islands and their geographical isolation. It was as if there was no place 
for them within the current state of island politics and development. 
 City and County of Honolulu Bill for Ordinance 15-1, Accessed 2/18/2016, http://www4.honolulu.gov/39
docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-161745/dspage07500950716899260828.pdf
 Office of the Mayor letter to City Council August 19, 2015, Accessed 2/18/2016, http://40
www.honolulu.gov/rep/site/csd/Bill_44_Letter_8-19-15.pdf
#20
 The most prominent effect of the ban was visual, that is, there were no or few temporary 
structures, personal belongings, or people occupying the extended sidewalk area in many of the 
city’s tourist areas. Yet, in sections of Honolulu where the ban was not in effect, there was an 
increase in the number of visibly unsheltered individuals. The most publicized area was 
Kakaʻako, which is between Waikīkī and the downtown business district that includes 
Chinatown. In 2016 it was the site of large, informal tent city, which swelled to as many as 300 
individuals before it too was swept, the order coming swiftly under the state of emergency 
declared as a result of increasing homelessness figures. This sweep put the sit-lie ban in the 
spotlight because it seemed to have been carried out under different circumstances than those in 
the tourist and business areas. Kakaʻako was an industrial area near the port that had recently 
become the site of construction for high-end, high-occupancy condominiums and shopping 
centers. The swelling numbers of unhoused individuals carrying on in the shadows cast by these 
enormous, sleek new buildings advertising multi-million dollar dwellings made the divide 
between the haves and the have-nots very clear. It also eerily fit into the area’s history.  
 The land reform policy enacted in 1848 by the Hawaiian government, the Great Māhele, 
divided the land into three equal parts for the king and the chiefs, both private, and the rest was 
held in a public trust. In order to gain access to the land, Native Hawaiians had to pay a 
surveying cost and fill out paperwork. Many did not have the money or, because Hawaiians 
traditionally did not believe in land ownership, they did not heed the advice to acquire parcels, 
especially the ones crossed with streams.  Many non-Hawaiians came to own public lands, and 41
 “Breach of Trust? Native Hawaiian Homelands: A summary of the proceedings of a public forum 41
sponsored by the Hawaii Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission of Civil Rights,” Hawaii Advisory 
Committee (University of Michigan Library: October, 1980).
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subsequent attempts to provide the land to Native Hawaiians have been marred by inefficiency 
and corruption.  Around the time that Hawaiʻi became a U.S. territory in 1898, many Hawaiians 42
who were formerly subsistence farmers came to Honolulu for work. They built semi-permanent 
dwellings from discarded materials from the port in what is now Kakaʻako, but then it was called 
Squattersville. The settlement was home to over 700 Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians who even 
requested that the city recognize them as a part of the municipality. Their request was denied and 
their encampment demolished by the city in 1926.  This event began Kakaʻako’s troubled 43
history of Hawaiian homelessness.  
 This history seems to have been repeated under a new guise. In 2016, the City and 
County deployed law enforcement and sanitation workers to remove, or “sweep” the 
encampment in Kakaʻako. It was framed by the city as an impetus for unsheltered individuals to 
seek institutional assistance. The concern voiced by the city council was that the relative 
permanence of the tent-city lessened motivation to seek housing, employment, and health and 
wellness care. But this did not address the disproportionate numbers of Hawaiians as well as 
Pacific Islanders residing there, as will be discussed further in the section about the Compacts of 
Free Association. 
 The public response to the sit-lie ordinances shows the polarizing nature of the problem, 
as well as the danger that these individuals are increasingly vilified, gradually forgotten, or both, 
 There were three land acts at the turn of the 20th century. Only one was not abruptly canceled. Until the 42
formation of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), there was no ethnicity requirement, so 
Hawaiians did not proportionally benefit from the sale of lands from the public trust. Even the HHCA has 
been found negligent in their duties to the interests of Hawaiians (Breach of Trust, 1980). 
 Adele Balderston, "Voices of Kaka‘ako: A Narrative Atlas of Participatory Placemaking in Urban 43
Honolulu" (M.A. Thesis, 2016), CUNY Academic Works, http://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/99
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as they disappear from view in the most bustling areas of Hawaiʻi. A significant experience of 
mine was when I happened upon a smattering of tents with jewelry, arts and crafts, food and 
beverages, and a small band performing the lilting rhythms of commercial Hawaiian music in the 
Waikīkī-proximal Kapiʻolani Park. Events like these can be found most weekends on these 
expansive grounds. They leave ample room for soccer, kite-flying, picnicking, but also the less 
acceptable activities of unsheltered individuals, namely, public intoxication, psychotic behavior, 
and clustered and cluttered habitation of the much-desired shaded picnic table areas in this public 
park. This area is considered a part of Waikīkī, the first area affected by the sit-lie ban, so there 
are no unsheltered individuals along the paths. Rather, they are in the shadows of the immense 
banyan trees, to which No Camping signs were affixed, then removed. On a sunny day in 
Honolulu, one might be able to overlook them. Most of those who wander out of the end of 
Waikīkī onto the park’s swaths of mowed grass do not see them, and many are unaware that they 
are standing on a shifting battleground where the unsheltered and the public safety officials who 
remove them play out a daily tragic drama. I eat fresh papaya and, thinking this, watch the 
people meander about the shell necklaces and tropical candles. The event organizer steps on the 
stage to announce that they are there to promote homelessness awareness.  
 Now, there might have been a small table among the tents offering copied pamphlets 
about homelessness that I did not see, but there was nothing about the event that seemed 
promotional or supportive. I was struck by the distance between the awareness of the problem of 
homelessness and the awareness of the unsheltered people and the myriad problems that led to 
their suffering from homelessness. These people, of course, had all been removed, and there was 
space to raise awareness without their discomfiting presence. This, I think is potentially the most 
#23
destructive aspect of this ban. Those living in Hawaiʻi agree that homelessness is an 
extraordinarily pressing issue, but moving unsheltered individuals out of sight risks a drop in the 
momentum of societal change. It also forms them into a haggard unity devoid of particularizing 
and humanizing histories. 
 The enforcement of the sit-lie ban increased public distaste for the presence of 
unsheltered individuals and their belongings. Efforts to remove them were gallantly taken up by 
civilians as well as civil servants. Most notably, in 2013, State Representative Tom Brower from 
the Waikīkī district took a sledgehammer to the wheels of about 30 stolen shopping carts that 
were being used by unsheltered individuals so that they could no longer be pushed, and no 
charges were pressed against him.  Some lauded his choice to take care of his constituents’ 44
needs outside of the serene lawmaking chambers. This condoning of violent and abusive 
behavior certainly colors the perception of the individuals affected by his armed rampage. It 
allows the unsheltered to be made into criminals undeserving of even the few belongings they 
carry from one inhospitable place to another.  
 There was one tack that led into a less morally turbulent area, and it is based on a phrase 
attributed to Mayor Kirk Caldwell. He calls the enforcement of the sit-lie ban, though hopefully 
he means on the part of law enforcement, an act of “compassionate disruption.”  The warnings 45
and citations handed out by officers are framed as reminders that living rough is an unsustainable 
way of life. The hope is that disrupting the daily activities and habits of chronically unsheltered 
 “Off The Beat: What Laws Did Hawaii Rep. Tom Brower Break?” Honolulu Civil Beat, Accessed 44
3/18/2016, http://www.civilbeat.com/2013/11/20487-off-the-beat-what-laws-did-hawaii-rep-tom-brower-
break/
 See coverage provided by the Honolulu Star Advertiser, for example, “Mayor Claims Win Over 45
Honolulu Crisis” pub. 2/1/2016 by Dan Nakaso.
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individuals will spur their desire to attain city and state-provided shelter and its concomitant 
services. The state-recognized advocacy group that regularly advises on issues of policy and 
programs that affect the homeless, Protecting Hawaii’s Ohana Children Underserved Elderly and 
Disabled (PHOCUSED), offered their official comments to the city council members in regard to 
the bills expanding the sit-lie ban on June 15, 2015. The group provided figures that showed no 
significant change in the number of shelter vacancies before and after the sit-lie ban was 
enforced.  Yet, when interviewed by a local news outlet regarding the ban in Waikīkī, Connie 46
Mitchel, Executive Director for the Institute for Human Services, indicated that there had been 
an influx of guests who had been rousted from the sidewalks of Waikīkī.   47
 I will grant that there are those for whom this approach works, but it will not work for 
everyone. It works for those who are willing and capable of imagining a future for themselves 
that is different, better, than the present. There are many factors that may blind an individual 
from a view of their life from the perspective necessary to better it, and these factors are 
concentrated among unsheltered individuals. Immense amounts of physical and emotional stress 
and trauma, as well as physical and mental disorders and disabilities, limit life to days and 
dangerous nights preoccupied with survival. The availability of choice to leave this lifestyle is 
not one easily conjured for reasons as varied as the unsheltered population itself.  
 From Scott Morishige, Executive Director PHOCUSED to Councilmember Ikaika Anderson, Chair, 46
Councilmember Trevor Ozawa, Vice Chair, and Members, Committee on Zoning & Planning. Hearing: 
Monday, June 15, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. Submitting comments relating to Bills 43, 44, 46, 47, 48. Accessed 
2/24/2016, http://www4.honolulu.gov/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-166380/
dspage09175064739941899694.pdf
 Hawaii News Now. Lynn Kawano. “IHS: Sit-Lie Ban is Working in Waikīkī” published Tuesday, 47
February 10, 2015, at 4:19 p.m. HST. Accessed 2/24/2106, http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/
28077207/ihs-sit-lie-ban-is-working-in-waikiki
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Dwelling in Philosophy: Phenomenological Experience of Homelessness 
 Is it possible for the sheltered--those more capable and acceptable for political and social 
involvement--to see this absence of choice? If the individuals are made invisible by political and 
social policy as well as habit, then a view of their exercise of freedom is likely also occluded. 
The sometimes emotional, strange, and violent encounters with unsheltered individuals do little 
to bridge reciprocal awareness of their diminished freedom. Instead of sameness, it is tempting to 
assert absolute difference in the face of an unsheltered person. This phenomenological 
experience of the other behind the eyes of a person suffering from homelessness is almost like 
that described by Hegel, Levinas, and Sartre, but often without the recognition of oneself in 
them. I think that Sartre’s ontology provides the most accurate description of the willingness to 
be indifferent to the visibly unsheltered while simultaneously being profoundly affected by them. 
 Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, describes the potential for an ontological 
relationship between moi même et L’autre as a complex and devastating give and take that occurs 
when I recognize ontological self-sameness encased in difference. This recognition brings about 
the realization that just as one’s own life is more than the sum of appearances and choices, the 
void of potentiality and the unknown at the center of my self-understanding must also be present 
in the Other. This void is the precursor of freedom, or the ability to assert oneself in the world in 
a way that is gratifyingly representative of the way one wishes to be seen. The realization that I 
view others in any way I please is like a mirror suddenly turned, and now my gaze freely 
explores and objectifies my own product of individual freedom. I imagine how others see me, 
but it has no verifiable relationship to how I am actually seen. There is an existential danger in all 
#26
human interaction of ceding to another’s freedom and losing the ballast stabilizing my reality as 
well as and the capability I have to change it. No longer would I be what holds at the center of 
reality as a void ontologically affiliated with the future. I fear that I will give myself up as a mere 
object among many, to which the future simply befalls. I allow myself to be cast in the light of 
another stage, someone else’s Grand Ole Opry blinding the view of the paltry, rough-hewn and 
shrinking plank on which the I, now a trite sideshow, am standing. Ashamed, I suddenly hope to 
disappear completely. Freedom is the ability not only to define the contours of own-most 
existence but to maintain this existence in the experience of otherness. A relationship, as defined 
by this context, will perpetually be subject to the woes of anxiety, abuse, and reciprocal freedom-
theft. One can never know the feeling that another person feels or their held hopes and 
expectations of the future, and this is more pronounced where there is more dissimilarity.  
 The discomfort of trusting a stranger to understand you, and to risk the loss of your self-
determining freedom, may be a compelling reason to ignore them. Sartre writes from the 
perspective of a person who would live in such bad faith:  
I scarcely notice them; I act as if I were alone in the world. I brush against 
“people” as I brush against a wall; I avoid them as I avoid obstacles. Their 
freedom-as-object is for me only their “coefficient of adversity.” I do not even 
imagine that they can look at me.  48
Although Sartre is describing an interaction with any given person, and an unsustainable one at 
that, I think this can describe the interaction many people have in encounters with visibly 
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 48
1984), 495.
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unsheltered individuals. We are made pointedly aware of our complicity in an unequal society 
and may hope for a moment that they do not see us and that they do not ask for more than we are 
willing to give. In this situation, I do not want them to see that I am free to ignore them and that 
my actions in their eyes have an effect on who I am.  
 In this way, one can be made homeless, without a place to be in the void of changing and 
dynamic self-making. In being cast as a solid, lifeless object, the project of continually choosing 
to be oneself is foregone. Like a statue moldering in the garden, however human its contours, its 
place is not within the dwelling of humanity, and as its perspective is non-threatening to those 
inside the house, it is not seen. One might wonder why they do not change their circumstances so 
that they can join everyone inside. A common refrain in Hawaiʻi is that they must not want to be 
housed. But, as Sartre writes, it is not easy for those in misery to turn their lives around, not 
because he “is accustomed to it,” but “because he apprehends it in its plenitude of being and 
because he cannot even imagine that he can exist in it otherwise.”  Unless a person can 49
concretely imagine ways in which things could be different, Sartre affirms that they will not 
act.  Speaking of the dispossessed factory worker, “to suffer and to be are one and the same for 50
him. His suffering is the pure affective tenor of his non-positional consciousness, but he does not 
contemplate it.”  This is in keeping with Simone Weil’s understanding, drawing from her 51
experience working in a factory, that the workers are “no longer able to pursue any good but that 
 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 561.49
 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 561.50
 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 562.51
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of existing.”  Only with reflective distance from the situation is change possible, and misery 52
leaves little space for openness and change.  
 Now I will turn to the implementation of Housing First in Hawaiʻi. This program aims to 
permanently house chronically unsheltered individuals. Its less tangible goal is to reintegrate 
these individuals, many of whom have not lived as a housed individual, with the concomitant 
desires for privacy and economic self-sufficiency, into the fabric of American society. The 
program must be adapted to fit Hawaiʻi’s unique needs, as I show. 
Housing First in Hawaiʻi 
 Housing First is a strategy and set of policy suggestions written by New York-based 
psychologist Sam Tsemberis that has been adopted in many major U.S. cities. It is novel and 
irreconcilable with the dominant approach to treating homelessness. It has necessitated not only a 
shift in how money is allocated for infrastructure and personnel but also an ideological shift in 
how taxpayers and policymakers conceive of homeless individuals. Traditional programs support 
a gradual transition from homeless to housed that incentivizes positive changes on behalf of the 
individual by gradually allowing more independence and freedom. This system is also called the 
linear continuum or staircase approach. It starts with “low demand and low service provision 
(such as in an emergency shelter, safe haven, or drop-in center) and ascend[s] through increasing 
demands and more services… The staircase’s top step is the attainment of one’s own housing and 
 Simone Weil, Late Philosophical Writings. ed. Eric O. Springsted, trans. Eric O. Springsted and 52
Lawrence E. Schmidt (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 132.
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a minimum of services required to maintain independent living.”  These programs are designed 53
to measure “housing readiness” in a strict, supervisory setting. Critics say that this system 
divides the homeless population into the “deserving” and “undeserving” according to their 
willingness to abide by shelter rules, which may include maintaining sobriety, agreeing to 
psychiatric treatment, giving up personal property, restricting contact with friends and family, 
and rehoming pets. The traditional model intended to provide a gradual transition from street to 
shelter, but it has been shown to be riddled with trap-doors and dead-ends. For many, the 
staircase of increasing expectations itself becomes a way of life as one complies (in order to 
maintain a life considered suitable by people who will likely never live it), gradually meets 
benchmarks, but then relapses or breaks the rules, goes back to living rough, and then eventually 
returns to the beginning of the process again. Housing First turns the division of deserving and 
undeserving on its head by focusing on housing those considered chronically service-averse with 
few strings attached. This model puts chronically homeless individuals directly into permanent 
housing while promoting harm-reduction instead of requiring treatment. 
 A common refrain from communities, primarily the housed, is that these individuals are 
being rewarded for being noncompliant and unwilling to work. This is how ideologically deep 
the deserving/undeserving distinction has been hammered in by years of neoliberal pandering as 
well as the semantic shift from “benefits” to “entitlements.” President Nixon’s fictional and 
entitled “welfare queen” and President Clinton’s promise to put all of the poor to work 
normalized the image of the poor as lazy and undeserving. This attitude has more or less carried 
 Deborah K. Padgett, Benjamin F. Henwood, and Sam Tsemberis, Housing First: Ending Homelessness, 53
Transforming Systems, and Changing Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.
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through the intervening years among the general population, even as the theory and practice of 
Housing First were taking hold among homeless advocates and upper administration, including 
Paul Mangano of the G.W. Bush administration, the appointed head of the U.S. Interagency 
Council on Homelessness.  But realistically, individuals who are typically deemed 54
“undeserving” by the transitional system receive more public benefits in the form of emergency 
and public safety expenditures than their “deserving” counterparts get in public assistance.  55
They are transported in police cars and ambulances to emergency rooms and jails when they are 
intoxicated, suffering withdrawal, in need of psychiatric intervention, fighting, bleeding, bruised, 
confused, and a number of other things forbidden on the public lawns and sidewalks where they 
live their lives. The cost of these services is more than the cost of renting an apartment, 
potentially even in the sky-high housing market of Hawaiʻi, and the housed citizenry will see tax 
dollars dedicated to these individuals either way. Referencing a study released by the University 
of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, The Honolulu Star Advertiser reported that of those placed into permanent 
housing, the vast majority remain housed, visited emergency rooms much less frequently, got 
arrested much less frequently, and 96% of those who participated in the study reported that they 
were involved in community groups.  I take this to indicate a willingness to be a part of the 56
 Though one might argue that this progressive agenda was tarnished by extreme tax cuts for the wealthy 54
and deep cuts to programs that help the poor, such as Section 8 housing assistance. 
 One particularly convincing source for this statement in my opinion, although many studies have 55
shown this trend, is Paul Guerin and Anne Minssen’s “City of Albuquerque Heading Home Initiative Cost 
Study Report Final,” May 2016, Accessible at http://www.cabq.gov/family/documents/
cabq_ahhcoststudy_finalreport_v3_wappendices_06272016.pdf




larger society, which is nurtured by being housed. These statistics show the dual benefits of the 
Housing First approach to homelessness: improving the lives of unsheltered individuals so that 
they can make choices that are beneficial and future-oriented, and saving city and county, state, 
and federal dollars that would be spent on public assistance, such as emergency medical care. In 
a similar fashion, a recently proposed bill in the Hawaiʻi state legislature illustrates the overlap 
between poor health outcomes and being unsheltered. Citing an instance in Honolulu, Hawaiʻi of 
one unsheltered patient who accrued over $5,000,000 in medical costs per year and had no 
resources to pay. Senate Bill 7, introduced to the Hawaiʻi State Legislature in 2017, suggested 
that Medicaid funding could be used to cover housing costs. The bill states,  
By recognizing the importance of housing stability within the practice of health 
care for homeless individuals, and exploring creative and innovative solutions to 
address homeless individuals' health care needs through housing stability from 
traditional and non-traditional resources, the State may be able to recover the 
costs that homeless individuals incur over their lifetime.  57
Allowing state and federal subsidized healthcare money to be allocated toward housing takes a 
step toward understanding the specific circumstances of unsheltered life. Living outdoors creates 
more potential for infected wounds and dangerous encounters, in addition to the deteriorating 
effects of sleep deprivation and stress on overall health. The personhood of this problem must be 
addressed. 
 Senate Bill 7, Senate Draft 2. 29th Legislature, 2017. The State of Hawaii. Accessed 9/4/2017, http://57
www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2017/bills/SB7_SD2_.pdf. The bill was deferred at the close of the 2017 
legislative session.
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Dwelling in Philosophy: The Capabilities Approach 
 Recognition of the connection between housing, healthcare, and optimum public 
spending for those who lack both requires a shift in how the unsheltered are factored into the 
social equation. Public spending cannot be seen as a zero-sum game, where money spent on 
those who do not contribute labor or resources to the market is chalked up as a loss. Martha 
Nussbaum challenges the focus on the centrality of economic concerns in public and political 
decisions. She and many others note that living in a wealthy country does not necessarily equate 
to a high quality of life. Gross Domestic Product, though often taken as a benchmark of human 
flourishing when comparing nations, does little to account for imbalances and disparities of 
distribution. She suggests a new measure for discussing quality of life that is based on Amartya 
Sen’s proposal: the Capabilities Approach.  The prevalence and accessibility of liquid assets in a 58
nation do not account for each individual’s ability to access and utilize them. It matters more 
what people are able to do to help themselves and others. In order to choose what to do and how 
to act, every person must be assured opportunities to be able to make decisions freely. The 
circumstances of one’s life must match up to the abilities one has to succeed in order for a 
desired effect to come about. Capabilities “are not just abilities residing inside a person but also 
the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, 
 While Martha Nussbaum contributes a nuanced consideration of what humans require to thrive, there is 58
one element that is out of line with a larger point I intend to make. The components on her list are meant 
to apply only to individuals, rather than families (p. 35). This is a stipulation that does not jibe with the 
centeredness of community in both the Chinese and Hawaiian conceptions of self I will reference in what 
follows. But I feel it is important to bring up an approach to measure flourishing that is opposed to the use 
of economic factors like GDP for characterizing prosperity. I use it to make a point about contemporary 
conceptions of poverty, generally.
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social, and economic environment.”  Nussbaum’s list of ten essential capabilities includes three 59
that especially apply to the discussion and necessity of housing solutions for the unsheltered: 
bodily health, or “Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”;  control over one’s environment, including 60
“Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an 
equal basis with others..”;  and affiliation, including “Having the social basis of self-respect and 61
nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of 
others.”  These, along with the other seven capabilities: life; bodily integrity; senses, 62
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; other species; and, play, are all distinct but 
connected. Nussbaum writes: 
The irreducible heterogeneity of the Central Capabilities is extremely important. 
A nation cannot satisfy the need for one capability by giving people a large 
amount of another, or even by giving them some money. All are distinctive, and 
all need to be secured and protected in distinctive ways.  63
This approach assumes that national governments should promote forms of justice and systems 
of laws that guarantee the happiness, dignity, and security of their citizens. It also recognizes the 
particularity of individual circumstances and how these circumstances may contribute to a lack 
of personal freedom, as well as the role of historical disparity in navigating the contemporary 
 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Harvard 59
University Press, 2011), 20.
 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 3460
 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 3461
 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 3462
 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 35.63
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landscape of available opportunities and hidden obstacles. In the context of this discussion about 
access to housing and the effects of being unhoused on health and well-being, the Capabilities 
Approach shows the true depth of the divide between housed and unhoused. The number of 
capabilities that the unsheltered do not have, which according to Nussbaum are required to be 
able to fully function as a human being in today’s societies, should make housing the homeless 
imperative. Characterizing homelessness as a health issue is unproblematic here. Thinking to the 
contrary is to refuse to accept the gross reality of unsheltered life for the individuals experiencing 
it as well as the history of unsheltered states of existence.  
 The ultimately exploitative relationship between the sheltered and unsheltered, variously 
knotted by factors contingent upon context as well as the unalike circumstances that shape each 
type of life, renders the possibility of their spontaneous coalescence slim. Plausibly, 
homelessness is a product of the United States’ capitalistic enterprise in its once insatiable need 
for unanchored, seasonal labor for harvests and large infrastructure projects, as well as the 
indignities perpetrated against indigenous populations in the name of various destinies. But now, 
the social and political factors surrounding unsheltered populations have eliminated their place in 
a civilized world. Money alone cannot bridge these worlds of the sheltered and unsheltered.   
 There are two ways to approach the integration of the unsheltered and the sheltered: 1) 
Focus on the factors, economic, political, societal, etc., that precipitate unsheltered states of 
existence and comprise the circumstances that limit the availability of choices to facilitate 
change. 2) Focus on the individual experiencing the factors above in an existential way, or as this 
reality is lived. Of course, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but nor can one be 
subsumed under the other. It is likely that 2) is consistently the handmaiden of 1) in terms of 
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policy in the United States, though this should come as no surprise in a capitalist, liberal, secular 
society. 
 Attempting to understand the ways in which unsheltered and sheltered existences are 
different realities, that one structures the other, and that freedom and choice do not have the same 
buying power in each, is formative for the public perception of unsheltered life. Hopefully, this 
will prevent the blaming of unsheltered individuals for their poor circumstances. The alternative 
is to view the unsheltered as a homogenous group rather than individuals experiencing certain 
issues in common. The urge to simplify a problem is tied to the hope for a simple solution, and in 
practice, this motivation has blurred the identities and needs of unsheltered populations. For 
example, focusing on the issue of affordable housing as a solution for homelessness assumes that 
sheltered reality, simply by creating space, can accommodate the unsheltered, but without regard 
for how their experience of being sheltered is different. For those who live in public spaces, 
private realms come with rules, curfews, isolation, reprisals, dismissals, expectations, and 
disappointments. This is not how the sheltered view private space. So although approaches that 
consider the perpetuating circumstances of unsheltered existence are well-meaning and allow for 
moderate complexity, they conjure a hypothetical individual who would behave just as a 
sheltered individual would if presented with the same set of privileges and choices. 
Transgressing against the expectations that come with privilege and choice invigorates 
distinctions among deserving and undeserving and also motivates the faulty conclusion that these 
individuals do not want help or are not capable of being included in civilized society. 
 This is where Housing First programs introduce a paradigm shift in how unsheltered 
individuals can become sheltered without incurring the social debt of accepting handouts that 
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come with what, for many, are unmeetable and unpredictable expectations. It also promotes the 
same values as the Capabilities Approach. Housing First advises that we begin by giving the 
unsheltered a place to live, for free and with no limit on their stay. There is something salient in 
the prediction if you give someone a place to live, they can learn to get by in our predominantly 
sheltered society. This learning, though, is more successful if facilitated by care professionals, 
especially social workers, who are trained experts in outreach and support of unsheltered 
individuals. And in fact, supportive services are an integral part of the success of the Housing 
First approach. 
 Housing First focuses on the existential reality of unsheltered existence in a way that 
avoids dealing blame and shame, and it is also personal. In many cities, including Hawaiʻi, 
where Housing First has been adopted, the social worker is the liaison between client and 
landlord, employer, treatment provider, etc., and this personal connection is often the basis of 
many subsequent connections. Isolation is a notable contributor to being and becoming 
unsheltered. Isolation of one individual from the family, whether by choice in order to avoid 
domestic abuse, or by force in response to changing one’s gender identity, for example, can limit 
one’s ability to become integrated into society as it is defined and delimited by sheltered 
existence. Further, isolation of family from clan or native society, as seen in the influx of people 
from Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of 
Palau to Hawaiʻi who do not have the economic resources or cultural similitude to create 
stability, undermines relationships within the family and prevents the formation of new 
relationships. Undoubtedly, the stress and lack of trust that often accompany unsheltered states of 
existence contribute to the inability to form healthy and lasting relationships with estranged 
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family, as well as old and new friends and partners. Fortifying and constituting relationships, 
which make you who you are, cannot be taken for granted, and in order to become and stay 
sheltered, individuals must cultivate such relationships.  
 It may seem strange to praise Housing First, which in its original formulation focuses on 
housing individuals in one-bedroom apartments, as a way to discourage isolation. Loneliness is 
an issue among people living alone regardless of housing history. I argue that the ability to form 
types of connections that are healthy and beneficial in a primarily housed society requires that 
one have a home. Using these connections, residents form profitable human and economic 
networks. From the comfort of a stable dwelling, one realizes one’s potential. The next section is 
dedicated to a discussion of these formative relationships. 
Dwelling in Philosophy: Confucian Role Ethics  
 There are a number of philosophical contexts in which it is appropriate to begin the 
search for inclusion and communication, and indeed the search for morals and ethics generally, 
from the unit of a relationship rather than a solitary individual. Giving up or never beginning the 
conquest of the own most, innermost, replicable and rational, autonomous self, these 
philosophies root themselves in the ability to be someone, a good upstanding someone, to, with, 
and around others.  
 Confucian Role Ethics brings into conversation American pragmatism and pre-Qin Ruist 
Chinese philosophy. I see this project of Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont as post-comparative, 
meaning that not only are two traditions compared, but also they are put into conversation to 
speak to the pressing issues of life. I think that this kind of project is appropriate because the 
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ideas and perspectives found in the ancient texts must be reimagined and reoriented in order to 
speak to modern predicaments. It would be disingenuous, I think, to take the recorded words of 
Confucius, for example, and rehearse them in the direction of policy-makers in Hawaiʻi right 
now, and also, it would be handily disregarded. This would be the result, no doubt, of many 
presumptions about race, politics, economics, and so on, but philosophically, and most 
interestingly, the reason is that Chinese philosophy is oriented toward the past, the wonders of 
Yao and Shun, and underscores its claims with historical references. We, let us say Anglophones, 
tend to be future-oriented, moving toward better technology, higher-paying and more plentiful 
jobs, and increasingly inclusive types of societies. Confucian Role Ethics (CRE) adds a 
dialogical dimension not explicit in the ancient texts, that is, how concern for incremental and 
expansive bettering of oneself, that is, imagining oneself becoming consummate in the future, 
can align with being as good as the sages of the past. CRE does this without recourse to 
teleology, and without saying that the ideal future will be like the past. It emphasizes the 
peculiarly contextualized state of person, lives and experiences are never repeated. This allows 
for the emphasis on creativity and imaginative incorporation of cultural roles into one’s 
individual striving as the driving force of human becoming, which is the open-ended formulation 
of ‘human being’.  These roles require at least two actors—one cannot be a friend to no one—64
and the relationships among persons are constitutive, that is, they make a person who they are. 
They are external relationships that become internal as they develop. Focusing on ‘being a good 
friend to someone’ forefronts the relationship between two individuals as being more primary 
 This phrasing is developed in Roger Ames and David Hall, Confucian Role Ethics.64
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than the individuals themselves. Networks of constituting relationships lend expansiveness to 
individual human projects and, ideally, responsibility for maintaining these relationships.  
The Confucian relationships, enumerated in the Mencius, are ruler to ruled, father to son, 
husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, and friend to friend. These are the primary 
relationships on which other relationships can be modeled. It is immediately obvious to me that 
this needs a little remediation. What about daughters, mothers, citizens, and colleagues? 
Confucian Role Ethics abstracts from these primary relationships to make the point that the 
fecundity of relationships given rise by the primary ones, as well as the possibility of forming 
new and meaningful connections, is the culmination of the relationally-constituted person. The 
ability to cultivate relationships is imaginative, as there is no template for relationships that 
develop in particular circumstances over time. Imagination and empathy go hand in hand with 
this relationally driven, expansive morality. Ames writes: 
The Confucian project begins from a recognition of the wholeness of experience 
and the constitutive nature of relationality that is entailed by it. Moreover, because 
each person and event is constituted by an interdependent web of relations, what 
affects one thing affects all things in some degree or other. Meaningful relations 
within this family make the entire cosmos more meaningful; barren relations 
detract from it.  65
 Roger Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011), 65
71.
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Confucian role ethics contributes two themes to this discussion. First, it illustrates the necessity 
of forming relationships for activating individual potential. Underscoring the first theme, it also 
implicates everyone doing their part to guide this coalescence of value and care.  
 Returning to the myriad causes and catalysts of unsheltered existence with an awareness 
of relational, role-centered ethics brings an acute issue to the fore. The lack of constituting 
relationships, the lack of a supportive network in which one plays an integral part, and the dis-
integration of a person from society seem to preclude the ability to achieve anything remotely 
consummatory. Is it possible to speak about role ethics in this context? Role ethics assumes that 
radical inclusivity is possible, and in fact what it is to be human. Is there in it a danger of labeling 
those who are not integrated as self-undermining, and would that be acceptable in this context? 
Perhaps most importantly, is it possible on this model to build sustaining relationships if none of 
the primary bonds are intact, or if they are dysfunctional and corrosive? Assuming that the 
possibility of recuperation among family members is unlikely, there seems to be little recourse in 
the concentric view of relationships inspired by pre-Qin Chinese philosophy. The assertion that 
relationships are integral to human flourishing is relevant if we hope to make our society and 
culture more inclusive. There must be a way to create formative and sustaining relationships 
outside of the family and potentially outside of the clan. Skipping over these two intimate levels 
of relationship education and development does not fit the ideal model in Ruist thought, but it is 
accommodated by the flexible and imagination-centered account in CRE, though certainly it is 
not the majority or preferred scenario. I would like to consider one relationship, in particular, the 
one between client and social worker, as one that might fit the model of a primary relationship. 
In this relationship, the social worker may be at times maternal, at other times paternal. They 
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may be encouraging like an older brother or empathetic like a friend. These relationships are 
often formed and dissolved on the basis of state or federal mandated requirements. But that does 
not disqualify them from being true relationships and, as I will argue, ones on which unsheltered 
individuals who have found themselves with few relationships may take as a model for other 
relationships that they form as they integrate into supportive communities. 
 Both the traditional step model and Housing First models for permanently sheltering the 
unsheltered depend on a robust social care network. Social workers provide valuable advice for 
navigating the bureaucracy, and when many unsheltered individuals have no form of 
identification, this can be incredibly daunting and demotivating. They also empathically promote 
self-control, self-awareness, and coping skills among their clients. These strategies for dealing 
with everyday life are not in the purview of psychiatric care, at least not for unsheltered clients, 
and so the social worker must be keenly aware of the history and context of each client’s life as 
well as the triggers that may cause them to manifest destructive behaviors. Social workers not 
only hear about and see the wretchedness that may afflict human beings, but they also see them 
make choices to return to and reenact scenarios that contribute to their destitution. Compounding 
the empathic response to the trauma their clients have experienced, which may result in trauma 
on behalf of the social worker, is the disappointment the care worker feels when a client relapses, 
lashes out, or disappears, ostensibly to return to an unsheltered and familiar life. The social 
workers, by virtue of their relationships with clients, hope to alter their behavior, to recuperate 
their ability to maintain relationships intimately and among strangers.  
 In order for individuals to move from shelters and streets into spaces where they feel 
secure and have real choices to continue to improve their lives, caring and communicative 
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relational networks must form. Clearly, there is no appropriate role, in the role ethics context, for 
the client and recipient of such care because there is little risk of losing the relationship, little 
chance of it developing into a self-sustaining friendship, and little responsibility on behalf of the 
client to achieve the expectations of the social worker. The client’s potential for self-
improvement is significantly affected by their relationship with the social worker. I suggest that 
the relationships between social workers and clients can be thought of as an imaginative exercise 
of relating in a meaningful and constituting way. But this shared situation is often one-sided, and 
while social workers find satisfaction in their contribution to the well-being and representation of 
clients as they put their lives together make ways toward successful futures, the power 
differential of this professional relationship, coupled with the emphasis on client self-
determination and freedom—even to cycle back into destructive behaviors—may detract from 
the social worker’s ability to tend to their own self-fulfillment and renewal.  
 This particular type of relationship is motivated by concerns for social justice and 
equitable living standards on one side and self-improvement and reintegration on the other. The 
conditions of the relationship may resemble those shared between friends, siblings, or parents. 
Even though the relationship is constrained by its institutional context, there is a propensity for it 
to become emotionally disruptive for the social worker. In the psychological literature, this is 
called compassion fatigue, and it was developed in 1995 by Charles Figley. It is defined as the 
“the formal caregiver’s reduced capacity or interest in being empathetic or ‘bearing the suffering 
of clients’ and is ‘the natural consequent behaviors and emotions resulting from knowing about a 
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traumatizing event experienced or suffered by a person.”  Prolonged exposure to these 66
conditions may result in “emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and reduced personal 
accomplishment.” This condition, which is focused on the second-order trauma experienced by 
care workers in empathic response to another person’s lived trauma, is definitionally similar to 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Because the relationship between social worker and client can 
have deleterious effects on the social worker, the psychological literature suggests that they take 
care to maintain a robust social and caring network around themselves. The support network 
needs a support network, and this concentricity is a fecund comparative space for Confucian role 
ethics. 
 This might seem tedious, seeing whether this peculiar type of interaction counts as a 
constituting relationship in the Confucian role ethics sense. But it is a necessary line of inquiry 
given the importance of public employees and civil servants in determining the meting of 
collective resources. The reason why I have focused in on the relationship between client and 
social worker is that it spans the landscape of difference between sheltered and unsheltered 
populations. This is the boundary of inclusivity as well as imaginative relational potential. The 
sheltered cannot put themselves in the place of the unsheltered and see their world, because it 
does not shape their daily lives. What may be possible, and what I hope to do, is to illustrate that 
the world of the sheltered can be made more inclusive by extending the webbing of social 
networks of supportive and sustaining relationships to include more people. Social workers are 
integral to facilitating this connectivity.  
 C. R. Figley, “Compassion fatigue as secondary traumatic stress disorder: An overview,” Compassion 66
fatigue: Coping with secondary traumatic stress disorder in those who treat the traumatized, ed. C. R. 
Figley (New York: Routledge, 1995), 7.
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  I suggest that there are two ways to go about addressing the problem of homelessness, 
and both are necessary. The first is to address the structural inequalities that have resulted in 
extreme poverty and homelessness that have little to do with individual choices. According to 
Ames and Rosemont, it is the championing of individual, autonomous selves over relational and 
communal aspects of society that have fueled contemporary inequalities.  Within the 67
individualist paradigm, the poor are blamed for their suffering. They are blamed because of the 
poor decisions they make rather than the poor choices they are offered. This view of society as a 
composition of discrete individuals justifies the abnegation of its responsibility to those 
experiencing hardship, often by appealing to character traits associated with failure. And with 
little in place in terms of extended systems of community-centered care and continued and robust 
investment in the so-called free market ideals, the road to change seems long. As long as things 
remain the way that they are, the realities of those that experience the comfort and security of 
shelter and a quality of life well above being at risk of hunger, preventable disease, and 
exhaustion, and those that do not have these things are not shared. Those who live in poverty in 
America in this time of unparalleled wealth and prosperity cannot make the decision to no longer 
live in this world. Those choices are few and almost always require sacrifices, preeminently the 
desertion of one’s homeless community.  
 There is little that can be done on behalf of social workers and care providers that can 
change the circumstances that precipitate the dire and limiting circumstances of the unsheltered. 
The difference between these realities is not manipulable by good intentions. And the assertion 
 Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., Confucian Role Ethics: A Moral Vision for the 21st Century? 67
(Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2011), 10-12.
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that the reality that structures the experience of poverty should not exist risks the further 
devaluing of those that experience it, which in the US are predominantly people of color and 
indigenous populations. The answer is not absorbing one world into the other, but a gradual and 
consistent depopulation of one by integrating or reintegrating the individuals who exist in a 
landscape barren of opportunity. Forming the types of relationships described in Confucian role 
ethics as “vital” and “consummate” does not erase or paint over the identity of either party. The 
imaginative ability to form expansive and comprehensive webs of relationships across fields of 
diversity is what makes us human. Bringing the character qiong 窮 back into my analysis, we can 
begin to see both sides of its meaning. Those that Housing First policies hope to help, the 
chronically homeless, are no doubt destitute, at a dead end, and have little recourse to achievable 
and desirable ways to getting their lives on track. They stand to benefit the most from such an 
intervention, and each study that comes about the effectiveness of this program in the cities 
where it has been implemented indicate that it is working.  
 In the next section, I shift to another aspect of homelessness in Hawaiʻi that may benefit 
from an appraisal from the perspective of Chinese philosophy. As before, I will introduce the 
topic and discuss the applications, comparisons, and justifications of bringing early Chinese 
thought into discussions about the contemporary issue of homelessness, as it arises from the real 
circumstances of life in Hawaiʻi.  
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The Compact of Free Association 
 In this section, I will discuss the third issue I have chosen to frame the discussion of 
homelessness in Hawaiʻi. As discussed previously, the composition of the unsheltered population 
in Hawaiʻi is indicative of a systemic, social imbalance that disfavors Native Hawaiians and 
Pacific Islanders. Native Hawaiians have been negatively affected by land reform, spiritual 
incongruity between conceptions of Hawaiian selves and those of American, Christian selves, 
and a lack of wealth that hinders the advancement of generations of Hawaiians. The 
commodification of Hawaiian culture also devalues Native Hawaiian experiential, ritual meaning 
and the residual, psychological effects of forced assimilation into U.S. political and social 
structures. It may be tempting to assume that peoples of other Pacific Islands have suffered a 
similar fate, and that the explanatory measures taken to contextualize the post-colonial struggles 
of Native Hawaiians may apply to them as well. But this reduction risks missing another set of 
crucial factors that have affected Pacific Islanders, especially those residing in the former United 
States Trust Territories that were acquired in the wake of the Second World War: the Republic of 
Palau (ROP), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
(RMI). These countries have an agreement with the United States outlined in the Compacts of 
Free Association (COFA). These Compacts, signed into law in 1986 for FSM and RMI and 1994 
for ROP, dictate what aid the U.S. is obliged to provide to these countries and what rights the 
residents of these islands hold. 
 The result of the COFA agreements has been an immense migration of Micronesians, as 
people from these islands are commonly referred (though they share only general Polynesian 
traits in common and cultivate their identities along lines of difference from other Islanders). 
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They leave their islands to pursue economic and educational opportunities, to seek healthcare, 
and out of necessity as many islands are experiencing the effects of human-caused climate 
change in the forms of rising sea levels, severe droughts, and powerful storms. Most, 
approximately 94%, travel to Hawaiʻi and Guam, according to the 2008 census.  As much as 68
30% of the population has emigrated, and about 15,000 people from the COFA nations have 
made a home in Hawaiʻi. And, as reported by the Honolulu Civil Beat independent newspaper, 
there is little in place for dealing with the economic burden of this burgeoning population.  69
Many travel to Honolulu, and this has put a moderate amount of strain on the social safety net 
and medical care providers in the state as they arrive with few economic resources or solid plans 
or expectations for achieving the success they hope for. The result of this migration has been a 
series of fraught attempts to obtain the social benefits associated with American ways of living, 
which have been denied to these individuals and families even though their lives have been 
shaped by American interests. 
A History of the United States’ Interests in the South Pacific 
 During the Pacific Theater of World War II, in the years following the attack on Pearl 
Harbor in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, the United States fought the Japanese forces for 
control of vast swaths of territory in the islands dotting the Pacific Ocean. After the Japanese 
 U.S. Census Bureau, “2008 Estimates of Compact of Free Association (COFA) migrants” (Washington 68
DC: United States Department of Commerce, 2009). Accessible at http://commerce.gov.mp/wp-content/
uploads/2010/08/COFA2008.pdf
 Chad Blair, “An Untold Story of American Immigration,” Honolulu Civil Beat. One of a seven-part 69
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surrender aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, several islands and 
island chains invaded and occupied by the Allied Forces were turned over to the United States as 
Trust Territories. While stewards of their Pacific Isles, from 1946 to 1958, the U.S. proceeded to 
test 67 nuclear weapons, which decimated several islands and displaced hundreds of people. 
During the testing on Bikini Atoll, comprised of 25 of the roughly 1,200 islands and islets 
referred to as the Marshall Islands, the poorly-placed detonation of Bravo, a 15 megaton nuclear 
bomb, over 1000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, blew several tons 
of radioactive coral ash into the air. Although the nearby islands were evacuated, a fallout cloud 
drifted to populated islands in Rongelap Atoll, about 125 miles away, and beyond, where it 
coated everything like snow. Under-informed, the island residents had prolonged contact with the 
irradiated debris. Many experienced immediate, severe burns, but the long-term effects, notably 
metastatic cancers and severe congenital disabilities, still plague Micronesian populations. Many 
of the details of the nuclear testing are still classified, though there is evidence to suggest that, 
regardless of the initial intent, medical knowledge of radiation exposure benefited from the 
prolonged contact facilitated by perceived bureaucratic lag.  70
 During the trusteeship period, the United States also had control of the Islands’ 
economies. The United States created bureaucratic and military centers throughout the islands, 
which quickly became the primary economic drivers. It surpassed the production of the coconut 
palm product, copra, as well as the selling of scrap metal from the destroyed war machines that 
were never removed after the Japanese surrender. The generosity and benevolence on behalf of 
 Jane Dibbin. Day of Two Suns: U.S. Nuclear Testing and the Pacific Islanders (New York: New 70
Amsterdam Books, 1990). 
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the United States “with that essentially American bouquet, a fistful of money,”  was bestowed 71
for the purpose of wooing the people of Micronesia to pursue a permanent relationship. For 
decades, the U.S. ladled money into their Pacific Island Trusts, to the tune of $600 a year per 
person, clearing away a sustainable lifestyle built around family ties and barter with a turbid river 
of American capital.  This river flowed, with little oversight and no direction, into the low-lying 72
pockets of the Islands. It created a new class and a new way of life for those lucky or well-
positioned enough to be the beneficiaries. The population of the Islands surged into the cities, 
abandoning millennia-old ways of living as well as the sick, aged, and young, in pursuit of fabled 
modernity. The results of this exodus and the loss of cultural ways of knowing on Pacific 
Islanders psyches and futures are inestimable.  
 The United States also undertook building schools in the cities to educate the populace, 
an American imperial motivation aligned with the Japanese who came before them. This 
education was sold as a ticket to prosperity, but the U.S. took no measures to provide a venue for 
economic advancement. The second class of graduating seniors found themselves on the outside 
of a constricted, inhospitable job market. Educated and unemployed, they kicked around in the 
cities, more joining them after each graduation, and many fell into alcoholism and depression. 
Their unreal expectations obliterated any desire to return to their traditional island lives. David 
Nivin, in his assessment of education in Micronesia, wrote:  
To put it starkly, expectations in Micronesia have risen so far beyond the 
possibility of satisfying them as to destroy hope, and hope destroyed is the root of 
 David Nevin, The American Touch in Micronesia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977), 71
23.
 Nevin, The American Touch, 25.72
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social misery. Thus grows the potential disaster which now faces America on 
these idyllic islands on the other side of the world, this angry, sullen, frightened 
paradise in the western Pacific.  73
 Even with prescient warnings and the disastrous consequences of American influence, the 
RMI and FSM voted to become a sovereign territory of the United States by signing the Compact 
of Free Association (COFA) in 1986. In return for continued and unhindered U.S. military 
residence, training, and weapons testing, the U.S. agreed to compensate the citizens for the 
damages resulting from the nuclear testing program and to provide grants for public 
infrastructure, education, healthcare, and environmental projects. The U.S. also extended 
conditional citizenship to the inhabitants of these islands that allowed for unfettered travel to and 
from these territories and the U.S. and access to healthcare and education. The agreement 
stipulated that although COFA residents would pay taxes, they would not have voting rights or 
political representation at the federal level. The Republic of Palau followed suit, signing a 
separate COFA agreement with the U.S. in 1994. 
 Whether the U.S. has been a good steward of these territories is a debated topic. In her 
testimony before the U.S. Senate regarding the effectiveness and accountability of U.S. COFA 
negotiations in 2001, Susan S. Westin of the U.S. General Accounting Office indicated that the 
millions of dollars distributed to the FSM and the RMI, which comprised the majority of their 
liquid economies, were not having the effect that was intended. The local governments expanded 
and government wages rose, hobbling capital, labor, and entrepreneurship in the private sector. 
“Moreover,” Westin wrote, “Compact-funded business ventures have generally failed due to poor 
 Nevin, The American Touch, 28.73
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planning, inadequate construction and maintenance, or misuse of funds.”  At the intersection of 74
low accountability and fraud at the local level, and disagreement and indifference among U.S. 
elected officials/custodians, millions of dollars fluttered into the tropical breeze. 
 The vacuum created by the influx of U.S. cash, the destabilization of local economies, 
and the deterioration of traditional lifestyles forced many of the islands’ residents to seek 
opportunities in the U.S., especially the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Hawaiʻi.  This migration necessitated that additional federal funds 75
be distributed to these places to stem state government funding shortfalls, especially in the health 
and education sectors.  Many of those who came from COFA nations did not have the skills or 76
experience to be hired for anything other than low-skill, low-wage, temporary employment, and 
as a result state and federal safety-net type social expenditures were stretched beyond funding 
expectations based on pre-COFA migration benchmarks. 
The Issue of Healthcare for COFA Migrants  
 Hawaiʻi has struggled with the necessity of providing healthcare to the residents of the 
COFA nations, especially those who were exposed to high levels of radiation as a result of U.S. 
 Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade, “Compact of Free Association: 74
Negotiations Should Address Aid Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants’ Impact on U.S. Areas,” 
Testimony Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: 
United States General Accountability Office, 2001), 3-4. Accessible at https://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02270t.pdf
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nuclear weapons testing. The deleterious effects of exposure to radiation are both immediate and, 
coded in mutated DNA, prolonged through generations. The result is an increased occurrence of 
metastatic cancers and congenital disabilities. Additionally, changes in the Islanders’ diets and 
lifestyles resulted in a drastic increase in type two diabetes to a rate higher than 400% of the 
national, U.S. average.  The confluence of several factors, namely the lack of adequate 77
healthcare options for these types of illnesses in the Compact nations, the lack of economic 
resources, language skills, and education to achieve sufficient employment in the U.S., and, most 
dauntingly, a rise in racist, anti-immigration sentiments in Hawaiʻi directed squarely at the COFA 
migrants created a quandary as to whether and which rights they are entitled to. COFA migrants 
are considered by many to be lazy and an unfair burden on society.   78
 It is no wonder that COFA migrants are overrepresented among Hawaiʻi’s homeless 
populations. The adjectives used to describe them are the same as those bandied at unsheltered 
populations in Hawaiʻi, the U.S., and many other liberal and capitalist nations. Their status as a 
colonized citizenry invokes the opposite of compassion, where many do not feel that the U.S. 
should support these individuals. This attitude was evinced in the disenrollment of thousands of 
COFA migrants from Med-QUEST, the state-level medical insurance provider for those who 
cannot afford private insurance in Hawaiʻi, in 2009. This move was fueled by a new Department 
of Human Services provision that stated that all recipients must show sufficient means of 
 Pearl Anna McElfish and Rachel S. Purvis, et al., “Interpretive policy analysis: Marshallese COFA 77
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supporting themselves in Hawaiʻi. In response, attorneys supporting the Micronesian community 
wrote: 
 Callously referring to them in public testimony as deportable commodities 
that should be grateful for their mere continued presence in Hawaii de-humanizes 
these individuals, diminishes public discourse on a complex subject and evinces a 
shocking lack of sensitivity on the part of DHS.  79
The migration from the U.S.-held Pacific islands to Hawaiʻi, as well as Guam and the 
Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, and the poverty of opportunity that met them there have 
many non-reducible components.  
 I argue that differing conceptions of whether Pacific Islanders are deserving of social 
benefits may be at the heart of the resistance of Hawaiʻi’s unconditional U.S. citizens to COFA 
migrants having the same rights and access to social belonging. These factors contribute, I think, 
to the conversation about the prevalence of homelessness among COFA migrants, and contribute 
to my broader efforts to understand homelessness in Hawaiʻi.  
 It seems that the citizens and governing bodies in Hawaiʻi are having a difficult time 
deciding who counts as deserving of social inclusion. The issues that contextualize the presence 
and reception of COFA migrants in Hawaiʻi can be reduced quite simply to racism. This should 
come as no surprise given the volume of the voices evincing distaste for their presence and the 
United States’ treatment of indigenous peoples, generally. The mistreatment of people of color 
has a long history that includes the implementation of the founding ideals and philosophies of the 
 Dina Shek and Seiji Yamada, “Health Care for Micronesians and Constitutional Rights,” Hawaii 79
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United States of America. A cornerstone of democratic identity is rational autonomy, which can 
be traced back through the pens of various men to Immanuel Kant. 
Dwelling in Philosophy: Immanuel Kant and the Framing of ‘Who Counts’ in Modern 
Democracies 
 This exposition is fundamental to understanding the basis of ‘who counts’ in Western 
societal and political arrangements, especially those historically rooted in the Enlightenment, as 
well as how we can reconcile these ideals with the incredible diversity of modern, urban 
communities. 
 The events surrounding the treatment of Micronesians by the U.S. over the course of the 
last seventy years are cause for concern that their fight for the barest cover of civil rights has not 
been sufficient to prevent poverty at home and homelessness abroad. As a result, many of them 
find themselves shuffled outside of the bounds of a prevailing, increasingly homogenized society 
ordered by justice and enriched by liberty. Without these rights, they are treated as something 
less than human, undeserving of basic necessities as well as the tools for intellectual and material 
flourishing. They are blamed for their own failures and, at worst, considered a threat to those 
safely inside the lines drawn around inclusive communities. They are troublesome pieces that do 
not fit into the social puzzle.  
 Those of us who see this as disastrous must ask ourselves how to assess and 
accommodate cultural diversity and find ways to diagnose and remove the racism that prevents 
us from improving the conditions of those most in need of social reform. The history of many of 
the world’s philosophies are not exactly the best places to look. The search for inclusive theories, 
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especially in Greco-Roman-Euro-North Afri-Canad-Austral-American—let’s just say Western—
traditions, uncovers many moldy old ideas about race, sex, and class, and, more sinisterly, the 
deep impact they had on so-called pure, universal, objective, and pragmatic ideas. The mycelia 
of racism and bigotry extend through millennia of philosophical explorations and explanations, 
and the excavation of this massive, interconnected fungus among us uproots many pivotal nodes 
of Western thought. We are working to appraise how deeply racial and sexist biases extend into 
our most coveted abstract ideas. Immanuel Kant is ubiquitously represented among the faculty of 
Philosophy departments in the U.S., Europe, and Australia, and the problems given rise by 
contemporary, critical interpretations of the high ideals of Reason and Rationality in nations with 
colonialist and imperialist histories and make him a fulsome target.  
 Describing the inherent shortcomings of people based on their race was Kant’s unique 
and major contribution to the area of “Physical Geography.” For Kant, the study of geography 
included the study of the characteristics of the people who inhabited a place. And he saw himself 
as studying them with the same detached and disinterested eye of a horticulturist. Physical 
characteristics, like skin color and inherent laziness, cataloged geographically, were studied from 
the perspective of moral character in his works in “anthropology,” geography’s “twin science.”  80
In these lectures, he was not subtle about the moral deficiencies of certain races, and even 
included a handy hierarchical chart in his “On the Different Races of Man.” In his Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant describes the prerequisite of reason in the presence of 
 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” Anthropology and the German 80
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“moral character” and implies that it is something that not all people have or something that is 
present in various degrees depending on race.  
As the highest maxim, uninhibited internal truthfulness toward oneself, as well as 
in the behavior toward everyone else, is the only proof of a person's 
consciousness of having character. And since having character is the minimum 
requirement that can be expected of a rational person, and at the same time also 
the maximum of his inner value (of human dignity), then being a man of principle 
(having a certain character) must be possible for the most ordinary human mind 
that can thereby be superior to the greatest talent, thanks to dignity.  81
In his description of moral character as a prerequisite for rational ideas, I get the sense that he 
does not think that everyone has such a character. Otherwise, why would Kant speak of a 
minimum requirement? Charitably, one might point toward other passages where Kant indicates 
that character is a matter of personal striving and discipline, but I counter that the message was 
delivered only to those he thought would be capable of such mastery. And he indicated in many 
of his works that he did not think that people of color could develop themselves enough to enjoy 
dignity. In his essay “‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze comments on 
one particularly disagreeable line from Kant’s Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime: 
Kant’s position on the importance of skin color not only as encoding but as proof 
of the codification of rational superiority or inferiority is evident in a comment he 
 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 81
University Press, 1996), 207.
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made on the subject of the reasoning capacity of a “black” person. When he 
evaluated a statement made by an African, Kant dismissed the statement with the 
comment: “this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what 
he said was stupid.” It cannot, therefore, be argued that skin color for Kant was 
merely a physical characteristic. It is, rather, evidence of an unchanging and 
unchangeable moral quality. ‘Race,’ then, in Kant’s view, is based upon an 
ahistorical principle of reason and moral law.  82
It may be said that Kant’s racism is reducible to a symptom of the times or merely a part of his 
troublesome empiricism. Contemporary Kant specialists typically stick to the Critiques.  I have 83
two responses to this tacit acceptance of Kant’s racism: 1) Kant taught his versions of geography 
and anthropology, which were gleaned through the testimonies of sailors and missionaries and 
any reading material, fictional and factual, as seen through the lens of colonial expansionism, 
that happened to come through the port of his beloved city, more often than any other course, 
including metaphysics and moral philosophy. It was probably not a hobby but central to his 
scholastic work. 2) Because of 1), we must take the idea seriously that even his pure philosophy 
conceals racist tendencies. Merely saying that it does not is not enough.    
 There is still the question of whether Kant’s “pure” philosophy harbors traces of his racist 
anthropology. How big of a disservice do we do to attempt to decolonize our world if we still 
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treat Kant’s ethics and metaphysics as unquestionably pure? First, there is legitimate evidence for 
the possibility of a person without a developed faculty of reason, (OFBS “The Negroes of Africa 
have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling.” p. 110). We must consider the 
implications of positing a person who only has the functioning faculties of understanding and 
imagination with which to make sense of the world. This would preclude the possibility of 
freedom. If we accept the possibility that Kant thought there were living humans who lacked a 
fully functional faculty of reason, then they would be essentially trapped in a world of mere 
empirical understanding. They would not have the ability to free themselves from the strict 
causality of nature. Their lives would be limited to the synthesis of ideas by the concepts of 
understanding (and maybe beauty, for what that’s worth). 
 It is in the implication of the absence of reason that we begin to see a darker side to all of 
this, so to speak. What happens if we do not keep intact the inclusive language, the implicit ‘we,' 
of Kant’s philosophy? If we then take his writings as a whole, we may find that reason is not 
necessarily a universal faculty, and in describing a “higher vocation”, he is referring to the 
socially-mediated moral character of a respectable European man. We occasionally find in the 
Critiques a reference to an uncultured person who is precluded from sweeping ideas of reason, 
for example in the Critique of Judgment: 
It is a fact that what is called sublime by us, having been prepared through 
culture, comes across as merely repellent to a person who is uncultured and 
lacking in the development of moral ideas. 
But the fact that a judgment about the sublime in nature requires culture still in no 
way implies that it was initially produced by culture and then introduced to 
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society by way of (say) mere convention. Rather, it has its foundation in human 
nature… namely, the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to 
moral feeling.  84
On my reading, Kant posited the possibility of a person with deformed reason or none at all in 
his works on geography and anthropology.  If we carry this into his theoretical work and 85
construct the possibility of a mind without reason, then we can imagine a person who cannot 
conceive of their own freedom, someone who is limited merely to the stepwise progression of 
experience given through time. Can they be trusted as subjects in the Kingdom of Ends?  
 There are many aspects of Kant’s work that are bearing the brunt of racist critiques. 
Notable, his “topical” works of geography and anthropology and his call for political 
republicanism and cosmopolitanism, where he implores all international hosts to be polite and 
for people never to permanently depart from the land they are from. Even if one attempts to 
distill Kant’s racism from his pure philosophy, there is still the problem of carrying through the 
implication of a person without Reason, who would not be able to realize their supreme vocation 
as rational men. To say this is not important, that Kant intended an implicit “we all” at least in 
the Critiques, is to assume that Kant was racist in some situations but not in others, and this is 
not likely. At worst, a person without reason would not be able to give themselves the moral law, 
and they must be made to do the work that they cannot choose. This is among the worst features 
of European Enlightenment thought that taint the attempted humanism of modern liberalism. It is 
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not inclusive, and it is a scaffolding on which to mount a supremacist edifice to exclude those 
peoples and cultures that do not hold Reason and Rationality as sacred. What ought we do to raze 
the racist monument of man’s supreme vocation? There are concerns we must address in order to 
understand the homelessness situation in Hawaiʻi, where clearly Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders 
are being excluded from social benefits and public concern. I will discuss the cultural differences 
that orient ways of social cooperation in later chapters. 
Conclusion 
 We must halt the simplification of society into an increasingly concentrated “Us,” 
because most of us are not those. But if, most unfortunately, rights are disintegrated and 
discrimination cements boundaries among the deserving and the undeserving, we will turn to 
find that the world on the other side is already populated. When one’s existence is deemed 
troublesome and unnecessary, the world becomes a fundamentally different and inhospitable 
place. One quickly realizes that being seen as human is necessary for protection against hunger 
and violence. Those without homes or shelter who are living in Hawaiʻi, especially underserved 
Native Hawaiians and COFA migrants, already struggle to be recognized as humanity. In this 
chapter, I have given attention to three of what I feel are the largest factors in assessing and 
remedying homelessness in Hawaiʻi and three corresponding excursuses to orient this issue in a 
philosophical context. 
 As philosophers, what is our responsibility to those experiencing houselessness and 
hardship? How has our work failed them? We have failed them because our contemporary 
Western conceptions of ethics are consistently narrowly defined. They either aim for the mean, a 
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remnant of their Greco-European heritage, or celebrate the personal strength to vanquish 
obstacles and create a good life for oneself on an open vista of possibility, or a mixture of both. 
In the first instance, ethical concerns focus on prevalent social identities and the accompanying 
privileges of these groups. Notwithstanding the obvious classicism of Aristotle’s ideal polis, even 
Kant’s universal reason is not a natural inhabitant of all minds. Rather, it is invited by those with 
‘moral character.’ These philosophies create a boundary between those who have the faculties 
necessary to earn rights and those who do not. These abstract ideals operate at the center of 
policies such as the sit-lie ban, which targets a behavior relatively unique to homeless 
populations: occupying a certain piece of public property for extended, uninterrupted periods of 
time. In a society shaped as it is by the intersection of the Capitalist and Protestant ideals of hard 
work and earned prosperity, this behavior is seen as unreasonable and unrespectable. I reference 
Max Weber critical analysis of religio-cultural rhetoric, “To want to be poor, it was often argued, 
was the same as wanting to be ill; it was to be condemned as seeking justification by works, 
detrimental to the glory of God. Most of all, begging by one who is capable of work is not only 
sinful sloth, but is also, as the apostle said, contrary to charity.”  86
 Although what might be called pragmatist or individualist ethics, on the other hand, do 
not depend on universal, rational precursors, they may exclude those who desire a good life but 
cannot attain it. These philosophies ascribe nimbleness to an open mind that allows one to avoid 
and subvert obstacles. But they do not lend much force to external circumstances that might limit 
one’s ability to pursue what is in their best interest. On my view, this is deeply and 
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problematically ingrained, especially in American imaginaries. It is encapsulated in the biased 
double-conditional ‘If one finds oneself in hardship it is temporary as long as one works hard and 
utilizes what is at hand most cleverly and prosperously, but if others are in hardship it is because 
they are not working hard enough or that they are holding themselves back with their own 
choices.’ This sentiment charges the debate surrounding the funding and implementation of 
Housing First initiatives in Hawaiʻi. Can those who have failed to successfully navigate their 
own frontiers be trusted with such a weighty show of societal goodwill?  
 My experimental reading in the final section of this chapter considers those lacking a 
developed faculty of reason, whose existence is confirmed in Kant’s works on race, who would 
never be able to unify their experience of the world in a way that confirms the supreme vocation 
of the moral. They would never experience the sublimity of their own power over the causality of 
nature, so their experience of the world would be one of quantity and the series of causes 
extending backward into the past. Their future would not promise the opportunity for self-
betterment, simply more synthesis that pulls the present from the past. 
 Those on the margins, the poor and the disenfranchised, probably experience a life more 
like a slave of the Kingdom of Ends than a subject. At worst, the circumstances of their lives 
limit their choices to survival and labor. They are not counted among those who may exercise 
their causally-creative freedom. They are trapped in the infinite never completed, shuffled 
forward by a necessity they have no control over into a future that is as dangerous as it is empty. 
#63
Looking Forward 
 In the following chapters, I will continue to focus on elements of the human experience 
that bring limitation and obstruction with the intent of applying philosophical products to the 
contemporary issue of homelessness, especially as it occurs in Hawaiʻi. My aim for this 
dissertation is to embark on a methodology for applied philosophy that makes use of diverse 
philosophical contributions. Pre-Qin and Han Dynasty Chinese Confucianism is a rich 
philosophical tradition from which to approach the topic of human limitation. It has a firmly 
social basis for understanding and describing the world as well as an intensely felt motivation to 
channel the best intentions, best actions, and best outcomes into the uninterrupted stream of an 
ideally lived life. Chapter two lays out this context and uses it to build a distinction between 
economic and existential poverty. The former is a temporary hardship that ought not to deter 
one’s behavior or the consistent activity of self-improvement, but the latter is a lingering danger 
invited by the first, which threatens to undermine one’s ability to navigate successful pathways 
into the future. Using these resources, I will return to the issue of Housing First strategies in 
Hawaiʻi in an attempt to steer the conversation away from the prevailing, inhospitable mindset 
spurred by what Max Weber terms the ‘calling’ of post-Reformation modern Protestants to the 
‘spirit of Capitalism’ which ties together piety and economic success into a neat bow of 
revelatory prosperity. This is tidily summed up with “God helps those that help themselves.”  87
and the idea that to mishandle the gift of prosperity is a mark on the intellect of a Christian 
person. This understanding of wealth, as well as rationality, has led to immense inequality as 
 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 79.87
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well as an explanation of poverty handily branded on the American brain: ‘You just aren’t 
working hard enough.’ This chapter seeks other ways to speak about and understand poverty. 
 Chapter three picks up on the theme that those who are homeless and living in poverty 
have the least control over their circumstances. I source Pre-Qin and Han Dynasty Chinese 
philosophy to characterize the lack of individual autonomy and power among the ‘common folk’ 
in terms of bad rulership and environmental devastation. In this context, those hardest hit by such 
unpropitious changes in fortune were the subsistence farmers comprising the agrarian clans of 
ancient China, but, I claim, their hardships can be mapped onto those whose cultures privilege 
subsistence and who ascribe spiritual significance to the land on which they reside. I bring in Fei 
Xiaotong’s anthropological research on China’s agrarianism and the Western mode of individual 
organization to shine a light on American modes of social association, and how they exclude 
other ways belonging and conceptions of selfhood. I end this chapter with a reflection on the 
status of Native Hawaiians in Hawaiʻi, and how the devaluing and destabilizing of their cultural 
traditions have contributed their overrepresentation among Hawaiʻi’s homeless populations. 
 Chapter four considers what it will take to shift the boundaries of human experience to 
include and nourish those experiencing homelessness. Here, I bring in the contronymic aspect of 
the Chinese character qiong窮 in texts where it means ‘to reach the limit of what is possible’ 
rather than ‘dead end’. I look to the Zhuangzi and the Xunzi to develop the theme of penetrating 
(qiong窮) awareness that allows a person to encounter changes in fortune without tripping over 
obstacles. I develop the term ‘transformative awareness’ to connect the concepts of boundless 
(wuqiong無窮) knowing and innovative interaction with one’s circumstances. By honing our 
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ability to incorporate diversity through broadened knowing, we become more able to tolerate 
difference as well as troubling times.  
 I connect the idea of transformative awareness to the philosophizing of Karl Jaspers. 
Here, the movement of Existenz, or the ability that each person has to communicate with what is 
radically other, motivates one to engage things that are difficult to understand. I characterize 
homelessness as a boundary situation on which our understanding founders and is unable to 
integrate it into the circumstances of our lives and hoped-for possibilities. We must deal 
authentically, openly, and continually with the reality of protracted human suffering because, 
according to Jaspers, the setting in of guilt opens us up to existential communication. Once we 
make ourselves available to communicate, we will cultivate the solidarity needed to seed 
compassion and culpability.  
 I end with a reflection on our ability to understand ourselves as a diverse, inclusive, and 
never-complete human community that is subjected to the pendulum of fraught and fortunate 
circumstances. Perhaps when we seek broad understanding rather than simple solutions to our 
largest social problems, then we can do the work of innovating harmonious futures. 
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Chapter Two. Existential Destitution and Cycles of Failure and Success 
 In this chapter, I will begin framing a new perspective, using resources from Pre-Qin and 
Han Dynasty Chinese philosophy, to consider the experience of poverty and destitution among 
people experiencing homelessness in Hawaiʻi. In this chapter, I will introduce and define the 
term ‘existential destitution,' which plays a pivotal role in my analysis of the damning effects of 
poverty that extend beyond a lack of money. Chinese philosophical traditions have much to say 
about the experience of poverty. They draw attention to the cosmic, cyclical forces that shape the 
human experience of failure and success that make hardship all but unavoidable. Many 
Confucian texts, as well as syncretist texts from the Han Dynasty that incorporated elements 
from Daoism and other schools, counsel that when the ways that things unfold offer few 
opportunities for success, one should continue to strive for self-optimization through self-
cultivation. Though this may do nothing to deter difficulty, I will show that it sets up a distinction 
between different types of poverty, so that one may find comfort in being economically but not 
existentially destitute. 
 Bringing the distinction between economic and existential poverty to bear on the problem 
of homelessness, I will discuss the Housing First and affordable housing initiatives in Hawaiʻi. 
Proponents of these measures claim that many people suffering from homelessness simply need 
homes and that once they have achieved the stability and safety of a residence, they can begin to 
put the rest of their lives together. Opponents of these initiatives do not believe that homeless 
individuals are being helped appropriately without the demonstrations of personal responsibility 
necessary for success on the transitional housing model, characterized by incremental movement 
from shelters to independent living. I make the argument that offering housing is an effective 
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way to address states of existential poverty that hamper one’s ability to lay and achieve plans for 
prosperous futures.  
Distinguishing Economic and Existential Poverty 
 In this section, I will lay the groundwork for what I term ‘existential destitution’ in 
Classical Chinese philosophical texts. My reading picks up on a theme that there is something 
more troubling than economic poverty at stake in the many stories about poverty in this tradition. 
To begin, I will relate a story from the Shiji history of the Kong family, about Confucius’s 
response to the news that a member of Duke Ai of Lu’s hunting party killed a lin. This animal, 
described as a shimmering, deerlike or goatlike unicorn, was an immensely auspicious, rare 
sight. The sighting is interpreted as a metaphor for a change in the times, heralding a world 
where Confucius’s advice would be heeded, and his intellect celebrated. The following was the 
exchange between Confucius and Zilu when he heard that a lin had been killed during a hunt in 
the West. 
「吾道窮矣！」喟然嘆曰：「莫知我夫！」子貢曰：「何為莫知子？」子曰：
「不怨天，不尤人，下學而上達，知我者其天乎！」   88
“My way is exhausted!” He sighed, then cried out, “No one understands me!” 
Zigong asked, “Why does no one understand you?” “I do not resent Heaven, and I 
 Shiji 史記, Compiled by Sima Qian 司⾺遷 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959). Translation based on 88
Mark Csikszentmihalyi, Readings in Han Chinese Thought (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2006).
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do not blame anyone. I study those around me and understand what is happening 
above me. Only Heaven truly knows me!”   89
The first sentence of this exchange is striking because of its existential and spiritual 
implications.  According to the Ruist canon, dao道 is a path that leads toward constitutive 90
fulfillment and optimized living, and it is likely the most important ethical and cosmological 
concept. And Confucius laments that his has been cut off! There is a deep rift between the way 
things are and the way that he would have them be. The destruction of a symbolic, auspicious 
animal compels him to say that there is nothing more that he can do. He has failed. Michael D.K. 
Ing points out the ironic quality of Confucius’ inability to bring into effect his vision. While 
 I have chosen to translate tian天 as Heaven, as it is most often translated into English, following the 89
early translations of ancient Chinese works by missionaries, most famously James Legge. The 
Anglophonic study of Chinese philosophy acknowledges the problematic nature of allowing Christian 
interpretations and metaphors to penetrate the understanding of Chinese texts, but by my estimation has 
not achieved the consensus necessary to formulate another translation. Another method has been to leave 
this nuanced character untranslated, writing the pinyin, tian, instead of attempting to fit English into the 
ill-fitting conceptual mold. But this may assume too much about the reader, and actually forfeits the 
subtlety the concept conveys.  
 In an essay included in his translation of the Xunzi, John Knoblock provides a brief history of the 
concept of tian天. “The ancient belief was that an anthropomorphic sky god, or Heaven, directed the 
affairs of the world and listened to the prayers of men. It was a directive moral force. Thus Heaven might 
“send down” illness, death destruction, floods, or droughts in response to what men, particularly rulers, 
might do.” Later, the concept became more metaphysical and abstract. It was considered an “impersonal 
Nature operating by knowable processes and principles that were certain and constant.” See John 
Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, v. I (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), 67-69.
 Analects 9.9 conveys a similar sentiment. ⼦曰：「鳳⿃不至，河不出圖，吾已矣夫！」The Ames 90
and Rosemont translation reads, “The auspicious phoenix does not appear; the Yellow River does no yield 
up to its magical chart. All is lost with me!”
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Confucius knows the deep significance of the appearance of the lin麟, he has no way to disclose 
it or share it with others. He has a visceral sense of what is meaningful but is unable to “render 
himself meaningful” in a way that connects the meaning of the omen to the contemporary state 
of affairs. “In his own words, no one recognizes him; only Tian天 understands him. He lacks the 
kind of deep companionship that allows for full self-disclosure.”  Failure is not only not getting 91
to the place one would like to get to, but it is also the feeling of being unable to convince others 
that one’s perceived failure is ill-gotten and misplaced. This isolation prevents others from 
valuing one’s desires and anxieties, which in other circumstances would motivate them to assist 
in bringing about a mutually better state of affairs. This is a foundational component of 
existential poverty. 
 I begin with this passage because it illustrates the pervasiveness of concern for failure and 
success that begins very early in the Chinese philosophical tradition. The main metaphor for 
success is traveling with ease and failure, obstruction. The connection to dao道 is clear, as it may 
be translated as path, way, and also follow, lead, as well as speak. These terms connote 
unhindered movement and clarity. The characters tong通 and da達 are usually translated as 
success, as well as ‘passing through’ and ‘arriving.’ Conversely, qiong窮 generally is the 
opposite, meaning ‘blocked,’ ‘at a dead end,’ ‘obstructed,’ or being unable to smoothly and 
efficiently move toward one’s goals. To stray from the path, on this metaphor, is not adventurous 
 Michael D.K. Ing, The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought (New York: Oxford 91
University Press, 2017), 99.
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or exciting, but a sure sign of ‘alienation and sorrow, diminishment and befuddlement.’  There 92
are many other examples that pivot around this metaphor of the unobstructed path. In Chinese 
medicine, the purpose of acupuncture and moxibustion is to open up communicative channels in 
the body, and the five senses are also called wulu五路, the five roads. The metaphors of 
movement and obstruction are pivotal for understanding the ancient Chinese existential milieu. 
Here, broadening one’s knowledge and broadening one’s impact on the world are tied together, 
so the ideas of movement and travel are essentially, and aesthetically, moral. For example, the 
character xing行 may mean simply ‘to travel’ or ‘to go,’ but in some instances, it indicates a 
preferable or appropriate course of action. The constant movement of the cosmos is inhospitable 
to what remains still. Stagnation, the unwillingness or inability to move through a swirling 
world, bespeaks ignorance and onerous inflexibility. Obstruction, in this existential metaphor, 
can be self or externally-imposed limitation of one’s path of moral discovery. At its worst, the 
dead end, the world discloses a stultifying stillness. 
 In pre-Qin philosophical texts and the philosophical traditions that followed, qiong窮 
indicated being stalled, stagnated, stranded, and prevented from smooth travel as a metaphor for 
failure and limitation. In modern Mandarin Chinese, qiong窮 is synonymous with poverty and 
the poor. My interpretation is that over time the existential import of this character declined and 
what was formerly the intersection of existential and economic poverty was impoverished of its 
psychological implications and favored a money-centered interpretation as China became more 
 Michael Nylan, “Highway Networks in China’s Classical Era (323 BCE - 316 CE): Regulations, 92
Metaphors, Rituals, and Deities,” Highways, Byways, and Road Systems in the Pre-Modern World. ed. 
Susan E. Alcock, John Bodel, and Richard J.A. Talbert (UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012).
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mercantilized and commodified. It is interesting that in this dissertation, as the spotlight is turned 
onto the myriad causes of poverty in hopes of finding lasting solutions for homelessness, the two 
types of poverty are found to be inextricably woven together, privileging the historic reading of 
the character qiong窮. Economic poverty cannot be purified of the effects it has on a person, or 
the conditions of a person’s psychological proclivity for self-undermining behaviors, voluntary 
and involuntary, on economic self-sufficiency. I think that, for these reasons, considerations 
about the predicament of homelessness will benefit from including the concept of qiong窮 in the 
discourse. 
 Concern for rhyme scheme, pun, and intertextual references complicate etymological 
studies that focus on just one word. Qiong窮 is a general word and part of a closely knit word 
family formed around the central metaphor of obstruction. Other words that mean limitation, 
limit, poverty, and exhaustion I take to be thematic for expressions of existential destitution in 
ancient Chinese texts. For example, the Shanmu chapter of the Zhuangzi includes this account of 
Zhuang Zhou that differentiates between being poor (pin貧) and being existentially destitute (bei







 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series. Supplement no. 20. (Cambridge: Harvard 93
University Press,1956), 53/20/45-50. Based on Guo Qing Fan’s Zhuangzi jishi, English translations in 
this chapter are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
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Zhuangzi, wearing patched and course clothes and shoes tied up with strings, 
passed by the King of Wei. The King said, “How have you come to this state of 
distress?” Zhuangzi replied, “I am poor, not in distress. When a member of the 
scholarly class possesses a suitable path and the power to walk it but is prevented 
from doing so, they are not in distress. My tattered clothes and busted shoes are 
signs of poverty, not being in distress. It is what they call meeting with 
unpropitious times. Has Your Majesty not seen swinging gibbons up in the trees? 
Among the cedars, catalpas, and camphor trees they grasp and swing from the 
branches, soaring between the trees. Even the great hunters Yi and Peng would 
not be able to even take aim at them. But when the gibbons encounter spiny 
mulberries, brambles, hawthorns, and citrons, they move warily, leaning 
awkwardly to one side, trembling, wincing and fearful. This has nothing to do 
with the muscles and bones. Their abilities are not depleted. Because it is 
dwelling in unsuitable conditions, the gibbon cannot express its abilities. Just the 
same, if a person is dwelling among a muddled upper class and confused and 
chaotic government ministers and hopes to avoid being in distress, how long do 
you think they can keep that up? Was not Bi Gan having his heart cut out a litmus 
test of this disorder?  
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 This selection is identified as a work of the “School of Zhuangzi.”  They glorify a Zhuangzi 94
living in poverty that may not be historically accurate, maybe conflating his disdain for forms of 
control that limit self-expression with avoidance of compensatory government posts. The 
glorification of poverty in the Chinese philosophical tradition will be the topic of a later section, 
but I wish next to cement the distinction between economic and existential poverty and to show 
that it is probable that where one is found, so too will the other. I relate this distinction to modern 
research on poverty and homelessness. Just like in this story from the Zhuangzi where the King 
comments on his dire state with a perhaps questionable authenticity, even jokingly, those who are 
unsheltered are treated as if their distress is beyond the scope of compassionate concern.  
Contemporary Perspectives on Existential Poverty 
 It seems that although we readily accept that there are basic human needs and we can 
discriminate when someone is not having theirs met, a common reaction is disdain. In the 
Zhuangzi, the King of Wei, who had the best that money and power could buy, saw Zhuang 
Zhou, disheveled and drawn, and his response was a casual ‘How did you get so low?’ The 
implication is that the King did not respond with concern, but with a mocking surprise. Was the 
King mocking him because he was wearing the clothing of a pauper (economic poverty) or 
because his current state was caused by his inability to further his own course in life (existential 
poverty)? In this section, I will explore the indications that people may feel justified to judge 
 A.C. Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 94
2001), 120. While it is unlikely that this story was written by Zhuang Zhou or any of his contemporaries, 
there was probably a network of disciples and disciples of disciples who carefully preserved writings 
originating within this intellectual community.
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someone as undeserving if they are somehow to blame for their poverty, because of their own 
poor choices. 
 According to Naomi Zack, there is a fundamental distinction that drives a judgmental 
psychological response to poverty: basic-need materialism versus value-materialism.  In 95
cultures that have monetized all goods, including those which satisfy the most basic human 
needs, water, food, and shelter, there is also a tendency for the consumer that has no problem 
purchasing these basic items to desire more valuable products, for example, electrolyte-enhanced 
bottled water instead of tap water. The former is desired precisely because it is a status symbol. 
Having these choices allows one to identify with a certain lifestyle, and some are even morally 
justified. Buying local, organic products is a moderately pricey alternative, a luxury that not 
everyone can afford, that may also have a positive impact on the environment. In this sense, not 
everyone can afford to live a moral life.  
 Zack goes on to say that value-materialism creates a dissonance with regard to the basic-
needs goods that results in the denial of their necessity. She writes, “Everyone needs the 
materials of water, food, and shelter but the focus on the non-material values of objects providing 
them (for the sake of status and prestige), can contribute to a delusion that one’s basic needs are 
psychological and social only and not at all physical.”  If one makes the decision to buy organic 96
or vegan, two alternatives that tend to be costly off the shelf and time-consuming to prepare, 
there will be a number of aisles at a commercial chain grocery store one will not venture down or 
 Naomi Zack, “Denial of Universal Human Material Needs and Aversion to the Homeless,” Delivered at 95
the “What is Materialism?” Conference at the University of Oklahoma in May, 2014. Accessible at 
https://cpb-us-east-1-juc1ugur1qwqqqo4.stackpathdns.com/blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/9/6716/files/2014/02/
Denial-of-Universal-Human-Material-Needs-and-Aversion-to-Homelessness-1wcmac7.pdf
 Zack, “Denial of Universal Human Material Needs,” 1.96
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even stores that one will avoid altogether. One may encourage the people close to them to 
accommodate their choices and consider making the same decision for themselves. Inexpensive 
and easily prepared—processed—food items, including those eligible for purchase with 
government assistance are associated with unreflective and unattractive lifestyle choices. Zack 
writes, “If one dismisses and contemns cheap food and lodging, it is a small extension of the 
attitude toward those things to look down on those who have to make do with them.”   97
 George Tsai brings this discussion a step forward with his discussion of conversational 
disgust. A person with the means to eat healthy fresh foods may eye the drive-thru line at 
McDonald’s with disgust, and turning to a like-minded friend, she might say, “Ugh, gross. That 
food is so bad for you! Have you heard about pink slime?” At root, the reason that a McDonald’s 
cheeseburger is considered disgusting is that it is cheap, and this refers to the ingredients and 
mass-processing as well. It is also an available product, with many locations and long operating 
hours, fast, high in protein, and filling. So for people living in poverty, it is an attractive option. 
They may have few options for choosing a healthier lifestyle. But, in conversation, the choice is 
moralized, and judgment is rendered not on an economic basis but on a psychological one. What 
Tsai shows is that conveying disgust of the poor as a conversational act can “oppress by enacting 
permissibility facts that make it appropriate for individuals to say and do oppressive things to 
poor people.”  He mentions “disgust contagion” as the result of socially acceptable forms of 98
derision against populations that are considered disgusting based on the things they buy. The 
lives they lead cannot possibly be desired, and perhaps without being fully aware of the 
 Zack, “Denial of Universal Human Material Needs,” 2.97
 George Tsai, “Expressives as Oppressive Speech: The Case of Conversational Disgust,” Delivered at 98
the Uehiro Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Hawaiʻi at Manoa in March 2016. 
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consequences, we affirm that they themselves are undesirable for living this way. Although we 
are aware that they have limited choices, what they buy is not valuable, and by virtue of the 
social domino effect of oppressive speech, they are not considered valuable. An interesting point 
of comparison is the way basic need items like nutritious food are treated in other places and 
cultures, for example, Taiwan. Here, ready to eat, fresh, inexpensive food is available in small 
stores and stalls along the narrow lanes off of the main streets. By contrast, McDonald’s costs 
about the same as in the U.S., making it far more expensive than the local handmade street food. 
Food from McDonald’s is purchased ironically as a display of American fetishism by those who 
can afford it. Although the dynamic is different than in America, it is not reversed. Street food in 
Taiwan does not come with stigma. It is celebrated as a cultural icon. This even in a place where 
the price of items that suit value-materialist tendencies is comparable to the U.S. if not more 
rampant. In the streets of urban Taipei, iPhones and Nike shoes are ostentatiously ubiquitous, and 
brand loyalty, much like sports team loyalty in the U.S., is a trait of character rather than a mere 
preference. This might be an instance where Zack’s fomenting distinction between basic needs-
materialism and value-materialism does not reduce all the way down to disdain and disgust. 
Where cheap, fresh foods are available, and widely considered delicious, the choice of the poor 
is not necessarily less socially valuable than the choice of those better off. Though it must be said 
that as the intersection of eating, environmentalism, pop-health movements, and Western 
concerns about organic and genetic modification becomes more trafficked in urban Asian cities, 
Zack’s distinction may lodge itself between two slightly different notions of value choice. While 
the U.S. context that Zack addresses is driven by scientific advancements in large-scale but low-
quality food production, the dismissal of traditional street foods in favor of modern, Western 
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styles of production and valuation brings in that element of dismissing the old to embrace the 
new.  
 I think that Zack is accurate in her diagnosis of value-materialism in the United States 
and the psychology of devaluing individuals who can only afford the lowest tier of basic needs 
products. Their inability to choose what others find inherently valuable challenges the way we 
view the world and the response of many individuals is to ignore their plight. The psychological 
din of value-materialism effectively mutes that of basic-needs materialism. The disgust and 
apathy widely felt about poor individuals create an imbalance that is not merely economical. 
Those who do not struggle to attain basic needs have a psychological reaction, but, from their 
perspective, those whom they are judging do not. They are reduced to their choices, which really 
do not amount to choices at all as they are made out of necessity with few or no options. They 
are diagnosed as lacking something fundamental and socially shared, something not simply 
monetary. At its most intensified, they lack humanity.  
Simone Weil’s Le Malheur and Existential Poverty 
 Simone Weil (1909-1943) wrote about a lack of humanity that transcends the categories 
of good and evil as well as innocence and shame, which she termed le malheur. It might be 
translated as affliction or woe, but the implication of this type of suffering is much deeper. 
People experiencing le malheur lack something fundamental, which she describes in her early 
work as the inability to think of themselves as an ‘I’. She contrasts this loss of the ‘I’ to the 
clearing of the ego to make room for God. In malheur, the ‘I’ is destroyed from the outside while 
in redemption, the ‘I’ is destroyed from inside to allow the ideas of God, most notably grace, to 
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expand. Malheur is a metaphysical and irreversible erasing of the potential for grace and 
redemption. Weil writes: 
Quasi-enfer sur terre. Le déracinement extrême dans le malheur. 
L'injustice humaine fabrique généralement non pas des martyrs, mais des quasi-
damnés. Les êtres tombés dans le quasi-enfer sont comme l'homme dépouillé et 
blessé par des voleurs. Ils ont perdu le vêtement du caractère. 
La plus grande souffrance qui laisse subsister des racines est encore à une 
distance infinie du quasi-enfer.  99
It is near-hell on earth. The extreme uprooting in malheur.  
Human injustice generally produces not martyrs but the near-damned. Those who 
have fallen into the hellish place are like those stripped and wounded by thieves. 
They have lost the clothing of character.  
The greatest suffering that leaves one’s roots intact is still at an infinite distance 
from this near-hell.  
This is what ultimate poverty, the combination of existential and economic poverties, looks like. 
The depth of this lack of personhood can only be accurately described using metaphysical 
language because there is no other way for us to conceive the rootless, cursed existence of those 
whose self has been crushed by forces beyond their control. It is impossible to relate across this 
infinite distance. Weil describes what today may be a common feeling among those who reach 
out to help only to have their hands batted away.  
 Simone Weil, Le pesanteur et la grâce (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1988), 35.99
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Quand on rend service à des êtres ainsi déracinés et qu'on reçoit en échange des 
mauvais procédés, de l'ingratitude, de la trahison, on subit simplement une faible 
part de leur malheur. On a le devoir de s’y exposer, dans une mesure limitée, 
comme on a le pouvoir de s’exposer au malheur. Quand cela se produit, on doit le 
supporter comme on supporte le malheur, sans rattacher cela à des personnes 
déterminées, car cela ne s'y rattache pas. Il y a quelque chose d'impersonnel dans 
le malheur quasi infernal comme dans la perfection.  100
When we extend a service to beings thus uprooted and we receive in exchange 
bad behavior, ingratitude, and betrayal, we suffer only a small part of their 
malheur. We have a duty to expose ourselves to it to a certain degree, as we have 
the power to expose ourselves to malheur. When this happens, we must endure it 
as we would endure malheur, without attaching it to a specific person, for it 
cannot be attached to anyone. There is something impersonal in the near-hell in 
malheur as there is in perfection.  
A person who lives in a quasi-inferno of suffering treats everyone as a fellow-damned. This is 
not because they feel enmity toward others. Weil finds that a collapsed self precludes the 
possibility of connecting with others, and there is no ground for feelings of appreciation or 
ingratitude. This is different than the pride that prevents those in need from accepting much-
needed assistance. Those experiencing malheur are not empty or thoughtless. Weil writes that 
their existence is plagued by the guilt of a criminal even though they are innocent.  
 Weil, Le pesanteur et la grâce, 35.100
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Le malheur durcit et désespère parce qu'il imprime jusqu'au fond de l'âme, comme 
avec un fer rouge, ce mépris, ce dégoût et même cette répulsion de soi-même, 
cette sensation de culpabilité et de souillure, que le crime devrait logiquement 
produire et ne produit pas. Le mal habite dans l'âme du criminel sans y être senti. 
Il est senti dans l'âme de l'innocent malheureux. Tout se passe comme si l'état de 
l’âme qui par essence convient au criminel avait été séparé du crime et attaché au 
malheur; et même à proportion de l'innocence des malheureux.  101
Malheur hardens and causes despair because it imprints on the bottom of the soul, 
as with a red-hot iron, contempt, disgust, and the same repulsion of oneself, the 
sense of guilt and defilement, that a crime should logically produce, but does not. 
Evil dwells in the soul of a criminal without him sensing it. It is felt in the soul of 
the “unfortunate” (malheureaux) innocent. Everything that happens as if the state 
of the soul in essence suits the criminal, as if the malheur has been separated from 
the crime and attached to the innocent.  
This is the depth of existential poverty: where one’s existence feels like a crime. A person in this 
state of distress is not capable of imagining a brighter future, for not only is there no self 
available to project into it. The ghost of self that remains is imprisoned by guilt and disgust. In 
contrast to the ideas discussed above that concern economic poverty and the disgust felt by those 
who are better off, those in existential poverty do not need the mirror of society to see the stain 
upon them. Their suffering is all-consuming. Weil writes that their lives are “un équivalent plus 
 Simone Weil, Attente de Dieu, Éditions Fayard (Paris: 1966), 79. 101
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ou moins atténué de la mort,” a more or less attenuated equivalent of death.  They are at a 102
dead-end. 
 For Weil, one may either choose to annihilate the self by seeking a mystical union with 
God or one’s self may be annihilated by external forces. The former invites grace and divine light 
to fill the space of the soul, and the latter replaces the soul with opaque darkness. This darkness 
does not allow for self-reflection and debilitates the ability to plan for better futures. It is like 
being imprisoned in a dank dungeon with no remembrance of the crime committed. Some 
approaches to ameliorate homelessness have a sadly ironic quality. By criminalizing acts like 
‘public camping,' which forbids an individual from sleeping in a public space with their 
belongings at night, the feeling that those experiencing homelessness may already have about 
their criminality is confirmed. They are not learning a lesson by being punished for their acts, 
rather their lives are acts of punishment, externally and internally wielded. This may help explain 
the unwillingness of many unsheltered individuals to accept services, even if they are made 
available by dedicated and cohesive outreach efforts. It also shines a bit of light on the knot of 
issues surrounding mental health. This knot is tightened by the uncertainty about whether 
psychological conditions precede homelessness, are exacerbated by homelessness, or are caused 
by homelessness. Incorporating Weil’s notion of malheur enhances the discussion of this issue 
because it acknowledges the crushing force of external circumstances that disconnect a person 
from themselves. At the limit of existential poverty, individuals become ahistorical nodes of 
suffering with no connection to the “I” they had been, and there is no going back. This is a 
metaphysical loss of personhood, not merely a series of poor decisions or a lack of psychiatric 
 Weil, Attente de Dieu, 77. 102
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care. At the limit of suffering, for Weil, the self is annihilated. For my definition of existential 
destitution, I keep the limit in view but focus on the road that ends there. Although there are 
certainly people already at the dead end, for whom we must provide even though it leaches our 
compassion, there are many who are not quite there and are still in possession of remnants of 
themselves. Existential poverty is remedied by the reconstitution and rooting of the self within 
supportive relationships and communities so that it can be projected into attainable and preferred 
futures.   
 Although it is anachronistic to tie these contemporary nuances of economic and 
existential poverty directly into the story from the Zhuangzi translated above, they bring nuance 
to the distinction Zhuang Zhou puts before the King. Zhuang Zhou is basically saying ‘I am not 
what you think I am. I just do not have the money for opulence.’ He is shielding himself against 
psychological warfare, and he even manages, by his famed wit, to reflect the insult back onto the 
King. Zhuangzi is being ridiculed because he is supposedly a sage and is living in poverty, but he 
is unruffled. He is not his poverty. He is not experiencing le malheur. Rather, those who are 
wealthy are squandering the world. Thorns and bitterness are preventing the thriving of those 
otherwise ready to swing through the trees.  
 This story from the Zhuangzi has allowed me to make a distinction between economic 
and existential poverty and to say that Zhuang Zhou was merely suffering from economic 
poverty. Why were sages like Zhuang Zhou, Liezi, and Confucius recorded as living in abject, 
economic poverty? The lives of sages are instructional and inspiring for overcoming adversity. 
They arose during times of immense social, political, and environmental unrest. They were not 
regular folks or guides to life, but representatives of the limit of what might be possible. They 
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were to be emulated as approximately as one is able, but they can never be surpassed. The 
simplest explanation of their poverty is that they are protesting the corruption that had become 
the status quo in their times. But this may not be what is intended as instructional. The moral of 
the poor sage is a more general lesson to continue to make one's way without sacrificing one’s 
values or strength of character. For centuries, these stories were heralded as inspiration for 
crestfallen bureaucrats to take the post offered to them and, though lamenting its lowliness, to 
work as if promotion will be granted once someone recognizes their potential. In other words, 
these texts did not advise a descent into poverty, but rather to make due with what is at hand. But 
for many living in poverty today, their existential currency is depleted as well. Chinese 
philosophical texts have much to contribute to this understanding of poverty. 
Existential Destitution (qiong窮) in Classical Chinese Texts 
 Works originating in the Warring States Era (475-221 BC) were riddled with stories of 
hardship and strife, including numerous accounts of Confucius’s (551-479 BC) own troubled life. 
The story of him at his lowest point, in the hinterlands, cast out of political favor, stranded and 
hungry, is told again and again in the ancient Chinese philosophical tradition. Whether or not this 
story is interpreted as one describing merely economic poverty or existential destitution, which is 
characterized by the inability to imagine or attain success, has deep implications for the 
interpretation of this story in other ancient Chinese texts. The locus classicus of the story in the 
Analects sketches Confucius as a role model for those who cultivate themselves in observance of 
ritual and hope to make a broad impact in the world. But this message is pitted against doubt in 
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the purpose and goals of his actions. Many of the other tellings of this story exploit this doubt, 
including many in the Zhuangzi that have Confucius give up on his vision.  
 Whether or not the story conveys an economic or existential message depends on the 
interpretation of the character qiong窮, which I have chosen as the philological basis for this 
study of limitation. This concept combines existential with economic connotations of poverty, 
contributing to a transactional account of the cosmos, which I believe is illuminating for modern 
discussions about extreme poverty and homelessness. For example, in the Xici commentary to 
the Yijing there is a passage about the penetrating insight of the sage that indicates a transactional 
pattern to the world. A selection reads, 「一闔一闢謂之變；往來不窮謂之通」  ‘We 103
recognize the turning over of things by their being at one time closed off and other times opened 
up. Being able to come and go through life unhindered by these changes is the ability of those 
who truly understand them.’ Even at times when the world becomes constricted and closed off, 
the sage is able to pass through (tong通) because the limitations (qiong窮) that befall those who 
do not understand the transactions of the cosmos fall away. As things change, they open up or 
close off human possibilities. A constricted world is pocked with variously interconnected 
limitations.  
 We find in the Chinese philosophical tradition that at the extremity of hardship all of the 
contributing factors interlock into a formidable social, personal, and ecological barrier. This 
theme matures early in the tradition, as indicated by the story of Confucius stranded between 
Chen and Cai. 
 Based on the Zhou yi yinde周易引得. Harvard-Yenching Index series no. 10 (Beijing: Zhonghua 103
shuju, 1980). Xi Ci 11.2. 
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Between Chen and Cai: Interpreting Poverty and Destitution in Chinese Philosophy 
The story of Confucius in distress in the Analects 15.2 is considered the locus classicus of the 
many tellings throughout the Chinese philosophical tradition.  104
在陳絕糧，從者病，莫能興，子路慍見曰：「君子亦有窮乎？」 子曰「君
子固窮；小人窮斯濫矣。」   105
In Chen they ran out of food, and his followers were all too sick to stand. Zilu 
turned to him and asked, “Are distinguished folks ever in this much distress?” 
Kongzi replied, “Distinguished folks stay true to themselves even when they are 
in distress, but petty people run amok when they are in distress.” 
The moral is that hardship should not change the steadfast character of upstanding individuals. 
The use of qiong窮 in this passage lends an economic and an existential interpretation. Not only 
is the group out of food, but they are also without a place to dwell and are unable to plan an exit 
out of this situation. There is an air of hopelessness in the followers strewn on the ground, and 
Zilu is concerned about whether Confucius has led them to a dead end. 
 To his weakened followers, Confucius replies that they must be strong in the face of 
adversity. He separates their poverty from their character when he describes the different ways 
that distinguished and petty people behave when they are in distress. But I do not think that this 
 John Makeham, “Between Chen and Cai: Zhuangzi and the Analects,” Wandering at Ease in the 104
Zhuangzi: A Postmodern Critique (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998); Scott Cook, The Bamboo Texts of the 
Guodian vol. I. (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2012).
 Based on Shisan jing zhushu, fu jiaokanji十三經注疏,附校勘記 Harvard-Yenching Institute 105
Sinological Index Series. no. 16 (Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Company, 1966), 30/15/2.
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story should be interpreted as an episode of merely economic poverty because that would dim 
the instructional moment for the moral psychology of Confucian self-cultivation. Ideally, a 
distinguished person should be able to move through life with relative ease and equanimity even 
in difficult times, but this is not a simple feat. Troubling times prompt self-reflection, and this 
could reveal personal defects that require remedy through self-cultivation. This practice yields 
the possibility of having brought misfortune to oneself, but it counters with the opportunity to 
enhance the emotional relationships between self and world that support moral constancy. A 
person has little control over what hardship may come, but the power to act deliberately and 
precisely in response preserves self-respect, even if one is in a pitiable state. We find Confucius 
and his disciples standing alone at the edge of a world that does not value his vision. Kwong-loi 
Shun amends to the tension between living a moral life in an immoral age the notion of 
loneliness. 
Accompanying this sense of tension is also a sense of loneliness, reflected in such 
remarks as that the superior person might have to walk the Way alone. This sense 
of loneliness is not a matter of physical isolation, as the Confucians even in 
withdrawal are often among students and close associates. Nor is it a matter of 
social disengagement, as the Confucians continue to be deeply engaged in social 
matters, if not through active participation in government, then through reflecting 
and discoursing on such matters. Rather, the sense of loneliness has to do with the 
awareness that one’s ethical aspirations and vision are often not understood and 
not shared by others. Although Confucius also observes on one occasion that the 
virtuous does not stand alone, the very fact that he needs to make this observation 
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also testifies to the sense of loneliness that the virtuous often feels. The ultimate 
tension, perhaps, is the tension between the sense of equanimity and the sense of 
loneliness that inevitably accompany each other.   106
Unquestionably, loneliness is an existential issue. It depletes one’s social currency and may result 
in existential poverty along the lines I have discussed above. Turning to Confucius stranded 
between Chen and Cai, these deep implications swirl in the background. We read this story and 
relate to his hardship, and we also take instruction from his placid equanimity in the face of a 
situation that could not get much worse. This story is a snapshot of Confucian moral psychology, 
from which a number of lessons can be drawn. 
 The story of Confucius stranded between states at war, with none willing to house him 
and some in pursuit of him, is included in the Mengzi, the Xunzi, the Mozi, the Lüshi Chunqiu, 
and the Zhuangzi. In these texts, the story is spun to emphasize different aspects of Confucius’s 
hardship. In the Mengzi, the party’s distress is the result of not having found a supportive 
audience among powerful individuals.  There is no word from Confucius included in this brief 107
passage, and the story is framed as one of many instances of his struggle for recognition. His 
poverty arises from his inability to achieve a position, but at least he does not yield his principles 
to tarry among the corrupt and self-serving. The tellings in the Xunzi and the Lüshi Chunqiu 
emphasize Confucius's equanimity while in distress and even go as far as to say that everyone 
 Kwong-loi Shun, “On Anger: An Essay in Confucian Moral Psychology,” Returning to Zhu Xi: 106
Emerging Patterns Within the Supreme Polarity, ed. David Jones and He Jinli (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2015), 318-19.
 孟子曰：「君子之戹於陳蔡之閒，無上下之交也。」 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 107
14.18/74/27.
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should experience some sort of adversity in their lives in order to have the opportunity to better 
themselves.   Poverty in these stories is framed in terms of willingness to suffer hunger for the 108
sake of one’s beliefs. Rather than accept a post that offends his sensibilities but would guarantee 
that his basic needs are met, Confucius puts his life and those of his disciples at risk by reducing 
them to dire poverty for the sake of his moral character. The party is reduced to the social level 
of paupers, eating course grains and soup made from weeds. How food is presented in these 
stories gives force to their lessons.  His inability to provide for the group is rooted in his moral 109
disdain for the powers that would willingly sustain them, but in the Mozi, putting his moral 
scruples before the health of the group frames him as a selfish hypocrite. 
 The story in the second Fei Ru (Against Ruism) chapter of the Mozi claims that 
Confucius had enough food even though there was a shortage. It describes an instance where 
Confucius was invited to dine with Duke Ai of Lu, and he refused to participate in the banquet 
on moral grounds, though his unwillingness to take part in the feast was likely because he’d 
unscrupulously eaten so much of the suckling pig Zilu had prepared earlier.  This story is 110
 君子貧窮而志廣，隆仁也；富貴而體恭，殺埶也；安燕而血氣不衰，柬理也；勞勌而容貌不108
枯，好交也；怒不過奪，喜不過予，是法勝私也。Based on the Sibu congkan edition. ICS 
Concordance to the Lü Shi Qun Chiu, v. 26. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1996), 2/8/13-15.





以活身，贏飽則偽行以自飾，汙邪詐偽，孰大於此？ Based on the Sibu congkan edition. ICS 
Concordance to the Mozi, v. 41. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2001), 9.7/66/18-22.
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intended to point out Confucius's hypocrisy and hubris. When times are tough, he is a regular 
man, but back in civilized society, he is judgmental and cantankerous. This is a common 
argumentation strategy in the Mozi, which favored an impartial and frugal version of society 
often compared to modern notions of social and political utilitarianism.  The theme of eating 111
found in the Mozi is also seen later works, for example in the Lüshi Chunqiu. Here Confucius 
secretly watches Yan Hui prepare a meal and notices that he picks some out and eats it when he 
thinks no one was watching. Once the preparation is finished, Confucius declares that he intends 
to offer the meal as a sacrifice to his father. As offerings must be pure, Yan Hui stops him and 
tells him that a bit of grit had fallen into the pot and he had reached into the pot to retrieve it and 
ate it. Although he removed the dirt, the food was not prepared the appropriate way for an 
offering. Confucius replies that one cannot truly know by looking what a person’s intentions 
are.  This story is framed as an instructive lesson for Yan Hui. It was a test to see if he would 112
admit to reaching into the pot so he could have some before anyone else in the hungry party. To 
remain upstanding in the face of poverty is the moral of this story, as in the original telling in the 
Analects.  
 The story of Confucius stranded is included seven times in the outer and miscellaneous 
chapters of the Zhuangzi, with a variety of themes. There are three tellings of the story grouped 
together in the Shanmu山木 chapter that pick up on a theme from the You zuo宥坐 chapter of the 
 Dennis Ahern, “Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3(2) 1976, 185–93; Dirck 111
Vorenkamp, “Another Look at Utilitarianism in Mo-Tzu’s Thought,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 19(4) 
1992, 423–443.
 孔子歎曰：「所信者目也，而目猶不可信；所恃者心也，而心猶不足恃。弟子記之，知人固不112
易矣。」故知非難也，孔子之所以知人難也。 ICS Concordance to the Lü Shi Qun Chiu, 
17.3/102/17-18.
#90
Xunzi. In the Xunzi version, Zilu ponders the question of whether bad things can happen to truly 
good people. Confucius replies that he is right to be concerned, but it is possible that the worthy 
encounter the wrong times. Just as flowers in the forest are fragrant even when no one is around 
to smell them, good men retain their moral potency even when no one is around to appreciate 
them. He assures Zilu that one must continue to cultivate and rectify one's conduct until the right 
times roll around.  The invocation of timeliness can be summed up with this selection from the 113
story: 
君子之學，非為通也，為窮而不困，憂而意不衰也，知禍福終始而 
心不惑也。   114
When the distinguished person focuses on learning, it is not for the sake of 
unhindered success. It is so that when there’s a dead end one does not feel 
helpless. When feeling anxious, one should hold steadfast to one’s ideals. 
Knowing that distress and success turn over endings and beginnings, one may be 
free of doubt.  
The versions of the story in the Zhuangzi expound on this sense of timeliness. The first in the 
Shanmu chapter ends with an interlocutor suggesting to Confucius that he abandon the cycle of 
failure and success. Confucius then gets up, bids adieu to his disciples, and strides into the 
swamp to commune with the birds and beasts. The second story similarly has him abandon his 
studies so that he can be freed from the cycle of fortune and misfortune. In the third telling of the 
 Based on the 夫遇不遇者，時也；賢不肖者，材也；君子博學深謀，不遇時者多矣！ ICS 113
Concordance to the Xunzi, 28/141/3-4.
 ICS Concordance to the Xunzi, 28/141/5.114
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story in this chapter, Confucius, starving, is rapping out an unmeasured beat against a tree and 
singing tunelessly. As the historical Confucius considered classical music to be the utmost 
expression of refinement, we readers already know that something is amiss. Confucius tells his 
disciples that the afflictions that plague him are not his doing and so are not his worry. The story 
concludes with 聖人晏然體逝而終矣  ‘The sage calmly goes along with things, and when the 115
body dies, that is the end of it.’ The tellings of the story in the Zhuangzi depart from the theme of 
Confucian moral psychology in their portrayal of Confucius as one conversation away from 
giving it all up. Having his experience of poverty undermine his sense of duty threatens the credo 
of living according to a set of moral principles. This interpretation takes Confucius past the limit 
of mere economic poverty toward existential distress. This theme is shown in telling in the Rang 
wang讓王 chapter of the Zhuangzi. 
 Confucius is playing the zither, singing, and dancing shamelessly, as appraised by Zilu 
and Zigong. His response to their concern that he might be at the end of his rope may be 
translated as ‘I may be a lot of things, but impeded (窮) I am not.’ Confucius compares himself 
to the evergreen trees that thrive in winter, another botany metaphor with the same thrust as the 
orchid in the forest: being unappreciated and left in the cold should not impact one’s behavior. 
Confucius tells his disciples that the important thing is to be happy, and the comparison to the 
evergreen tree lends the idea of the naturalness of being content with one’s lot. This telling of the 
story includes two elements not present in the Analects version. First, Confucius rarely declares 
the intention to be happy in the face of obstacles. Rather, happiness and pleasure are reserved for 
the appreciation of a life lived suitably well, unobstructed and with wide-ranging moral and 
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series. Supplement no. 20., 54/20/61.115
#92
sensual rewards. Second, though Confucius was known to be a splendidly refined zither player 
and an authority of the Book of Odes,  it does not seem from the response of his disciples that 116
he was playing a cultivated tune. He seemed to be playing a folk song or some kind of ditty, and 
Zilu grabs a shield and dances with the all the gusto of a seasoned warrior. This detail, the shield, 
may indicate that the song was an old one rather than improvised. In the Book of Rites, there are 
a couple of passages that indicate that the training with instruments for music and war are 
similar.  
「凡學世子及學士，必時。春夏學干戈，秋冬學羽龠，皆於東序。小樂正學
干，大胥贊之。龠師學戈，龠師丞贊之。」   117
The instruction of heirs and eligible, talented young men, varied seasonally. In 
spring and summer they learned to wield arms, and in fall and winter, they learned 
the feather and the flute.  All of these techniques were in the Eastern style. The 118
lower ministers of music taught how to use a shield, and the more qualified 
assistants helped him. The master flautists taught how to use a spear, and his 
deputy helped him.  
It may be a bit of a stretch to judge the type of song by this one criterion. But it would make the 
scene a little less blatantly anti-Ruist, which would make the concluding lines that emphasize 
 See Analects 3.23 where Kongzi instructs a music master how to play, 8.8, 11.1 where he likens 116
himself to former generations in his preference of music, and 13.3, 15.12.
 ICS Concordance to the Liji, v. 2 (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1992), 8.2/56/27-28.117
 The feather may be an early reference to the yubao gu, a feather screen drum, which was used in 118
military proceedings in the Tang dynasty. For a list of the instruments used in military ceremonies, see 
Kai Filipiak ed., Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History: From Ancient China to the Communist 
Takeover (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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naturalness over ritual more forceful in their delivery. Suffice to say that men attempting to 
garner an official position would not engage in frivolous or ecstatic song. Much like in the ideal 
polis conceived by Plato in the Republic, there were certain sets of chords and melodies that 
were approved for dignified people to enjoy, and for Confucius, this was very important. The 
Confucius of the Analects would have likely stopped his ears to keep from hearing tones that 
may have a negative effect on his character. If the Zhuangzi’s Confucius is singing an old song, 
but with a folksy twang, it effaces his propriety. But if he is playing a proper song while in the 
wilds at the bounds of society, it might be seen as an act of defiance. Even in a calamitous state 
of hunger, he will not resign his self-won moral excellence. The world may fall to ruin, the songs 
forgotten and the rituals debased, but one may find some footing by holding firm to behaviors 
that would prevail in a different, better world.  
 The story ends with reference to the contentment of the hermit Xu You, who refused to 
take the throne, and Gongbo, who abdicated the throne. They removed themselves from the cycle 
of favor and disfavor, hot and cold, impeded and unimpeded, and they were content. What is at 
stake in portraying Confucius this way? John Makeham argues that the exclusion of the stories 
about Confucius in the Zhuangzi would be arbitrary because even though it is not a Ruist text, it 
does provide valuable insight into the interpretation of the relatively sparse account in the 
Analects.  In order to understand the account of Confucius living in dire straits, a few words 119
must be said about the Zhuangzi itself as a composite text with many philosophical motives. 
After providing a brief interpretive context, I will illuminate a theme that becomes fully fledged 
in the Zhuangzi: the celebration of poverty. 
 Makeham, “Between Chen and Cai,” 94.119
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The Role of Confucius in the Zhuangzi 
 In order to explore Confucius’s role in the Zhuangzi, a word must be said about the 
cohesiveness of the text as it is bound together today. Different contributors to the text likely 
used the figure of Confucius in different, instructive ways. Speculation regarding the timeline 
and the number of contributors has abounded over the last century in many articles, books, and 
dissertations.  Many criteria have been created and theorized for stratifying the strips of the 120
composite Zhuangzi text. It is grouped into three sections, inner, outer, and miscellaneous, 
although the pian, or portions of text grouped together roughly based on theme, that comprise 
each of these sections do not lend to airtight divisions between the three. By convention and for 
consistency, these designations have stuck. The first seven chapters, the inner chapters, are still 
considered by many to be written by Zhuang Zhou, the illustrious Zhuangzi himself, though I’m 
partial to David McCraw’s assessment, which uses data analysis to quantify differences in rhyme 
and word choice in the inner chapters, that even they were likely penned by several authors. 
Many 20th century scholars were caught up with an authentic-inauthentic distinction, which 
made the question of the authorship of the inner chapters contentious.  Hopefully, we have 121
moved on as a scholarly community because the text, as it is received now, is a treasure chest of 
philosophical inquiry and storytelling regardless of the intent of the many contributors.  
 See authors Liu Xiaogan, Angus Graham, Lu Deming, David McCraw, and Brian Hoffert to name a 120
few recent studies. 
 David McCraw, Stratifying Zhuangzi: Rhyme and Other Quantitative Evidence, Language and 121
Linguistics Monograph Series 41 (Taipei: Institute of Linguistics, Academia Sinica, 2010) p. 48.
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 The value of getting to the bottom of who wrote the Zhuangzi is to untangle the mass of 
political threads woven throughout the tapestry of characters. It would be misleading to assume 
that every story in the text speaks to a purely Daoist worldview, or that Daoism itself was not 
permeable and accommodating to myriad influences over the centuries. For example, the disdain 
for government, indicated by stories in which Confucius decides to jettison his desire for 
government approval, is the calling card of the editors hailing from the intellectual tradition 
credited to adherents of Yang Zhu’s (c. 350BC) school, and these additions to the text, judging by 
the style and use of binomial terms, were likely added at least at the end of the Warring States 
Period (475-221 BC) and even well into the Han Period (206 BC - 220AD). A handful of the 
tellings of the Confucius stranded between Chen and Cai story are included in the chapters A.C. 
Graham terms the Yangist miscellany.  The similarity of these four pian is taken to show that 122
they were likely grouped together before their inclusion in the Zhuangzi text, and though some 
commentators conflate the Yangist message as Daoist, there are indicators that it is not. In The 
Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, Feng Youlan labels Yang Zhu a proto-Daoist, but even that is 
dubious. Feng writes that the Yangist man engages in just the right amount of good and evil. But 
anyone who has ever gone down the rabbit hole of ‘that’s it’ and ‘that’s not’ (是非) in the Qi Wu 
Lun to its inevitable anti-conclusion will have trouble agreeing with the connection to Daoist 
themes, which tend to take the difference between good and evil an arbitrary distinction. 
 Feng Youlan cites Confucian derision of the Daoists to make a division between early and 
late Daoism. From the following quotes, he surmises that Daoism was first a utilitarian, selfish 
belief system that only later became concerned with transcendent matters. 
 Graham, Zhuangzi, 221-223.122
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“Taoism came from recluses. We get a glimpse of such in the Lun Yü, for 
Confucius met a number of them; and since he had the wish to save the world, 
they did not approve.”   123
“So far as the early Taoists were concerned, they were selfish. Their principle was 
to encourage selfishness… As Tzu Lu said of them, “they want to make 
themselves clean, but they throw into confusion the great relationships of life.”  124
“It is entirely obvious that Yang’s theory blocked the way to jen and yi, because 
the Confucian emphasis on jen and yi contained an emphasis on ‘the other 
man’.”  125
 The Yangist school emphasized the preservation of the body over the accumulation of 
wealth and material things. Although a historical account about him is included in the Legalist 
text Hanfeizi,  the most well-known stories about Yang Zhu appear in an eponymous segment 126
of the Liezi, a Daoist work likely compiled around 300 AD.  When asked by Qin Guli, a 127
 Feng, Youlan, The Spirit of Chinese Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 30.123
 Feng, The Spirit of Chinese Thought, 33.124
 Feng, The Spirit of Chinese Thought, 34.125
 楊子過於宋東之逆旅，有妾二人，其惡者貴，美者賤。楊子問其故，逆旅之父答曰：「美者自126
美，吾不知其美也，惡者自惡，吾不知其惡也。」楊子謂弟子曰：「行賢而去自賢之心，焉往而
不美。」Based on the sibu congkan edition. ICS Concordance to the Hanfeizi, v. 42. (Hong Kong: The 
Commercial Press, 2000), 22/50/18-20.
 Another contentious date. According to A.C. Graham, many Western scholars argued for its inclusion 127
as one of the three main Daoist texts alongside the Laozi and the Zhuangzi long after Chinese scholars 
had agreed that it was likely a compilation if not a creation of the Han[??300+ce] Dynasty. A.C. Graham, 
“The Date and Composition of the Lieh-Tzu,” Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical 
Literature (New York: SUNY Press, 1990). 
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disciple of Mozi, if he would sacrifice a single hair to help the whole world, would he do it? He 
replied that it would do no good to give up even one hair. Qin incredulously asks him if he would 
do it if it really would help, but Yang refused to answer. His disciple, Meng Sun-yang, stepped in 
to continue the conversation on his behalf. His argument consisted of upping the ante on what 
Qin himself would be willing to do for others until he would no longer agree to help, which was 
having a limb cut off at the joint. Taking this as a concession, Meng presses Qin on the difference 
between a single hair and a joint, as they each have their place among the parts of the body.  128
The focus on health and longevity instead of the pursuit of notoriety and material wealth was 
incorporated in the Daoist tradition, but not wholesale from the Yangist school. It was paired 
with the pursuit of the unknowable, the transcendent, the unexplainable, and the mystical, and so 
it shed the grounded, utilitarian ideals of Yangism.  
 A reader of the Zhuangzi must be careful in ascribing Daoist predilection to the character 
of Confucius portrayed in the work. The seven tellings of the Confucius stranded between Chen 
and Cai are all in the outer and miscellaneous chapters, which does not necessarily mean that 
they are inauthentic, but that their inclusion may have been at the whim of a contributor who, 
although devoted to the Zhuangzian message, fell in with the ilk of Han Dynasty scholars for 





肌膚，積肌膚以成一節。一毛固一體萬分中之一物，柰何輕之乎？」」Based on the Sibu congkan 
edition. ICS Concordance to the Liezi, v. 25. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1996), 7/41/20-25.
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unification and preservation during this time. How does this affect the interpretation of the 
stories about Confucius? This influence flattens the implications of Confucius’s poverty and 
willingness to abandon his purpose because the potential to rise above the distinctions and merge 
with the limitless (wuqiong無窮) is not included in the Yangist assessment of reality. He either 
must attempt to continue his journey down this rocky, obstructed path or take the fork in the 
road, foregoing the social and political milieu in favor of self-preservation and retreat into the 
natural. By contrast, the Zhuangist would find this choice superficial and the result of an ill-
begotten perspective. This difference is humorously shown in the legend of Yang Zhu weeping at 
a crossroads. Not knowing which way to go, but having a sagacious awareness of the 
repercussions of choosing the wrong path, he is the picture of existential despair. Can he trust 
himself to make the right choice? For now, he is stuck, unable to determine which way to go. 
Compare this to the Zhuangists who asked one another 「孰能登天遊霧，撓挑無極，相忘以
生，無所終窮?」  ‘Which of us can ascend into the sky, wander in the obscuring mists, go 129
whirling into the infinite, and forget about one another, without end?’ Hearing them, Zigong was 
mystified by these men and their unsolemn behavior at the death of their friend. Confucius told 
Zigong that whereas he stays within the guidelines of propriety and humanity, they go beyond it 
to commune with the changes themselves and forget themselves and their bodies. A Zhuangist 
would not be stuck at a crossroads because their goal is not to find the right path, but to transcend 
the difference between right and wrong paths. Thus the portrayal of Confucius in the Zhuangzi 
does not style him as a Daoist or Zhuangist, but rather a Yangist. This is notable because with no 
transcendent realm (wuqiong無窮) to appeal to, which would allow him to dissolve the 
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 20., 18/6/61-2.129
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distinction between bad times and good, Confucius decides to leave off with his studied, 
ritualized ways of making his life meaningful. This situation has a glimmer of what I refer to as 
existential destitution because for Confucius, the figure merely caricatured in this story, stepping 
off his path into the forest would have brought his life’s project to an abrupt end. The historical 
Confucius carefully tended to his path, his life’s work and legacy, such that even in distress he 
was not at a dead end. Put another way, even when he was out of money his surety did not flag. 
When in the Zhuangzi Confucius breaks from his path to find happiness elsewhere, the moral of 
the story cuts with two edges. The straight-forward one ridicules Confucius for his stubborn 
adherence to arbitrary ritual with the wit and abandon that is the hallmark of the Zhuangist, and 
as a result, we can imagine Confucius suddenly agog, following a butterfly into the thicket. The 
hidden, darker edge cuts through what Confucius holds most dear: the moral constancy of his 
path through life. Without the spiritual wealth of an incrementally perfected life, Confucius 
would be made existentially destitute.  
 The contributors to the Zhuangzi forge a path for Confucius that leads him away from the 
moral dictates that, by their estimation, limit his spiritual progress. Even though he may end up 
tragically poor, he will find a wealth of insight in an unbounded life. The glorification of poverty 
is a prevalent theme in Daoist texts and Post-Han philosophy, poetry, and prose. This will 
contribute to my study of contemporary homelessness by supporting an important distinction. 
The sort of poverty celebrated in ancient and imperial Chinese texts is one that respects human 
dignity and the ability to choose an ascetic lifestyle. In these texts, it was celebrated as a political 
statement against the strict, power-driven status quo. But the vast majority of today’s homeless 
populations are not making a political decision. Their lives are not lived amid such choices 
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because their basic human needs are not secure. But some insight may be drawn from the 
preservation of integrity in the face of poverty seen in the Chinese philosophical tradition. 
Poverty and Cosmology in Chinese Texts 
 The narrative of the celebrated poor contributes complexity to the distinction between 
economic and existential poverty. In this section, I will provide examples that show that these 
types of destitution are often linked. The glorification of poverty became a common trope in the 
works annotated and compiled in the Han Dynasty, as the social and political metropoles in 
China became more bureaucratized, as well as in Tang and Song Dynasty poetry. During this 
time, when many government positions came with a slew of benefits and privileges unrivaled by 
any but the high nobility, there were legions who did not receive their desired post and were 
fraught with competing emotions. Internalizing Confucian moral psychology, they looked within 
for faults and fortified themselves through study and ritual. But they also condemned their 
circumstances and yearned for someone or something to blame. The theme of being cast into a 
dismal situation beyond one’s control is common. Before I begin discussing examples from the 
texts, I will orient the discussion around relevant concepts from the Yijing易經, the Classic of 
Changes. This context is important for interpreting stories that describe and glorify poverty 
because, as a divination manual that engages the connection between cosmological forces and 
human social and political striving, the Yijing crystallizes the concern surrounding the 
circumstances of success and failure in early Chinese thought. 
 The broad scope of the Yijing includes uncontrollable and active forces that create 
circumstances beyond one’s control. It is one of many works on this theme originating from 
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prolific Warring States Period through the Han Dynasty. I am collecting these descriptions 
together to create a narrative of existential destitution. Existential destitution is the hopelessness 
of a long path’s dead-end. It is an utter depletion of the harmony between being and bearing that 
characterizes smooth travel, personal advancement, and productive unselfconscious ease. It is a 
lack both of propitious circumstances as well as the ability to discern the appropriate actions to 
take, and it only exists if there are forces shaping the world that call humans to question their 
foundational assumptions about the world. 
 In the Western Zhou period, the Zhouyi周易 was a divination manual compiled as a 
collection of the interpretations of the ancient sages, rendered in trigrams and hexagrams, who 
had the ability to glean the forces that shape the world directly. Interpretations and commentaries 
were interpolated into the divination manual, and the result is preserved under the title Yijing易
經. Eventually, the text became a cornerstone of Chinese intellectual life, so interpretations of 
Chinese philosophy benefit from this context. The composite Yijing was read not only as a 
manual but as a cosmological description of the cyclical proclivities of the world, though 
personal divinatory readings could be performed at any time. Naturally, readings were rarely 
performed when things were humming along nicely. More often, the text was consulted during a 
big event, such as a birth or wedding, or in times of difficulty. The purpose of this mantic 
practice is that the would-be cleromancer could be perceptive to the signals of impending shifts 
in fortune. The Yijing describes the cosmological operations of the world as polar and cyclical so 
that everything eventually gives way to its opposite. This includes the fortunes of humans, who 
are at the whim of the impersonal forces of the cosmos, which are not always predictable. There 
are, however, inklings among the mundane phenomena that signal impending change. The 
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appropriate response to these signals may change one's fortune while by being unscrupulous and 
unaware of what to look for, one may be beset by perpetually bygone opportunities.  
 The type of prognostication elicited by engagement with the Yijing advises one to act 
with care or abstain from acting altogether when the current state of things indicate an imminent 
shift to less auspicious conditions. It cannot aid in preventing the inauspicious because humans 
are not the only force shaping the world. In the Yijing, the first two hexagrams are Qian乾, which 
is comprised of all unbroken lines, and Kun坤, which is comprised of all broken lines. They are 
associated with pure yang and pure yin.  Although the application of yinyang theory was not 130
made an inseparable part of Chinese conceptions of the cosmos until the Han Dynasty, there are 
many attributes the two pairs share. Qian is the ascendency of the growing season, spring 
through fall. Kun is the culmination of the harvest and the dead ice of winter. Without the 
harvest, the season is not completed, and only after the winter does the next season begin. These 
represent two interlocking and opposing forces that shape this cosmos, which is why yinyang, a 
description of the same effects but abstracted from the calendrical origins of qiankun, was taken 
by Han Dynasty literati as the central metaphor to describe how the changes that shape the world 
affect humans. Yin is the complementary opposite of yang, which connotes an active growing 
and building. Yin is characterized by a return to darkness, potential, and stillness. According to 
Robin Wang, the purpose of yinyang thinking is not merely to describe the way the world 
physically operates but to quell the anxiety that things are unconnected or random through 
pragmatic and probabilistic reasoning. She writes, 
 This and what follows benefit from the analysis of the Yijing in Edward L. Shaughnessy, Before 130
Confucius: Studies in the Creation of the Chinese Classics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997), 197-219.
#103
Facing an unpredictable world, we might lose confidence and feel as if there is no 
stability at all. Yinyang thinking emerged as a conceptual apparatus to ease the 
anxiety of lost control by creating ways of predicting and accepting the 
inevitability of change.  131
Focusing on patterns of change instead of on independent events contributes to the view of a 
radically connected world in which humans have an integral involvement in what comes to pass. 
So rather than indulging feelings of hopelessness in the face of misfortune, yinyang thinking 
emphasizes a personal responsibility to understand the inevitably shifting propensity of the 
world.   132
 Cyclical and patterned thinking is an original contribution to Chinese thought. With the 
addition of the seminal commentaries, including the Ten Wings attributed to Confucius and the 
commentarial tradition that followed, the effects of cosmic forces on a human life were 
systematically discussed. Before the introduction of cosmological thinking of the Yijing, aspects 
of hardship referred to human social and political life. This thinking was prototypical of later 
emphases on broader, more inclusive causal connectivity. The Shijing詩經, or Book of Odes, 
includes many lamentations about one's station in life. One ode, translated by Arthur Waley, 
begins: 
I go out the northern gate; 
 Robin Wang, Yingyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture (New York: 131
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 15.
 This is influenced by Robin Wang’s interpretation of Xu Fuguan’s writings about youhuan, the 132
“manifestation of consciousness of one’s responsibility toward events and a manifestation of an emerging 
humanistic spirit.” Wang, Yinyang, 73.
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Deep is my grief. 
I am utterly poverty-stricken and destitute; 
Yet no one heeds my misfortunes. 
Well, all is over now. 
No doubt it was Heaven’s doing, 
So what’s the good of talking about it?  133
Although at first blush this selection suggests extra-human forces, referring to the odes Arthur 
Waley opines, “The discontented poet refers to the king, or more generally to those in power, 
under the cover-name ‘god,’ ‘god on high.’”  The use of Heaven in this selection is more likely 134
to describe the ‘powers that be’ or the ‘higher-ups.’ The Ode continues: 
The king’s business came my way; 
Government business of every sort was put upon me. 
When I came in from outside 
The people of the house all turned on me and scolded me. 
Well, it’s over now. 
No doubt it was Heaven’s doing, 
So what’s the good of talking about it? 
This continues for several stanzas. The lamentations inspired a tradition of poetry and prose that 
spans Chinese intellectual history. They gesture toward something unpalatably mercurial that 
threatens to upend a life’s work, a good reputation, and the best intentions. 
 Arthur Waley, trans., The Book of Songs (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1978), 305.133
 Waley, The Book of Songs, 304.134
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Cycles of Failure and Success  
 How do the forces that shape the cosmos infiltrate and disrupt human lives? The cyclical 
patterns of the world are reflected in the lives of humans, and some amount of hardship is to be 
expected. Michael Nylan writes, “For change, however perfectly patterned, cannot ever “match,” 
being a product of the operation of two different polarities (yin and yang) combined in ever-
varying proportions; that the polarities will “rub against one another” is an immutable law of the 
cosmos.”  This friction potently affects humans, generating the extremes of fortune and 135
misfortune.  
 Although it does not form a significant part of my study of Karl Jaspers, I will mention 
his theory of the Axial Age, roughly the first millennium B.C. He writes,  
What is new about this age, [in China, India, and the Occident], is that man 
becomes aware of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He 
experiences the terrible nature of the world and his own impotence. He asks 
radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and 
redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits he sets himself the highest 
goals. He experiences unconditionality in the depth of selfhood and in the clarity 
of transcendence.   136
The broadening of context that accompanied the cosmological import from the Yijing into 
Chinese philosophical thought makes enough room for consideration of the broadest possible 
 Michael Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 248.135
 Edith Ehrlich, Leonard H. Ehrlich, and George Pepper, Karl Jaspers: Basic Philosophical Writings 136
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994), 383.
#106
picture of reality, even in the radically imminent context of early Chinese philosophical thought. 
Interestingly, in the Chinese philosophical tradition, the human, natural, and supernatural realms 
remained fused. Success and failure slide among the opposing but connected forces that shape 
the world. As a result, responsibility and culpability are extended beyond the bubble of self-
concern and individual efficacy. But faced with the sometimes incomprehensibly complex world 
in which success is nowhere guaranteed, disconnection, isolation contribute to the possibility of 
existential destitution. 
Success as Interconnectedness and Communication: Encounters (yu遇) in the Qiong da yi 
shi窮達以時 “Failure and Success is a Matter of Timing.” 
 In this chapter, I sketch a theory of success as metaphysical communication in the 
Chinese philosophical tradition. The lack of communication results in failure, which, 
notwithstanding efforts to be permeable and responsive to the forces and expectations that shape 
a harmonious world, stymies one’s progress through life. The central metaphor in Chinese 
philosophy for human flourishing is forward movement along a path. Smooth, unhindered travel 
analogically indicates approbation of purpose, while the wayward, the lost, those stuck at a 
crossroads, and those who have reached a dead end lose the momentum of self-improvement and 
the ability to creatively formulate attainable goals. What I focus on in this chapter draws more 
from this metaphor. Looking around at unfamiliar and inhospitable surroundings and wondering, 
‘Did I make a wrong turn? Am I on the right road?’ is complicated in relation to the moral 
metaphor of dao道 because in the metaphor the road is not merely traveled, but also hardened, 
made, with each step.  
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 The moral metaphor of travel along a path includes the equivalent of inclement weather 
and unexpected obstructions, as well as crossroads and dead ends. How one responds to these 
distressing circumstances, which are an inevitable feature of a constantly shifting and tilting 
cosmos, are a prominent concern in the Confucian tradition. This is the theme of a short series of 
bamboo scripts discovered in the first Guodian tomb in 1993, “Failure and Success is a Matter of 
Timing” Qiongda Yi Shi窮達以時 (hereafter QDYS). The scripts were well-preserved though 
jumbled together with many texts. They were painstakingly ordered at the Jingmen City Museum 
under the direction of Peng Hao and Liu Zuxin. Dated to the Warring States Era (475-221 BC), 
this collection is attributed to the Ruist scholarly tradition based on its main theme: moral 
constancy should not be threatened by ill-fated events. I analyzed the stories of Confucius that 
approximate this theme above, but this text is unique because of its shocking opening line: 「有
天有人，天人有分」  ‘There are the affairs of the heavens and the affairs of humans, the lot 137
of the heavens and that of humans are different.’ Rarely has this division between the dynamic 
cycles of the cosmos and the affairs of humans been made so starkly.  In a tradition that 138
emphasizes harmony and continuity, this work is unique because it describes just how out of 
alignment things can become. The message of this text is that anyone, regardless of their 
preternatural knowledge and awareness, may find themselves in distress. But they can achieve 
moral consistency in spite of poor circumstances because they are aware of the unbounded and 
immense net of the causal cosmos, in which things are alternatingly snared and set free. 
Individuals have little control over whether and when they get caught up in the net, which may 
 郭店楚墓竹简：穷达以时·忠信之道. 简帛书法选：编辑组编, 2002, 1137
 Cook, The Bamboo Texts of the Guodian, 435.138
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hinder them in any number of ways. The text warns, 「有其人，亡其世，雖賢弗行矣。」  139
‘When the person and the times don’t match up, then though one is worthy there will be no 
appropriate actions to take.’ Even though humans have a formative effect on the world and by 
observing ritual can preserve the mores that harmonize society, there are other forces at work that 
can retard these effects. Cataloged in the QDYS are the experiences of men who encountered the 
powerful kings, lords, and dukes who promoted them to their appropriate station in life. These 
men’s natures were not changed as they toiled in obscurity, and they did not change once they 
advanced to the side of their lords. Like a fragrant orchid in full florescence deep in the forest or 
a glittering emerald occluded by mountains of drab stone, the dignified person does not change 
their behavior depending on whether they are found or favored.  
 The QDYS describes, in moderate detail, the lives of a handful of farmers, prisoners, 
storekeepers, and shepherds, before they encountered their respective lords who would elevate 
them to prominence. The celebration of moral consistency during hard times mirrors the many 
tellings of Confucius in distress, namely those in the Mengzi and the Xunzi. But the collection of 
vignettes in the QDYS differs from the stories of Confucius because these men eventually 
attained notoriety in their lifetimes. These accounts encompass the full spectrum between failure 
[qiong窮] and success [da達]. These men saddled a revolution of yin to yang. It is tempting to 
ascribe to them a sort of telos that was not present in the stories of Confucius stranded between 
Chen and Cai, something along the lines of their labor not being in vain. But this would 
undermine the central message of moral constancy, which does not labor to make things come 
about but regardless of them. A subtler mistake, I argue, would be to take these figures as having 
 穷达以时, 1-2. 139
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done literally nothing to attract the attention of their respective kings, dukes, lords. The main 
active verb common to all of the vignettes, yu遇 ‘encounter,’ which may also be translated as 
‘opportunity’ or ‘chance,’ does not convey the sense that they were randomly found. Although 
these men did not go to the court and demand a position, they were scanning the horizon for an 
indication that their fates may change. Their prescient awareness allowed them to put themselves 
at the right place at the right time to facilitate effective communication.  
 My reading is different than interpretations of the QDYS that emphasize the passivity of 
the person focused on moral self-cultivation.  Rather than become anxious about a dearth of 140
opportunities, distinguished individuals would, in the absence of distinguishing scenarios, turn 
inward. This “inward turn” is noted by Michael Ing as a common interpretive mistake in the 
contemporary literature.  In his study of dysfunction of ritual, which focuses on the Liji禮記, 141
the Classic of Rites, he writes that presenting these ancient figures as unconcerned about the 
external state of affairs undermines the reasons why Ruists hold rituals to be such a central part 
of cultivated life.  Edward Slingerland is one target of this criticism, Ing claims, when he 142
ignores the distinction between preventable and unpreventable failure and the uncertainty in 
 See for example this quote from Dirk Meyer: “[T]he text puts forward the notion that the worthy 140
himself plays a rather passive role. He is of worth, and that is it. His fate changes because he encounters 
the right times (here: the superior). The second part of the introduction already implies this when pointing 
out the missing times of this encounter, not a missing worthy. This anticipates that the issue which the 
“Qiong da yi shi” observes is well beyond human influence.” From Meyer, Dirk, “Structure as a Means of 
Persuasion as Seen in the Manuscript ‘Qiong da yi shi’ from Tomb One, Guodian,” Oriens Extremus 45 
(2005/06), 188. 
 Michael David Kaulana Ing, The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism (Oxford: Oxford 141
University Press, 2012), 77.
 Ing. The Dysfunction of Ritual in Early Confucianism, 77.142
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these ancient works regarding which of these types would explain difficult times. In his essay 
“The Conception of Ming in Early Chinese Thought,” Slingerland emphasizes the passivity of 
the distinguished person when navigating the vagaries of fate that are beyond human control.  143
This essay is an interpretation of the concept ming命, which may be translated as fate and has the 
connotation of an impersonal, or non-egoist, force that shapes human possibilities. I add that 
ming命 might also be conceived as the ‘forces of nature’ that reveal and occlude patterns of 
change. This definition detracts from the temptation to ascribe to ming命 teleological or 
deterministic proclivities. It also prevents the temptation to pit the sometimes oppressive forces 
of ming命 directly against human striving. I believe this is erroneous because it undermines the 
complexity of the cosmos, reducing it to the level of human machination, which offends against 
the cosmological influence of early Chinese texts, including the Yijing described above. A 
passage from the Zhongyong cements this point. 
成己，仁也；成物，知也。性之德也，合外內之道也，故時措之宜也。  144
To realize oneself is to optimize one’s relationships with others. To realize the 
world is to live wisely in it. This instinctive ability to cultivate virtuosity shows 
that the internal and the external are integrated. This is how one knows how to put 
things in the right place.  
As does this passage from the Mengzi 
 Edward Slingerland, “The Conception of Ming in Early Chinese Thought,” Philosophy East and West 143
46:4 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1996), 567-581.




Mengzi said, “The myriad things in the world have their counterpart in us. 
Turning inward to realize myself gives me a profound sense of genuine 
understanding. If I seek to understand benevolence, I will find it in my 
sympathetic understanding of those close to me.   146
The interplay of human intentionality and the impersonal forces of ming命 does not have 
recourse to an internal and external conception of self and world because the relationship 
between self and world is akin to that among people. In each of the passages cited above, the 
external other and internal self (wai外, nei內; shu恕, shen身), as well as the natural and the 
human (wu物, ji己; wu物, wo我) are bound together. From this perspective, the idea of a person 
withdrawing from the world and pursuing internal self-cultivation does not get much traction. So 
I find it unconvincing when Slingerland writes, “If one does not understand ming, that is, what is 
internal and what is external to the project of self-cultivation, one will lack a sense of what is 
important and so misuse one's energies.”  Slingerland concludes that this does not mean a 147
complete withdrawal from one’s obligations, but that one’s energies should only attend to one’s 
“proper task.”  This interpretation hinges on what it means to dedicate one’s energies to pure 148
self-cultivation so that one’s efforts will not be wasted in unpropitious circumstances. But what 
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 13.4/67/24.145
 Translation based loosely on Bryan W. Van Norden. Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional 146
Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008).
 Slingerland, “The Conception of Ming in Early Chinese Thought,” 573.147
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would purely inward self-cultivation look like? In the intensely social setting of Confucian 
philosophy, there is little patience for the person who appears to be doing nothing. In the 
Analects 14.43, we find that one may not be given the benefit of the doubt about whether they 
are internally self-cultivating.  
Yuanrang was sitting on the floor with his legs stretched out, waiting. The Master 
scolded him, saying, “In one’s youth to be neither modest nor respectful to one’s 
elders, to grow up without having accomplished anything at all to pass on, and on 
growing old, not to have the courtesy to die, such a person is a thief.” He then 
rapped Yuanrang on the shin with his cane. (Ames & Rosemont trans.)  149
Yuanrang is a noted eccentric in the Ruist tradition. In the Liji, he is said to have sung an 
impromptu song during his mother’s funeral preparations, but Confucius did not remonstrate him 
and pretended he did not hear him. When asked why he carried on a relationship with this 
person, Confucius replied「丘聞之：親者毋失其為親也，故者毋失其為故也。」  “I have 150
heard this: Members of a family do not forget about their families, and friends do not forget 
about their friends.” But here we have Confucius beating the old man, his friend, with his cane! 
It seems like he has finally lost patience with Yuanrang. Ostensibly, Yuanrang has not been 
dedicated to cultivating himself because Confucius accuses him of accomplishing nothing in his 
life, and he chides Yuanrang for not even having the dignity to die.  
 I have related this story from the Analects in order to shed light on the activity of self-
cultivation. This story indicates that it is not a completely personal or independent activity. The 
 Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New 149
York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 182.
 ICS Concordance to the Liji, 4.69/30/8.150
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QDYS offers the advice that one must wait for the appropriate moment, when one encounters the 
opportunity to be pulled from obscurity and its concomitant hardships. But this waiting is not an 
unsubstantial, idle passing of the time. The final few strips of the QDYS indicate that one should 
not behave any differently whether in obscurity or prominence. I take this to mean that just as 
one is busy when one is in favor, which means daily appointments to structure and maintain 
social and political relationships as well as awareness of influences and proclivities in the court 
and official bureaucracies, one must also busy oneself while out of favor. Self-cultivation is 
never a purely an inward-directed activity.    
 The call to continue to cultivate oneself even in obscurity, when the intent and the effect 
of one’s actions do not match up, keeps the possibility of communication open. With this in 
mind, we can read the stories of Confucius stranded between Chen and Cai in one of two ways. 
Either he was delusional about his purpose in life and all of his travels to curry favor with 
whoever would listen were fool’s errands, or he was waiting in the nuanced sense I have 
described above by attempting to put himself in a position to encounter the opportunity he was 
certain would one day arise. The latter reading is more easily defended in this context. Laboring 
in the darkness of ill-repute aside, Confucius was not existentially destitute. He was merely at the 
whim of the vicissitudes of failure and success. These vicissitudes are further chronicled in the 
Feng su tong yi風俗通義. 
Failure and Success in the Feng su tong yi風俗通義 
 The Han Dynasty text, the Feng su tong yi風俗通義, the Comprehensive Discussion of 
Customs (hereafter FSTY), by Ying Shao應劭 (140-206 CE) described the practices of the 
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common people, reconciled accounts of anomalies, examined the history of the Chinese literati, 
and anthologized the various religious and cultural practices of the tumultuous Eastern Han 
Dynasty. The seventh chapter (juan卷) is titled qiongtong窮通, “Impeded, Unimpeded.” It is a 
compilation of passages from many known works, including the Mengzi and the Xunzi, but with 
several original insights. It was a resource for those who found themselves in inhospitable 
circumstances by providing seminal examples of ancient sages in distress, including Confucius. 
 Michael Nylan pinpoints the purpose of the FSTY as the unification, under one pattern, 
of the myriad, contradictory, and unexplainable forces shaping the world. “Written in a time of 
turmoil,” she writes, “the Feng su tong yi assumes unity of political empire and institutions to be 
the secondary outgrowth of a more fundamental unity of thought.”  This thought coalesced in 151
Ruist social principles, which orbit around one true ruler and are not enforced by laws but are 
upheld by rituals. Ying wrote that this was only possible during times of peace and harmony, 
states conducive to human thriving. He was pragmatic in this regard, and he realized that there 
was no sense pushing the Ruist agenda into the face of adversity. In the qiongtong窮通 
“Impeded, Unimpeded” chapter, Ying chronicled the stories of how the sages conducted 
themselves when they found themselves in distress, many of which I have already mentioned, 
but several of them tweaked to play up Ruist themes or moral psychology. Ying Shao describes 
the metaphor of tong通 as a talent of the sage to order the people according to the blueprint of 
the cosmos so that they operate in productive harmony. The sage is unhindered by political or 
social agendas and may penetrate (tong通) through the chaff that obscures the simplicity of 
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harmony and balance, and importantly for the Ruist sage, the place of humans as an integral part 
of this harmony. Its antonym, qiong窮, is indicative of being at an impasse, without the ability to 
move forward. By chronicling the stories of the sages, Ying makes it clear that the ability to 
determine (tong通) the organic movements of the world does not define the sage qua sage, but is 
rather the confluence of the sage’s intentions and the prevailing circumstances of the empire. 
When the times are not conducive to the probing (tong通) of the sage, then the sage must 
likewise recede. Ying Shao emphasizes the eventual return of the sage to prominence, and as in 







The Yi states, “Of the images hung in the sky, none are as bright as those of the 
sun and moon.” But now things are confounding and obscured. The Shi says 
beautifully, “Rushing mightily are the Jiang and Han rivers, the regulators of the 
south and north.” But now things are obstructed and sluggish. In the Lunyu, 
“Surely of all those heaven has endowed, none are more certain to be a sage. But 
now things are oppressive and evil. The sun and moon do not lose track of their 
 ICS Concordance to the Qiong Da Yi Shi, 49/11. From Dirk Meyer’s Bamboo Texts from the Guodian. 152
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function, and so they disappear behind the earth, but then they eventually return to 
their former luminescence. The Jiang and Han rivers do not lose track of their 
path, and although they may become obstructed, they will eventually return to 
their former smooth flow. The sages of antiquity did not lose their excellence, so 
although they were discarded, they returned to their former brilliance. It is not 
only the sagacious who have such probing awareness. Those who demonstrate 
constancy may likewise achieve their utmost perfection. This is the reason that if 
junzi fall into a pitiable state of exhaustion and impediment, they do not then 
mourn. If they labor only to be insulted, then they do not lose focus. They are 
content with their lot so where could they place blame for their poor fortune? 
Hence this record of first encountering limitation and strife but then returning to 
good fortune and delight will be called “Impeded, Unimpeded.” 
The chapter includes the stories of Confucius and Mengzi falling out of favor, becoming 
impoverished, but then rising to a position of respect, if not prominence. The conclusions of 
these stories are where Ying Shao leaves his most distinguishing marks. The citizens of Qi thank 
Confucius as he returns to his humble town after reordering and annotating classics and 
rectifying the names so that power could not be abused again in the name of the ancients. And 
even though Mengzi was prevented from exercising his vision, any ruler would have appreciated 
his thought.  
 In the FSTY, Ying Shao embellished the Ruist insistence on the inherent value of moral 
constancy with happy endings for its troubled heroes. He emphasized the patterning of the 
universe and the inevitability of change, which virtually guarantees that everyone who cultivates 
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themselves would eventually receive their proper due. Their due is not monetary success or 
political influence, as in the stories of the QDYS, but the reassurance of knowing that if the times 
had been more propitious, they would have achieved prominence. They might die poor, but they 
are not existentially destitute. Their path is strewn with obstacles, but they press on.  
 Failure cannot be prevented but the deleterious effects of failure on one’s character can. 
Cultivated awareness of oneself and the world may reveal opportunities to re-balance one’s lot. 
The inability to effect this balance or continue to try is existential destitution. This interpretation 
requires a different metaphysical picture than that of the person who is contented regardless of 
their circumstances. The experience of the limit of human striving is the coupling of coming up 
against the way things are (tian天) or fate (ming命), and the existential limit that is not outside of 
oneself, but an intricate part of what it takes to make sense of a world that is unpredictable and at 
times dysfunctional. The limit is the occlusion of one’s own possibilities. It is a lack of 
communication and connectivity to the dynamic forces that shape the world. The result is a 
feeling of being disconnected and incapable of effecting positive change. I interpret Mengzi 
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When Mengzi was leaving Qi, on the road Chong Yu noted, “Your face has a 
worried look lately. Before today I heard you say that ‘A distinguished person 
does not resent heaven and especially not people.’” Mengzi replied “That was 
then. This is now. I thought that every five hundred years it was certain that the 
right and proper king would come along, accompanied by people who would 
make a name for themselves. Since the Zhou, seven hundred years have passed. 
Counting the years, the time has long passed, and I have been expecting them to 
rise up. But it does not seem like peace and good governance are in store for the 
empire. If it were to come about, whose priority would it be other than mine? 
Why should I not be dissatisfied?’’ 
Mengzi is uncertain about of whether things will improve and whether he will take part in the 
shift if it occurs. This is the existential limitation I am tracing, beginning with the story of 
Confucius stranded between Chen and Cai. The moral sagacity and penetrating awareness of 
cosmotic change ought to guarantee that these sages and distinguished individuals achieve some 
measure of success. But there are times when obstructive forces prevail. Confucius presses on, 
traveling from state to state, expanding his network of communication by impressing his vision 
of an ideal empire on those he meets. This desire for communication in times of hardship goes 
against an interpretation that emphasizes his passivity, or perhaps sullen disappointment, in 
simply waiting for better times to roll around. In an attempt to reconcile his vision with reality, 
and in the face of doubt, Confucius traveled in order to intensify and grow his network of 
relationships.  
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 Karl Jaspers describes this motivation as the ‘will to communication.’ Describing this 
will, he writes: 
It places trust in itself and in possibility in the world, a trust that can be 
disappointed time and again and lead to doubt, not in its foundation but in its 
specific actualization. It also trusts the truth of the other, which is not his but 
which, as truth, must include some mode of the possibility of communication. 
Therefore this will cannot simply be extinguished under the burden of failure. 
Perhaps it possesses, where it is actual, a kind of spirited moderation in which it 
plans out a vision of its path as idea—to be sure, without an extended actuality but 
as the expression of his possibility which never betrays itself.  154
This remark is given in the context of Jaspers' discussion about the nature of truth. He 
emphasizes that there is not one truth that exactly explains one reality, but rather that each 
individual who searches for certainty founders on an aspect of revealed but uncognoscible truth. 
This truth is what fuels each life project, or as he describes it, the path each individual chooses 
both as their present and their own possibilities. I must also clarify that here Jaspers does not 
simply mean verbal communication between oneself and an other, but a metaphysically-
grounded questioning directed outward. He has in mind a conversation with the 
incomprehensible otherness that comprises a world shaped by natural as well as social, political, 
and economic forces. It is only from within this maelstrom that humans can hope to make sense 
of the world, and the certainty of purpose required to walk a path cut through it must be 
consistently, actively verified as an appropriate projection into the future, or as a path one 
 Ehrlich, et al., Karl Jaspers, 298-9.154
#120
chooses to continue following. The hallmarks of Jaspers' philosophy are the yawning gaps in 
certainty where suddenly foundations once held uncontrovertibly true are undermined by doubt. 
When the world, an undeniable empirical certainty, pulls away from our expectations like a boat 
from the dock, and we see the dark water below, we wonder if our communication with the 
world is genuine or whether we have been misled.  
 This feeling of existential limitation, the inability to match up one’s goals to the 
possibilities presented by the world, is especially distressing if one is living in poverty. The 
existential danger is that faced with overwhelming obstruction, one will cease trying to facilitate 
communication and connectivity. Existential destitution is characterized by passivity and 
detachment. The existentially destitute are mired in the lonely margins of the world. How does 
enriching a concept of existential destitution aid in helping those suffering from homelessness 
today? 
Practical Application of the Distinction Between Economic and Existential Poverty: 
Affordable Housing and Housing First in Honolulu 
 Distinguishing between economic and existential poverty is important because 
generalizing in a way that roots all poverty in a lack of money obscures the fact that the poor 
stand at the intersection of many contributing factors. If poverty is simplified to economics, the 
fact that the system may itself generate inequality will be overlooked. A purely economic view of 
poverty that ignores issues of disability, race, gender, and multi-generational poverty amounts to 
weaponized apathy. These factors affect a person’s ability to become integrated into networks 
that facilitate success. Chinese philosophy contributes two novel factors to this discussion. First, 
#121
as a result of the influence of the Yijing, this tradition emphasizes the interconnectedness of the 
processes that shape experience and include the efforts of humans. Such a view complicates 
placing blame squarely on those who find themselves in difficult circumstances for their 
hardship. Second, the holistic view of the ideal Confucian world incorporates natural and social 
forces into one dynamic and complex reality. The ability to improve social circumstances is 
brought about by the optimal alignment of things, and ignoring the potential for societal 
improvement invites obstruction (qiong窮). This is an important contribution to understanding 
homelessness today because change can be wrought through the modification of political and 
economic systems in a way that does not challenge any prevailing, natural way of things. I will 
use the example of permanent housing strategies to solving homelessness to show the productive 
novelty of this view. 
 Permanent housing strategies began to be implemented in Honolulu in 2013 and aim to 
create housing that is offered to the unsheltered for free or at reduced rates. This approach relies 
primarily on state and federal funds to cover the expenses not paid by the beneficiaries. 
Opponents feel that providing housing at little or no cost sins against the social tenet of earning 
commensurate on effort. Those who have not succeeded at securing a stably-housed life are 
presumed to have handicapped themselves. As a result of this judgment, boundaries of difference 
are erected that impair compassionate responses to the suffering of the unsheltered. Though they 
are passed on the street every day, they are not seen. So when ballot measures and government 
bills that fund approaches to remedy homelessness appear in the social mainstream, there is 
resistance because individuals experiencing homelessness are not seen as having the same 
relationship to the government as housed citizens, those who are more socially present. Their 
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need for secure shelter is not seen as a human need, but an economic expenditure that may 
detract from other projects with more relevance to the housed. On this view, there is an 
inalienable connection between contributing to society and the merit of social spending. Those 
who are too poor to contribute to society do not get to draw from it. This, I think, is the danger of 
collapsing the distinction between economic and existential poverty.  
 Proponents of permanent housing strategies for ameliorating homelessness claim that not 
only do these approaches reduce social spending, but they also have significant positive social 
outcomes. Housing is more than shelter. It brings individuals into alignment with the prevailing 
patterns and expectations of society. Bridging the divide between housed and unhoused 
overcomes a significant barrier to social inclusion because the supportive formations of human 
relationships are currently almost exclusively among the housed. The result of not being included 
among sustaining and supporting relationships is existential destitution, which in turn limits the 
possibility of communication in the nuanced sense I described above. The world is inscrutable 
and silent for those who are disconnected from the currents that harmonize the world. Housing 
First strategies address existential poverty by providing a baseline requirement for social 
inclusion, personal and secure shelter, as well as supportive services such as drug and alcohol 
dependency treatment on a voluntary basis. Permanent housing strategies recognize that although 
economic and existential poverty are bound together, focusing on methods that reduce the latter 
has sustainably successful results. I argue that this approach, viewed using concepts from 
Chinese philosophy, may change the way that we view homelessness. Rather than framing 
housing assistance as an intervention, which implies intentional action against naturally 
prevailing forces, the resources gleaned from Chinese philosophy show the possibility of 
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changing the boundaries of social inclusion to more naturally include those who are not 
integrated. If we accept the premise that supportive and inclusive communities are necessary for 
human flourishing, expanding these communities is the responsibility of a developed society, not 
merely an economic decision.  
Conclusion  
What does ancient Chinese philosophy have to offer to the modern problem of poverty and 
isolation that results in homeless individuals and families? It provides a different context for 
viewing the causes and effects of poverty as well as a new lens to view the effectiveness of 
programs designed to impact homelessness. In this chapter, I used resources in Chinese 
philosophy to make a distinction between existential and economic poverty. In these sources, 
economic poverty and failure are woven into the dynamic fabric of the cosmos, and so are 
beyond one’s personal control. But how one conducts oneself in poverty is a pivotal expression 
of the human will, for if one becomes existentially poor, there are few opportunities to change 
things for the better.  
 The difficulties of finding effective contemporary solutions to homelessness arise in a 
time of unparalleled affluence and technological advancement, and in effect, two worlds have 
emerged. One is the benchmark of the aforementioned successes, and the other is populated with 
the hopelessly poor, and the distance between the two widens in correlation with rising Gross 
Domestic Product. The danger of this situation for those in the unenviable world is the corrosive 
effect of poverty on human flourishing. The feeling of being disconnected from and 
inconsequential to the world of ease and opportunity feeds both fears and realities of permanent 
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hardship. By contrast, the Chinese philosophies I have discussed draw everything together into a 
single dynamic whole. These philosophies speak to a connected, interdependent world in which 
people play an integral part. For Confucians, human harmonies were ordered by moral 
hierarchies. 
 In the next chapter, I will explore the concept of moral hierarchy. I will focus on the 
bottom, the common folk. Many early Chinese philosophical texts indicate that the common 
folks have little control over their lives and surroundings, which is why the ruler has an 
imperative to facilitate their livelihood. Although this seems to indicate a division between the 
common folk and the rest of society, there is a thread of culpability tying the bottom to the top. 
On my appraisal of the current situation of homelessness, this thread has been cut, and the result 
has been a free-fall of the most vulnerable populations. I will discuss the alienation that results 
from not being in the kin of social awareness and concern using resources from Chinese 
philosophy as well as contemporary agricultural economics. The world’s poorest populations are 
primarily subsistence farmers and peasants who are not a part of the prevailing world economy, 
which not only does not support them but keeps them in poverty. I will use this as a metaphor for 
the barriers that prevent social inclusion more generally, and apply it to the problem of homeless 
among Hawaiians.  
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Chapter Three. Agrarianism and Constitutive Relationships Among Persons and Places 
 In the previous chapter, I studied accounts of poverty from ancient Chinese texts to elicit 
a few themes that I used to add depth to the issue of permanent housing strategies for the 
unsheltered in Hawaiʻi. First, the condition of poverty may be beyond one’s control. If even 
sages can find themselves destitute, then there must be other forces contributing to human 
difficulties. Second, one must continue to cultivate oneself even during unrelenting hardship. I 
explored the lack of existential self-certainty in this context. How can one be sure they are on the 
right path? At some point, one must ask if the uncertainty of the times has infiltrated and 
obscured one’s certainty of purpose. In the Confucian tradition, this doubt fuels self-reflection 
and self-cultivation, which in turn bolsters certainty of purpose. This resolve is captured in the 
many phrases beginning with qiong er bu...窮⽽不…, poor but not…, which are followed by 
adjectives typically used to describe the poor: ‘resentful,’ ‘pitiable,’ ‘besieged,’ and ‘lost.’ A 
person who is dedicated to the Ruist vision of a harmonious world must never believe that they 
are truly at a dead end. The world shifts precipitously one way then the other, but the things held 
dear by a distinguished person (junzi君⼦) do not. We know that many of the pivotal works of 
the Chinese philosophical tradition were penned during periods of unrest and strife, so it is not 
surprising that many of these concerned appropriate, moral responses to chaotic and undermining 
circumstances. In an age when brigands and thieves proliferate, how does one define and 
delineate a path to follow? In the context of the Housing First initiatives in Hawaiʻi, which 
modified the programs adopted in other states to suit Hawaiʻi’s unique unsheltered population, I 
suggested we view those who are in need of housing in this light. When people are not housed, 
their ability to flourish becomes extremely limited. Rather than begin to catalog all of the things 
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that went wrong in order for these individuals to come up short on their ability to pay for 
housing, Housing First programs simply put people in homes, and usually with few or no strings 
attached. I explored the connection between this treatment of the unsheltered and the theme of 
‘unpropitious circumstances’ in the Chinese philosophical tradition.  
 In this chapter, I will again turn to this scenario, but instead of focusing on the potential 
for flourishing in the face of hardship ascribed to the sage or distinguished person, I will widen 
the lens to view the backdrop of human struggle more generally in the Chinese philosophical 
tradition. Because chaos rules in a chaotic age, one might assume that this background was 
populated with the immoral and uncivilized, with petty people run amok. Although the petty and 
corrupt would achieve prominence during these times, according to Pre-Qin and Han Dynasty 
philosophical texts, there is a large population that is not classified as either moral or immoral. 
The common folk, toiling in the fields and in the evenings performing folk ceremonies, were 
given no choice but to succumb to chaos in a chaotic age.  
 I will begin by showing that the common folk had no agency to counteract difficult times 
and that they are the most vulnerable to the effects of these times. The world of the common folk 
does not include any substantial notion of freedom, as it is shaped and manipulated by outside 
forces. The common folk have a visceral connection to the land, which provides for them during 
prosperous times and withholds during inauspicious times. This mixture of alienation, from a 
political perspective, and communion, from a social and ecological perspective, defines the 
ancient agrarian setting of Chinese civilization. The centrality of farming is an inextricable part 
of early Chinese social identity. This tradition stretches back to pre-antiquity with the mythical 
sage Shen Nong神農, the “God of the Tillers.” He interpreted the cosmos and wrote the language 
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of the hexagrams collected to form the Zhouyi周易 divination manual, created farming tools and 
worked alongside the people in the fields, brought the common folk into fruitful communion 
with the land, and taught people methods for being self-sufficient. Traces of this agrarian past are 
still distinguishable today in the writings of anthropologist and philosopher Fei Xiaotong 
(1910-2005), who argues that the defining differences between Chinese society and those in what 
he refers to as the ‘West’ are a result of different organization patterns. As I will discuss, he 
emphasizes the deep cultural effects of China’s agrarian past on contemporary Chinese 
communitarian politics in a way that plants the farmer at the center of Chinese identity. 
 I will then turn to modern farming, where the division between peasants and modern 
farming industry, markets, and infrastructure marks the limit of their world. Many times living in 
abject poverty, the peasant’s world is shaped by forces that they cannot shape or change. In the 
wake of capitalistic world trends, their way of life, traditional subsistence farming, is no longer 
viable. Similarly, Hawaiian farming practices have largely given way to modern commercial 
practices, forsaking a substantial part of the Hawaiian cultural identity and the livelihood of 
native Hawaiians. I will conclude by arguing that as a result of this and other policies that 
subjugate relationality among people and the land they inhabit, opting instead for an 
individualistic narrative that hinges on personal achievement, the prevalence of native Hawaiians 
in the state’s unsheltered population is a structural problem that is difficult to address from 
within the modern, capitalist paradigm. 
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The Common Folk in Ruist Texts 
 Although the question of why bad things happen to good people is a common theme in 
the Pre-Qin texts, by the Han Dynasty, when these texts achieved their widest distribution, the 
intended audience was a specific section of society, namely, those who were eligible for state-
sanctioned bureaucratic positions. Men of established lineages who had access to the appropriate 
education and resources were so numerous that pedigree was not enough to receive a position in 
court, and many of them related to the idea that fate was acting to deter their progress to their 
desired height in the system. The subjects of the instructive Ruist stories were preoccupied with 
this worry, as indicated by the many rags to riches tales, but it would have been unlikely that a 
commoner would have found their way into the rooms where the privilege was conferred. We 
must view the poverty described in the stories, for example, the many tellings of Confucius 
stranded between Chen and Cai, not simply as a historical portrayal of a man living in dire 
straits. The reason why his strife is described time and time again is that he deserved better. His 
way of seeing the world should not have been overlooked, and it was shameful that no one 
vested with political power was lucid enough to see that at the time. This is what makes him such 
a relatable figure, and the fact or fiction of the story a negligible detail.  
 What problematizes the application of poverty described in the Confucian context to 
poverty in contemporary times is that the two situations are woven into different political 
paradigms. The morals and motives in early Chinese texts were not meant to solve the problems 
of poverty but to promise the worthy that the recognition they deserved would come in time, and 
that hardship was only a temporary test of their character. This is not the case for the common 
folk, who had no choice but to succumb to chaotic times, as shown by their presentation in early 
#129
Ruist texts. In a world that was structured and harmonized hierarchically, those at the bottom, 
closest to the earth and furthest from the sovereign ruler, were limited in many ways.  
 I will begin with a few selections from the Analects that show the inability of the 
common people (min民) to carry out individual, ethical actions. This singular, impressionable 
mass of people cannot be taught the ethical principles that govern the elite but must be 
controlled, indirectly, by other means. From the Analects 2.19: 
哀公問曰：「何為則民服︖」孔⼦對曰：「舉直錯諸枉，則民服︔舉枉錯諸
直，則民不服。」   155
Duke Ai asked, “How do I go about making the common folk serve me?” Kongzi 
replied, “Lift the upright people and bury the crooked, then the common folk will 
serve you. Lift the crooked people and bury the upright, then the common folk 
will not serve you.”  156
This passage emphasizes indirect rule over the common folk. If we accept the premise that the 
common people are not able to self-cultivate without intervention, except perhaps in a few rare 
cases such as Kongzi himself and his disciple Yan Hui, then their actions cannot be assessed as 
right or wrong, efficacious or deleterious. Rather, they are exposed to distinguished actions of the 
elite and ruling class, who influence their behavior. By allowing those culpable for their actions 
to act contrary to ritual propriety or with a dearth of self-control, a ruler risks a mirroring 
unruliness among the common people. From the Analects 8.9, in reference to the appropriate 
method (dao道) of rulership: 
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, no. 16, 3/2/19.155
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⼦曰：「民可使由之，不可使知之。」  157
Kongzi said, "The common folk can go along with it, but they cannot go on to 
know it.” 
Although similar to the previously cited passage, this selection delivers the message bluntly. The 
common folk must be ordered by example rather than by an appeal to higher principles. Bringing 
in the metaphor of understanding as penetrating insight (tong通) discussed in the previous 
chapter, I will conjecture that being unable to understand (zhi知) indicates a profound limitation 
of the common folk in the sense of tong’s antonym, qiong窮. As I will argue later, they do not 
forge their own paths (dao道), but only meander among the prevailing realities. This limitation is 
shown in the Analects 7.20, again regarding the way things ought to be (dao道): 
孔⼦曰：「⽣⽽知之者，上也。學⽽知之者，次也。困⽽學之，又其次也。
困⽽不學，民斯為下矣。」   158
Kongzi said, “The ones at the top were born knowing it. The next below them are 
the ones who studied and came to know it. Those who had limited access but 
studied it nonetheless are just below them. And the common folk at the bottom 
have limited access and do not study it.” 
In this passage, the character translated as ‘common people,’ min民, is used to describe those on 
the lowest rung of the social ladder: those furthest from attaining moral completion or those 
whose efforts are the least notable. The others are simply those ‘above,’ shang上, and those who 
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, no. 16, 14/8/9.157
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, no. 16, 34/16/9.158
#131
come ‘next,’ ci次. This passage does not make it clear whether the folks at the bottom choose 
whether or not to study. I argue that the simplicity of the characters 不學, which I have translated 
as ‘do not study,’ is for consistent parallelism and rhyme, hallmarks of ancient Chinese texts, 
more than for describing what the common folks are capable of or choose to do. In fact, the other 
passages I have included lend to the interpretation that because the common folk do not 
understand it, there would be no reason to study it. Instead, they encounter the way things are in 
a way that does not include epistemic discovery. Their lives are contextualized within a larger, 
encompassing frame in which they have little creative moral power. While their behavior can 
exacerbate bad conditions, they act from a foundation of mimicry, taking instruction from those 
above as well as from generationally transmitted wisdom. The way to prevent the common folk 
from becoming unruly depends on a corporeal and aesthetic mode of education, which 
encourages harmoniously moral behavior, rather than a set of directions distributed in a top-
down manner. In the next section, I will discuss this mode in the context of harmony in the 
Confucian tradition, which emphasizes inclusivity and cohesion among the different 
stratifications of a moral society. 
Social Harmony in Confucian Thought and the Place of the Common Folk 
 In this section, I will summarize the Confucian theory of harmony and the expectations of 
the common folk in a Confucian society. Theories of harmony in the Chinese philosophical 
tradition do not emphasize equality per se, but rather that each element has its proper place. In 
the Ruist socio-metaphysical system, which privileges change over stasis, harmony is only 
possible in dynamicity. In his book The Confucian Principle of Harmony, Li Chenyang writes, 
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“Confucian harmony is multi-lateral and multi-faceted.”  He lists five characteristics of 159
Confucian harmony (he和): heterogeneity, tension, coordination and cooperation, 
transformations, and renewal.  This type of harmony emphasizes the ephemeral compatibility 160
of difference, and that the tension between opposites is what makes harmony possible. The 
motivation for promoting Confucian harmony is to close the rift between the natural world and 
the human world, which opens during times of strife and chaos, when even the sage cannot use 
their powers of discernment (tong通) to order and align all of the forces of the world, including 
social forces. Li writes: 
 For Confucians, the difference between harmony and disharmony is one between 
good and bad, right and wrong, and success and failure. As far as the need for 
harmony is concerned, Confucians tend to see more continuity than distinctions 
between the “private sphere” and the “public sphere,” between the political and 
the non-political, and between human society and the natural world. When 
persons and things are engaged in a healthy, stable interplay and each gets its due, 
it is described as harmony; the opposite is disharmony.   161
Confucian harmony is radically inclusive. There is nothing and no one left out of the picture of 
an optimally harmonized world. This is due first to the pervasiveness of the socio-political 
construal of geographical space in this philosophical tradition. The imperial construal of the 
world is seen in the Shanhai jing 山海經 or the Classic of Mountains and Seas (compiled 
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between 500-200 BC), an early gazetteer that records the strange and otherworldly creatures 
living in the hinterlands of the empire, far from the ruling center of human society. This text was 
one of the earliest examples of the political construal of geographical space. The further one 
travels from the central pivot of the empire, the ruler, who is given authority by celestial forces to 
order and organize the world, the more uncivilized and unexplainable things become. This is 
what I mean by the imperial construal of the world. This metaphor is not only horizontally 
spatial but vertical as well. Those of elevated importance occupy a space physically above those 
below, in a palanquin (jiào轿), or upper hall (shangtang上堂). The metaphysical perspective of 
the cosmos is never far from the physical. The proximity of those with power to the forces that 
shape the world (tian天) is another instance of this spatial metaphor, as the sovereign ruler 
(tianzi天⼦) either facilitates or upends a harmonious empire through sagacious ordering or 
nefarious activity. The results of a poorly ordered empire can come in the form of civil unrest or, 
in extreme cases, massively destructive droughts and floods. In short, the ruler, with his close 
proximity to these cosmic forces above, shapes the world, while those closest to the earth and 
thus furthest from such power are understood to be ‘below’ and without control or effect on these 
forces. 
 This paints a different picture than one that portrays all people as having similar faculties, 
imaginations, and capabilities. But it also gives everyone a place to dwell. Confucian socio-
political hierarchy, rendered geometrically, resembles a cone with the ruler at the top and the 
circumference of the base representative of the boundaries of the empire. This simple 
representation is problematic as the boundaries of the cone would have to be moderately 
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permeable to forces that do not originate from within. But this also may be a fruitful way of 
pointing out the moral influence of the worthy ruler to instate the proper shape. Without the ruler 
to hold up the top, the shape will become disfigured, yet without the parity of force among all 
those that comprise the base, the shape cannot be held upright. 
 This concept of harmony had a profound influence on the political ideals described in 
Warring States texts. The preservation of difference and tension among sections of society meant 
that a system of laws and regulations would not be effective, as they would risk reducing the 
relationships among people to a common standard. Ideally, different types of relationships are 
determined by appropriate types of behaviors, and each party has a responsibility to the other to 
facilitate a relationship morally beneficial to each party. These relationships (renlun⼈倫), 
according to the Mengzi, were defined by the filial sentiment between father and son (fu zi you 
qin⽗⼦有親), the civic responsibilities between distinguished persons and ruler-ministers (jun 
chen you yi 君臣有義), the distinctions between husband and wife (fu qin you bie 夫婦有別), the 
respective responsibilities, or pecking order, of seniors and juniors (chang you you xi 長幼有序), 
and trust between friends (peng you you xin 朋友有信).  On my reading, only if these values 162
are put into practice, and when everyone cultivates these relationships in uncoerced, organic, and 
mutually beneficial ways, can a harmonious Ruist society come to pass.  
 According to the Mengzi, the appropriateness of these relationships is the result of moral 
education and not necessarily the natural proclivity of humans. Only with moral education can 
the potential, that all people have, be cultivated, and in a harmonized society everyone must 
 The translations of these relationships are my own. I intend for them to convey the responsiveness and 162
fluidity of these foundational relationships that offer insight into any possible relationship.
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achieve a degree of cultivation. But the Mengzi did not prescribe a system for universal 
education to facilitate this goal. Instead, society must first have an educated core of individuals 
who would spread the virtues of ritualized living among those proximal to them. So rather than 
educate the common folk en masse, they would be educated indirectly, by mimicking the 
behaviors of the distinguished individuals (junzi君⼦). Even if the common folk did come into 
the fold of civility, they would never be elevated out of their station, for their labor is necessary 
to facilitate the lifestyle and education of those above. The moral education of the masses, after 
all, is not meant to facilitate democratic engagement; it promotes social harmony and cohesion. 
Although moral education is non-coercive, it keeps people in their place. The place of the 
common folk is mainly in production, the growing and selling of their wares, so the moral 
lessons transmitted to them, as shown in the Mencius, ought to be limited to that scope. 
 The selection that follows is a conversation between Mengzi and Xu Xing’s newest 
disciple Chen Xiang. Chen was very taken with the teachings about Shen Nong神農, the sage of 
pre-antiquity who was celebrated for inventing the plow based on the blueprint of the cosmos 
and working alongside the farmers before the world fell to ruin. Carrying his plow handle with 
him into the city, Chen speaks with Mengzi about the coming of the sage ruler who would restore 
order by creating a society in which everyone would provide for themselves. First, Mengzi 
accuses the traveler’s master, Xu Xing, of being a hypocrite for not making his own cap and 
cooking pots, but instead trading for them with grain he had grown. Mengzi asks,  
「何為紛紛然與百⼯交易︖何許⼦之不憚煩︖」   163
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 5.4/28/28-9.163
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Why does he lower himself to the confusing and complicated trading? Why does 
Xu Xing put himself through the trouble? 
If everyone who has a skill is given the ability to do only one thing,  like making pots, then 164
everyone else will be saved the trouble of having to do it themselves, and that person can 
dedicate themselves to pots without having to worry about making other items. For Mengzi, this 
market is enriched by a moral economy as well. If those who are educated in ritual and social 
mores participate this market, then by the cultivation of everyone, according to their station, 
society will flourish. This market would also teach the common folk what is valuable by relating 




Things are inherently unequal. Some are twice or five times as valuable, others 
ten or a hundred times, and still others a thousand or ten thousand times as 
valuable. If you instead say that everything is of equal value, then there will be 
chaos throughout the empire. If fine shoes and shoddy shoes were the same price, 
then who would want to make better ones? If people wanted to follow the way of 
Xu Xing, they would lead each other into artifice. How would the empire be 
ordered like this?  166
 A comparison to Plato’s Republic would not be inappropriate here.164
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 5.4/30/3-5.165
 Translation based on Bryan W. Van Norden, Mengzi: With Selections from the Traditional 166
Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 73.
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Just as a market must be regulated to reflect the true worth of its wares, otherwise vendors may 
make up any price they wish, those with moral worth must be valued with respect to their 
contributions to a harmonious society. This is not to devalue the contributions of farmers and 
artisans to society, but to affirm that there is a proper balance of manual and intellectual labor. 
From the Mengzi, famously: 
或勞⼼，或勞⼒︔勞⼼者治⼈，勞⼒者治於⼈︔治於⼈者食⼈，治⼈者食於
⼈：天下之通義也。   167
There are those that labor with the power of their minds and those labor with their 
physical strength. Thinkers govern, and workers are governed. The governed 
provide and those that govern are provided for. This is how it should be 
everywhere. 
It might be tempting, given contemporary modes of political discourse, to think that the 
hierarchy celebrated by Mengzi fosters a power differential that disenfranchises common folk. 
But it would be irresponsible to reduce the social philosophy of the Mengzi to the Platonic notion 
of the visceral connection between a person and their station, which has the disagreeable effect 
of positing a person who has and would want no choice other than cleaning latrines. Mengzi is 
not concerned with the economic system that would be given rise by his statements as much as 
he is the social impact of implementing a moral society, and the metaphor is an appropriate way 
to reach the common folk. The essential difference between the laborers and the intellectuals is a 
moral one, the former having the ability to cultivate themselves according to the internalization 
of ritual and the laborers lacking that ability. According to the metaphor of the moral economy, 
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 5.4/29/1-2.167
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laborers are morally poor; they lack the intellectual capital to participate directly in the moral 
market. Instead, they are sold a less complex version of moral currency, which includes five 
paradigmatic relationships, and gives them the ability to participate in a moral society in a way 
that recognizes their moral worth. This can only be the case in a society where everyone’s basic 
needs are met, and so it is the interest of the elite to provide for the poor so that the moral 
currency will have a wider distribution. But in order to ensure that the common folk are not taken 
advantage of, the responsibility of the ruling elite to the common populace is emphasized time 
and time again. This necessitates an explanation of the political authority within a harmonious 
society.  
 In his essay titled “Probing the Three Bonds and the Five Relationships,”  Tu Weiming 168
advises his readers on how the ancient Ruist tradition ought to be interpreted today. 
The secularity of Confucian ethics in dealing with the mundane affairs of the 
world gives it a particular contour significantly different from those of the other 
major ethicoreligious traditions (e.g., Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism). The 
Confucian life orientation, being this-worldly, takes political authority seriously 
as an essential factor for the maintenance of social order. Confucians consider the 
respect for authority an important virtue, even though they are often highly 
critical of the existing power relationships. This is predicated on the Confucian 
emphasis on duty-consciousness, which is more demanding of the leadership 
(including the ruling minority and the cultural elite) than of the general populace. 
The rationale is that self-imposed discipline as a lifestyle of personal cultivation is 
 These relationships are the same as those in the discussion of the Mengzi above. 168
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a prerequisite for moral and political leadership. A clear manifestation of this 
lifestyle is the practice of frugality; the precarious livelihood of the farmer rather 
than the conspicuous consumption of the merchant serves as the basis for social 
ethics. It was not an accident that the Confucian intellectual considered the 
farmer, rather than the merchant, as the embodiment of the desired philosophy of 
life.  169
I have included this long quote to highlight a couple of avenues I will be taking in the remainder 
of this chapter. In order for there to be social order, an inclusive political context must be 
maintained. The responsibility of the rulers and elite to provide for the common folks is 
mentioned many times in the Liji禮記, the Book of Rites, and I will focus on two selections, the 
Daxue⼤學, or Great Learning, one of the Confucian Four Books (sishu四書), and the Ziyi緇衣 
“Black Robes,” which was also included, as a manuscript, among the scrolls in the Guodian 
tombs. These passages corroborate the imbalance of responsibilities of the common folk and 
those of the ruling elite that Tu mentions. The common folk are generally associated with 
farming and artisan crafts, and they were not educated in the same way as the elite and ruling 
classes. But they did receive a moral education centered around familial bonds, passed from one 
generation to the next. These texts show a continuity that spans ethical and political lines and 
forms the backbone of Ruist society. 
 DU Wei-Ming, “Probing the Three Bonds and the Five Relationships,” Confucianism and the Family, 169
ed. George A. De Vos (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), 130-131.
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Ritual and Providing for the People: The Daxue and the Ziyi 
 Confucian harmony, which is fostered through relationships, is radically inclusive due to 
its comprehensively dyadic structure, a feature of the Confucian cosmos. Rather than relating 
independent relata, this dyadic structure pairs oppositional elements so that if one element exists, 
so must the other. These relationships interpenetrate what would be described as classes in the 
Marxist model. In fact, if we take Tu Wei-Ming’s statement quoted above at face value, an ideal 
Confucian society would begin and end with the concerns of the underclass. I do not think a 
Marxist critique of Confucian society would find a relationship of power characterized by the 
economic division between the rich class and the poor class. A critique of this tradition might 
find fodder in the view of the common folk through the eyes of elite, that is, with a hearty dose 
of romantic idealism without much concern for the true cost of their innocent, good-hearted 
toiling. But the moral metaphysic of Ruist social philosophy manages an attack au fer on this 
critique. As I discussed in the previous section, the Ruist social metaphysic posits relationships 
as the units to build a harmonious society, rather than the actions of individuals alone. This 
metaphysic relies on the conditional dependence of the cultivation of ritual propriety, manifested 
through five relationships, on behalf of everyone in order to bring about propitious conditions for 
all. On a broader scale, Confucian harmony is achieved in the dynamic balancing of diversity 
and opposition, and in a harmonious world nothing is left out or left over. According to Li 
Chenyang, the existence of the elite necessitates that of the poor.  In other words, the common 170
people are a necessary part of a harmonious society, and their flourishing is of paramount 
importance to the thriving of the ruling and intellectual elite and society as a whole. Such a 
 Personal conversation at the APA Pacific held in Vancouver, Canada, in April, 2015. 170
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society does not push for equality, which is why the government has a stake in promoting their 
well-being. The importance of considering the common folks is a common theme in Pre-Qin 
thought, notably the Daxue. 
 The Daxue⼤學 is one of the Confucian Four Books, which were considered by the Song 
Dynasty (960-1279) compiler and commentator Zhu Xi朱熹 to be the central texts of the 
Confucian tradition. Zhu attributed its authorship to Zisi⼦思, the grandson of Kongzi. These 
books, the Daxue⼤學, the Zhongyong中庸, the Lunyu論語, and the Mengzi孟⼦, comprised the 
core curriculum for the civil service examinations in China and are indispensable in the study of 
ancient Chinese thought. The Daxue emphasized the integral connectedness of the world through 
the moral imagination of humanity and was included in the Liji禮記, the Book of Rites. The most 
well-known passage illustrates the stepwise narrowing of the operation of a flourishing kingdom 
to the behavior of each individual and then widens the scope again from the individual to the 
kingdom. The passage ends: 
⾃天⼦以至於庶⼈，壹是皆以修身為本。其本亂⽽末治者否矣，其所厚者薄，
⽽其所薄者厚，未之有也！此謂知本，此謂知之至也。  171
From the sovereign ruler down to the common person (shuren庶⼈) self-
cultivation is the root of everything. If this root is neglected then what grows from 
it will lack order and consistency. Important things cannot be treated flippantly 
and inconsequential things cannot be treated as something important. 
 ICS Concordance to the Liji, 43.1/164/25-30.171
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Here it is undeniable that the common folk have their own role to play in the ordering of the 
cosmos. But, as the passages from the Analects quoted above have shown, the method of self-
cultivation is not the same among the different classes of people. The common folk are cultivated 
by internalizing the behavior of moral exemplars, who treat people in a way that is appropriate 
for their place in the social hierarchy. As shown by the Daxue, self-cultivation is the common 
denominator of an ordered state. The qualities of a ruler that concern what is best for all of the 
kingdom’s subjects, what I translate as “principled conscience”, are focused exclusively on those 
capable of such action. Between a principled conscience, which not everyone has the material 
ability to attain, and self-cultivation, a universal human capability, lies the key to Confucian 
social harmony: moral education. In order to span this divide, the Ruists relied on the 
replicability of relationship structures across different social and economic demographics. Their 
belief was that if everyone optimized their immediate relationships in accordance with Ruist 
principles of deference and respect, then order will ascend to larger social organizations 
concentrically, eventually encompassing everyone in the world.  
 I have endeavored to show that even though the common folk were not thought to have 
the ability to discern the reasons for acting morally, they were led by the example of those who 
could. By positing that the elite and the commoners share a fundamental moral ability, Ruist 
social theory binds these groups by a shared moral-metaphysical causality, one in which immoral 
actions beget chaos and upright actions beget flourishing. The next step is to show the ways in 
which this moral system distributes responsibility and culpability for the welfare of the common 
people. I will use examples from a Warring States text, the Ziyi, or Black Robes. This text is also 
included in the Liji, and it was also purportedly authored by Confucius’s grandson, Zisi. It is a 
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collection whose entries share a common structure: a few lines of social commentary attributed 
to Kongzi followed by an authoritative quotation from the Classics. The theme of these entries is 
that a ruler ought to rule by example and not coercion. The three passages I have chosen will 
speak directly to the responsibility of a ruler to the common people. The first emphasizes the 
influential behavior of the ruler: 
⼦曰：「有國者章好章惡，以⽰民厚，則民情不貳。」詩云：「靖共爾位，
好是正真。」   172
The Master said, “If rulers make clear what is preferred and what is despised to 
show the people what is important, then the people’s natures will not be led 
astray.” From the Odes, “Be circumspect in whom you appoint, and make sure 
that you prefer what is upright and true.” 
This passage illustrates a ‘top-down’ distribution of moral responsibility. The appropriate 
relationship of the ruled to the ruler is one of deference, and once the appropriate people 
populate the upper echelons, standing in the moral spotlight, the people will follow their 
example. But this deference relationship corrodes when there are doubt and confusion about the 
commitment of the upper echelon to maintaining social harmony, and by extension, cosmic 
harmony. From the Ziyi: 
⼦曰：「上⼈疑則百姓惑，下難知則君長勞。」故君民者，章好以⽰民欲，
謹惡以遏民淫，則民不惑。臣事君，⾔其所不能，不詒其所能，則君不勞。
 ICS Concordance to the Liji, 34.11/153/7-8.172
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⼤雅云：「上帝板板，下民卒(瘁)疸(癉)。」⼩雅云：「非其正之共，唯王
之恐。」   173
The Master said, “If superiors are doubted, then the masses will be disconcerted. 
If those below are difficult to know, then the ruler will have a hard time doing 
their work.” Thus the ruler rules the people by manifesting their likes to show the 
people what is desirable, are cautious over their dislikes so as to block them from 
excess, and the people are not confused. If the ministers in government service are 
forthcoming with what they are able to do and are not deceptive about what they 
are able to do, then the ruler will not have a hard time doing their work. The Daya 
says, “If the ruler is oppressive, then the people below will be distressed and 
angry.” The Xiao ya says, “They cannot be made to do their work, they will speak 
about the ruler with enmity.” 
Another passage from the Ziyi ends with a quote from the Jun ya, “In the heat of the summer 
growing season the rain drowns the crops and blocks the sun, the common folk will complain 
more and more each day. When in the winter it is too cold for the common folk to sustain 
themselves, they will likewise complain.”  The common folk cannot be faulted for their 174
visceral response to political mismanagement because they have a heavy stake in the 
maintenance of harmony. From their perspective, even the weather that makes or breaks their 
livelihood is given controlled to some extent by the ruler.  
 郭店楚墓⽵简: 緇衣. 简帛书法选. 编辑组编. vol. 3. ⽂物出版社 (北京: 2002). p. 5-8. The alternate 173
readings in parentheses are considered acceptable variants. See Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, 382. 
 郭店楚墓⽵简: 緇衣. 简帛书法选. 编辑组编. vol. 3. (北京: ⽂物出版社, 2002), 9-10.174
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  There is no blueprint for Confucian harmony because there is no replicable, stable, or 
completed state of harmony possible in a changing and dynamic world. But there is a pattern, 
namely the Confucian social hierarchy as it comes about through the cultivation of the 
appropriate types of relationships and moral education. But although the relationships, for 
example between older and younger siblings, may have the same moral structure whether they 
are between the rulers of a fiefdom or rural farmers, it is not the same relationship because each 
has a different foundation. The relationship between elite siblings is informed by direct study of 
the Classics and practices of self-cultivation peculiar to high social status. The relationship 
between commoner siblings is the result of the influence of the elite relationship. The moral 
behavior of the underclass is dependent on the upper class as well as generationally transmitted 
wisdom. The common folk do not discern right and wrong but are led to laud right and loathe 
wrong by the behaviors of those above, the elite and ruling class. This is shown by the passages 
in the Rites that indicate how common people behave when the modeling is not appropriate. 
They complain and willfully create problems. The political power of the underclass is in their 
ability shift things from bad to worse, from tenuous harmony to chaos.  
 In the classic Ruist texts, the ruler had the inalienable responsibility to provide for the 
people. As I have discussed above, this goes beyond economic and material support. The ruler 
and the elite class were also bound by moral, ritual dictates to act as exemplars of appropriate 
behavior. This complicates the comparison to contemporary societies for insight into poverty and 
homelessness. A Confucian society does not deal in scarcity, which is one of the primary drivers 
of a Capitalist economy, nor does it compel the distribution of capital among laborers, a 
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simplistic account of a Communist economy. Each person ought to be due what is appropriate to 
their position in society. In the Analects 16.1, Kongzi says: 
...有國有家者，不患寡⽽患不均，不患貧⽽患不安。蓋均無貧，和無寡，安
無傾。夫如是，故遠⼈不服，則修⽂德以來之。既來之，則安之。   175
As for those who rule the state and those who govern their households, they are 
less anxious about scarcity than they are about the inequitable distribution of 
wealth. They are less anxious about poverty than they are about discontent. They 
know that if there is an equitable distribution of wealth, there is no poverty, and 
where there is harmony, there is no scarcity. Where there is contentment, there is 
no incitement to overthrow. Thus when people on the margins are unruly, they 
ought to receive a moral education. Then they will come to see its value. Once 
they come to see this, then they will be content with it.  
According to Shirley Chan, this indicates a tension in Ruist social philosophy. She writes,  
Confucius believed social disruption and economic poverty was largely due to 
moral inadequacy resulting in improper attainment of individual benefits. In other 
words, the basic rule in the art of governing is to find a balance between 
individual rights and public interest and to reconcile the tension between 
individual desire and social harmony in a humane way.  176
 Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, no. 16, 33/16/1.175
 Shirley Chan, “Equilibrium in Classical Confucian “Economy”,” Open Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 2, 176
No. 2. 2012, 101. Accessible at http://file.scirp.org/Html/19182.html.
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The topic of the inappropriate accrual of wealth (li利) as a lack of propriety (yi義) is a topic 
much discussed in the Ruist tradition, especially the Mengzi, which begins with Mengzi’s 
admonishment of King Hui of Liang for valuing profit (li利) over ritual (li禮) and 
appropriateness (yi義). What is pleasurable ought to be so for everyone and what is valuable 
ought to be accessible to all. This is the commitment that rulers must have to their people. 
 In order to alleviate poverty today, the poor must be included in the realm of social 
concern. Due to its focus on harmonious inclusivity and the responsibility of the ruler to act as an 
exemplar and ensure that everyone has the means to support themselves, Confucian philosophy 
has something to offer to modern approaches to poverty. Confucian philosophy does not dictate 
that the role of government is simply to give the people what they need in order to survive, but it 
also does not say that they must earn these things. What falls between these two drives, and what 
Confucian philosophy emphasizes, is that a society underpinned by universal human moral 
expectations instead of economic concerns will relieve hardship and maintain cohesion among 
social groups. There is no accommodation for abject poverty from the Ruist perspective because 
such an arrangement would not qualify as a functional society. If the conditions for the common 
folk do not allow them to sustain themselves, then the predictable result—that they will become 
unruly—is not morally reprehensible. If the government squanders or sequesters its power and 
resources among those at the top, then the people below are not bound by their laws. If the rulers 
do not cultivate appropriate behavior, according to Ruist political philosophy, then neither will 
the elite, and the common folk will not have the opportunity to cultivate themselves and cannot 
be blamed for the repercussions of their lack of moral education. If their basic human needs are 
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not provided for, they will doubt the authenticity of the those above. What would happen if we 
looked to our government this way? 
 The basis of a constitutional democracy is concern for the well-being of its citizens. 
Today in America millions of people, American citizens, are unsheltered and do not have food 
security. They lack fundamental components for human survival, which puts human flourishing 
even further from their grasp. They are not at the bottom of the current social hierarchy; they are 
not a part of the social spectrum at all. They are not included in the world that democracy has 
built. They are its casualties. Even though Ruist political philosophy, as conceived in ancient 
China, cannot be imported wholesale into the current American socio-political context, its focus 
on social inclusivity offers invaluable advice to those hoping to ameliorate poverty.  
 What does ancient Chinese politics have to contribute to contemporary discussions about 
the predicament of homelessness in Hawaiʻi? There are many things that resonate between 
Chinese and Polynesian cultures such as social inclusivity structured by a set of relationships, a 
moral education that dictates appropriate behavior among hierarchically stratified groups with a 
monarch at the top, and a visceral connection to the land and seasonal changes. In the next 
section, I will bring these themes to the present by aligning the common folk of the Chinese 
philosophical tradition to modern-day peasants and framing a discussion of poverty along a rural/
urban divide. I will argue that homelessness is an intractable problem in Hawaiʻi due to a 
complex set of interrelated issues including the tension between Hawaiian and American values 
and the rapid urbanization of the islands. I will argue that the sit-lie ban, enacted by the City and 
County of Honolulu to prevent unsheltered individuals from sitting and lying down on public 
#149
sidewalks and in many public areas, has had the effect of worsening the problem of 
homelessness among Hawaiian and Pacific Islander populations in Hawaiʻi. 
Ruist Principles in Application 
 There are many cautions to be heeded in doing comparative projects that use ancient 
Chinese philosophy to address social problems in the United States. Even within China, the 
application of ancient principles can be divisive and a hindrance to modern advances in human 
rights and gender equality. However, I have chosen to bring the social stratification described in 
early Ruist texts to contribute to a conversation about homelessness in Hawaiʻi because it 
resonates in a number of unexpected ways with pre-colonized Hawaiian society as well as other 
Polynesian societies. the distributions of power that render the United States of America’s brand 
of capitalism inhospitable to Confucian political philosophy are similar to those that have 
systematically undermined Hawaiʻi and Hawaiians since the American coup d’état in 1893. In 
this section I will discuss agrarian values in China and Hawaiʻi as a focal point for understanding 
extreme poverty in Hawaiʻi.  
 According to a study conducted at the University of Hawaiʻi at Manoa in 2015, 63% of 
the respondents to an ethnic composition survey identified themselves as Hawaiian/Part 
Hawaiian (28%), Micronesian (19%), Samoan (10%), or Other Pacific Islander and Mixed 
Pacific Islander (6%).  Hawaiians and other Pacific Island populations are overrepresented 177
among unsheltered ethnic groups in Hawaiʻi. Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians) experience the 
 Tai Dunson-Strane and Sarah Soakai, “The Effects of City Sweeps and Sit-Lie Policies on Honolulu’s 177
Houseless,” June 2015, 14. Accessible at http://blog.hawaii.edu/durp/files/2015/06/Houseless-Honolulu-
Report.small_.pdf
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highest percentage of poverty among ethnic groups living in Hawaiʻi and are overrepresented in 
jails and prisons as well.  Why are so many Hawaiians struggling at the bottom of the social 178
heap? Pre-colonized Hawaiʻi was self-sufficient even though its population numbered nearly a 
million, compared to fewer than 100,000 who identified as Hawaiian in the 2010 U.S. census 
(about 6% of the Hawaiʻi islands population). Of course, the wealth of the Hawaiian ruling elite 
was not distributed among the commoners (maka ʻāinana), but the society structure was based 
on the inclusive model of community interdependence. Bonds were ritualized among members 
of large families as well as between the people and the land (ʻāina), and the ruling class (aliʻi and 
aliʻi nui). The composition of the ancient Hawaiian social structure shares many of the themes 
related to harmonious hierarchies in the context of ancient Chinese philosophy, as I have 
discussed elsewhere.  In what follows, I will discuss another similarity: the cultural importance 179
of relationships to the land. Agrarian societies privilege familial organizational structures, and 
when these structures are undermined the effects can have a disastrous result on economic as 
well as psychological self-sufficiency. To conclude, I will return to the issue of homeless in 
Hawaiʻi to show how the colonization of Hawaiʻi and, more recently, the sit-lie ban have caused 
the disintegration of bonds among native Hawaiians, which has had the effect of dissolving 
significant portions of Hawaiian identity especially among its most economically vulnerable.  
 Shawn Malia Kanaʻiaupuni, Nolan J. Malone, and Koren Ishibashi, “Income and Poverty Among 178
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Agrarianism in Chinese Intellectual History 
 There were three early sage-rulers in Chinese antiquity who gave shape to a human 
understanding of the natural world. These supernatural individuals had keen awareness of the 
changes that shape the world and were inspired to teach their people how to survive and flourish 
among these changes. Of the three sage rulers (san huang三皇),  Shen Nong神農, the Divine 180
Farmer, taught his subjects to be self-sufficient. Descriptions of Shen Nong appear in the Warring 
States texts the Lü Shi Chun Qiu呂氏春秋, the Mengzi孟⼦, and the Zhuangzi莊⼦ and during 
this time when many different doctrines flourished, known for its ‘Hundred Schools’ (zhu zi bai 
jia諸⼦百家), there was a school dedicated to the teachings of Shen Nong, though very little is 
known about it today. In his study of this school, the School of the Tillers (nong jia農家), A.C. 
Graham notes that the books associated with this school, which would tell us more about ancient 
Chinese agrarianism, have disappeared, but we ought not to assume that they were not important. 
Since agriculture has always been an inescapably important topic in China, the 
loss of its most ancient class the Shen-neng is in any case remarkable, and likely 
to have had something to do with its ‘upsetting of the degrees of superior and 
inferior’. …We may suspect that the Tillers are an invisible presence which would 
re-order our perspectives if we could bring it to light.   181
 Although the texts indicate that there were three, the individuals comprising the three differ among the 180
ancient and Han Dynasty texts, and there are no texts in existence that date back to the times of their 
purported reigns. 
 A.C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany: SUNY Press, 181
1991), 69.
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In other words, the formation of a peasant utopia, where the ruler worked alongside the workers, 
did not accord with the formation of a hierarchically-organized state. This may explain to a 
certain extent why the texts of the School of the Tillers were not preserved through the 
intervening ages. Shen Nong is celebrated as one of the formative influences on Chinese society. 
His rule predated the period of social decline that led to the necessity of implementation of rules 
for governance and ritual propriety. He was said to have ruled without punishments in a time 
with no wars and enough food for everyone to live comfortably. The Lü Shi Chun Qiu includes 
an appraisal of his reign: 「神農⼗七世有天下，與天下同之也。」  “Shen Nong ruled for 182
70 generations, and everything was harmonized.”  
 The School of the Tillers would have shared several concerns with the Daoists, 
Primitivists, and Yangists—all compilers of the Zhuangzi— about the legitimacy of the 
Confucian hierarchic bureaucracy. But unlike the Daoist utopia characterized by the complete 
lack of human artifice (wuwei無為), a farmer utopia is decidedly an exercise in re-forming (wei
為) the earth to suit human needs. The School of the Tillers saw farming as fundamental to 
human society and hard work as a badge of authenticity not just for the common folk but for all 
folk. Why, they wondered, would one feel compelled to engage in the machinations of politics 
and war if all one needs to survive and flourish one can do with one’s own hands? The writings 
of the School of the Tillers were not likely written by the tillers themselves. During the Warring 
States Period, there were probably many literate individuals suspended precipitously if not 
already descending into the plight of the common folk who took it upon themselves to record 
 ICS Concordance to the Lü Shi Chun Qiu, 慎勢2.182
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what the common folk had to hope for and how they conceived the golden days of the distant 
past. Perhaps the disenfranchised former elite celebrated the predictability of the farmer’s life, 
which was shaped by the continuity of the seasons and the daily monotony of farming tasks, 
which may have been soothing to those who found themselves at a dead end.  
 Although there is no one collection that can be referred to as the main text of the School 
of the Tillers, the influence of the school can be seen in the numerous references to Shen Nong 
himself, as well as the characters likened to him, seen intermittently throughout the Chinese 
philosophical tradition, acting sometimes as gadflies for the well-meaning Ruist and other times 
as naïve and bumbling caricatures of so-called unsullied living. These folks were no doubt poor, 
but they were not stuck (qiong窮) in the sense I described in the previous chapter. They lived 
their lives in simplicity without scarcity, greed, avarice, or crime. I take this to be more or less 
the standpoint of the common folk, who comprised the vast majority of the Middle Kingdom’s 
population during that time and for centuries before and after. From here I will turn to the 
importance of agrarian lifestyles throughout Chinese history up to the present, as described in the 
works of Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005). Here we find the blending of Confucian political philosophy 
and the anarcho-communitarian leanings of the Tillers. 
  
Agrarianism and Community: Fei Xiaotong’s Differential Mode of Organization 
 Fei Xiaotong was one of China’s first social scientists to bring research he himself had 
conducted in rural China to the classroom. These lectures were compiled into a volume that lays 
out his theory of 20th-century Chinese social structure from a Chinese perspective. He 
constructed a theory of human organizational tendencies in China that he saw as a counter to the 
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prevailing structures in the so-called ‘West.’ This book was published in 1947, just as Marxist 
Orthodoxy was taking hold of Chinese academia, and it is fortunate that his works survived 
because they illustrate the complexity of Chinese social relationships that are not reducible to the 
structures of class interests. According to Fei, Chinese society is fundamentally agrarian, which 
defines Chinese social structures even in urban environments, and that because the ‘West’ does 
not have the same social structure, China cannot hope to mirror its achievements by the same 
means. Instead, China will achieve success according to its own unique capabilities. In this 
section, I will discuss Fei’s theory of Chinese social organization and its emphasis on the 
agrarian roots of contemporary Chinese culture. I will then compare this culture with traditional 
Hawaiian culture and by extension Kānaka Maoli living in Hawaiʻi today. When the traditional 
social system, which was based on subsistence farming, was suddenly upended and replaced by 
another system, the inevitable result in Hawaiʻi was dissolution and alienation among its native 
population. I believe Fei’s description of communitarian social groups is a tool for explaining the 
overrepresentation of Kānaka Maoli among Hawaiʻi’s unsheltered population. Of course, its 
usefulness is more as a diagnostic and corrective for neocolonialist guilt than for construction of 
contemporary Hawaiian identity. The next step would be privileging Hawaiian ways of knowing 
and living as autonomous and valued.  183
 The fundamental difference between Chinese and Western societies, according to Fei, is 
the way that social groups are formed. In the West, groups are formed voluntarily, and every 
member has qualifications that allow them to be a part of that group and enjoys benefits that 
everyone in the group enjoys. Individuals in Western-style social groups enjoy equality and are 
 See Noenoe K. Silva, Karin Amimoto Ingersoll, Lilikala Kame’eleihiwa, Elizabeth Green Handy. 183
#155
fungible within the defined lines of the organization, like straw in a tied bundle. Fei calls this the 
‘organizational mode of association’ (tuanti geju 團體格局). In this mode, individuals choose 
whether or not to be a part of an organization, and they can be involved in different 
organizations. This organizational structure lends to the promotion of individual rights, as 
membership is non-coercive and each member who meets their responsibilities receives certain 
entitlements. This mode of grouping is not defined geographically or lineally, although anyone is 
free to organize according to these criteria. This mode of organization necessitates a 
differentiation between public and private, as the family does not fit the model of voluntary 
inclusion. Rather, families are private concerns, and each family is not necessarily connected to 
any other. Individual rights come from each individual’s relationship to the organization, which 
in its most inclusive manifestation is the state. Public life is the most formative element of social 
cooperation and compatibility, rather than the family. 
 Fei writes there is no material thing that can be identified as ‘the state,’ and likewise, 
members of organizations do not interact with an entity called ‘the organization.’ Organizations 
depend on the symbols each member recognizes as important, and they do not exist 
independently of their members. For example, in the relationship of citizens to the state, laws are 
created to preserve the symbol of individual liberty. Fei shows that this model is inseparable 
from the Western idea of God: 
Jesus addressed God as the Father, as everyone’s Father. He even publicly 
rejected his own parents, who gave birth to him and brought him up. To achieve 
this equality, according to Christian beliefs, Jesus was born of a young virgin; the 
special and personal relationship between father and son is denied here. This 
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denial is actually not nonsense; it is, instead, a powerful symbol of the public 
quality of organizations. God is necessarily without a private side. Jesus 
symbolizes each person within this universal organization.  184
Abstracting from Fei’s observations, I am tempted to explore the dark side of this organizational 
structure. While the symbol of God as universal inclusivity is the limit of the magnitude of 
possible organizational structures, most organizations have boundaries, and these boundaries are 
set by those inside of them. I see the potential here for unincorporated individuals, and in a 
society defined in terms of identity in a group, these people would be existentially homeless. In 
other words, there may be people who are not accepted as a part of any group, and whose 
contributions are not considered valuable in the formation of inclusive social structures. I see this 
today in the United States of America, where the actions of powerful groups undermine the 
relationship of citizens to the state. For example, education is compulsory up to a certain age, but 
the differences between the educational experiences different groups receive are startling. The 
simplicity of this organizational structure allows for individuals to ignore the complex and 
systemic problems that create disturbing inequalities among people assumed to be equal in the 
eyes of the state. This model is also problematic in places where it is imposed on populations that 
do not share in this type of social identity, especially one where the family takes precedence. 
This focus on family, Fei argues, is the primary organizing element in China. 
 The Chinese pattern of association is based on the relationships shared between 
individuals and those around them, expanding outward in concentric circles. Fei calls this a 
 FEI Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California 184
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‘differential mode of association’ (cha xu geju差序格局). In this mode, the line between private 
and the public is blurred. The constituting feature of this system is the multitude of interpersonal 
relationships. The realm of ethical concern is populated by familiar faces, and moral actions are 
contextualized by the actual relationships they benefit. One’s family is the nexus of moral 
behavior, and as one expands their social network, one’s realm of moral concern grows. This is 
very different from what Fei considered the Western mode of interpersonal ethics, which he saw 
as favoring groups based on preferences and identity more than family or clan. Fei highlighted 
the difference between Western, or more accurately, American, and Chinese society by 
comparing their historical counterparts. Western society was nomadic, so individuals needed to 
band together to survive. Fei saw early American settler colonists as untethered from geography-
based identities. Whole segments of society could up and move across the sea and set their sights 
West, and their strength was precisely drawn from a sense of adventure and danger in the face of 
the unknown.  
 Here is where Fei’s account of early American society and morals differs markedly from 
a problematic and increasingly common interpretation of Americans’ own history. Fei saw the 
necessity of groups, whether formed by common interests or familial bonds, as an inalienable 
part of what it is to be human, and even what it is to be an individual. Social commentator and 
author Rebecca Solnit characterizes and criticizes an attitude peculiar to contemporary right-
wing American conservatism, which she terms “the ideology of isolation”: “The loner taketh not, 
nor does he give; he scorneth the social and relies on himself alone.”  By her estimation, when 185
 Solnit, Rebecca, “The Ideology of Isolation,” Harper’s Magazine, July 2016, 4-8. Accessible at https://185
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we consider ourselves as individuals things start to go sideways. Without a feeling of shared 
responsibility, there is no way to talk about gun control, women’s reproductive rights, 
environmental degradation, or poverty because none of these fits into the cowboy aesthetic of 
independence and self-reliance. She describes an online discussion in response to the killing of a 
homeless man in which a commenter indicated that they did not feel that the homeless had the 
right to depend on society for help because they did not contribute anything. She writes, “This is 
the rhetoric of modern conservatives: freedom is a luxury that wealth affords you; wealth comes 
from work; those who don’t work, never mind the cause, are undeserving. If freedom and 
independence are ideal, dependence is not just merely disdained; it’s furiously loathed.”  If we 186
consider the prevalence and power of conservatives in all levels of government, then it is fair to 
say that this view is quite common among Americans today. The result of this has been massive, 
unsubstantiated doubt in things that do not suit the conservative agenda including the findings of 
climate science, whether women tell the truth about being sexually harassed, and the 
unseemliness of revisionist histories.  “Fear of penetration and the fantasy of impenetrable 187
isolation,” Solnit writes, “are central to both homophobia and the xenophobic mania for “sealing 
the border.” In other words, isolation is good, freedom is disconnection, and good fencing, 
especially on the U.S.-Mexico border, make good neighbors.”  Solnit’s arguments for 188
interconnectedness and collectivity mark her as a something of a radical intellectual. But these 
 Solnit, “The Ideology of Isolation,” 6.186
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are things that Fei Xiaotong took for granted in his interpretation of an American society that is 
reliant on rules and laws that privilege the success of the group over the success of the 
individual, rather than protecting the individual from having their rights trampled upon. Fei’s 
interpretation, and what it shares in common with the viewpoints of America’s more liberal 
contemporary intellectuals, can be noted as community-based but not necessarily family-based.  
 According to Fei, Chinese society was primarily agrarian, and families tended to be more 
or less permanently settled on the land and largely self-sufficient.  One of the defining features 189
of Chinese society is the spatial metaphor given rise by its agrarian history. In ancient, agrarian 
China, each family was firmly rooted in the land they cultivated in a way that was foundational 
for their identity. Those with whom they shared a relationship outside of the home were those 
closest to them, their neighbors, and that relationship defined their moral obligations to one 
another. On this scale, relationships begin to translate into social currency, which can be used to 
accumulate power. The more powerful the family, the wider the realm of moral concern. Fei 
writes: 
In the traditional structure, every family regards its own household as the center 
and draws a circle around it. This circle is the neighborhood, which is established 
to facilitate reciprocation in daily life. A family invites the neighbors to its 
weddings, sends the red-dyed eggs when a new baby is born, and asks for their 
help in lifting its dead into coffins and carrying the coffins to the cemetery. But a 
neighborhood is not a fixed group. Instead, it is an area whose size is determined 
by the power and authority of each center. The neighborhood of a powerful family 
 Fei, From the Soil, 71.189
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may expand to the entire village, while a poor family’s neighborhood is composed 
of only two or three nearby families.   190
From a Confucian perspective, the power of an individual is a result of their self-cultivation and 
resulting ethical influence on others. Notice that the examples in this selection of what neighbors 
do for one another is practical and not defined by obligation or need. Acting ethically in this 
context means performing the appropriate rites and rituals and meeting the expectations of others 
with whom one shares a relationship. The larger the network extending out from the individual, 
the more power and influence this individual has. The attendant reciprocation to each 
relationship concentrates social, economic, and political power in those that have an extensive 
network. But this network is not ‘solid.’ Those within a network do not necessarily share 
relationships with one another, and not everyone in the network is entitled to the same benefits. 
Instead, the individual at the center of the social web dictates the commitment to other 
individuals based on their influence. In other words, although those with comparatively little 
influence are included in the network of a powerful individual, the further they are away, the 
fewer relationships they will share between them.  
The Pitfalls of Organizational Association 
 Fei’s theory of differential social association, which relies heavily on his interpretation of 
the concepts benevolence (ren仁), filial piety (xiao孝), fraternal respect (di悌), sincerity (xin信), 
and loyalty (zhong忠) from the Chinese Classics, relies on each person’s felt obligation toward 
those with whom they share a relationship. This prevents the system from accommodating 
 Fei, From the Soil, 64.190
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universal and comprehensive moral principles that are extended to everyone equally. Just as in 
agrarian societies, families were tied to the land and so their relationships may be defined 
spatially, the mode of social organization which is bolstered by this history preserves the idea 
that everyone has their proper place. This distribution may also be viewed vertically as a socio-
economic hierarchy. Those at the bottom are still entitled to benefits that come as a result of their 
being a part of a vast interlocking whole, even if their web of connections does not reach far up 
the hierarchy.  
 Fei’s distinction between the organizational and differential modes of association frames 
a discussion about a society’s need for laws to govern the people. The organizational mode 
requires laws that apply equally to everyone while the differential mode does not. In practice, 
however, laws do not have equitable effects among citizens. The potential for abuse of power is 
rife in a law-making society, as those with power may write laws to protect themselves and that 
disadvantage those with comparatively less power. Today, progress in maintaining the rights of 
the poor that conflicts with moneyed interests is in most cases perpetually stalled. In Hawaiʻi, for 
example, activists who advocate for the poor are concerned about the number of exemptions and 
allowances that allow new condominium projects to subvert the state’s commitment to provide 
affordable housing units.  And each year, bills to secure funding for projects to assist the state’s 191
unsheltered population fail to pass through the maze of numerous government committee 
hearings. Instead, funding for measures to treat and house the homeless are one-off heaps of 
funds from various, established budgets. While the numbers sound large, to the tune of $20 
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million from the state plus $10 million in federal funding in 2016,  not including a slew of 192
private donations and project-specific vouchers, they are not a part of a comprehensive, long-
term funding plan and there is no guarantee that they will meet the needs of the state’s poor and 
unsheltered populations. Although an organization mode of association is vastly successful at 
accumulating wealth, it may be at the expense of equitable distribution among citizens. Those 
who are not organized among powerful groups do not enjoy the same rights as those who are. In 
Hawaiʻi, an increasingly large number of people find themselves without shelter, food, and clean 
water. They are radically disconnected from the groups that have more than enough to buy the 
luxury versions of each. From the perspective of Fei’s critique of Western organizations, we see 
our society in an unflattering mirror. There are groups that are politically invisible, and we are 
not beholden, from within our own groups, to care about them or for them. Fei does not explore 
the implications of a society structured by boundaries and the lack of inclusiveness that comes as 
a result of powerful groups undermining the relationship of citizen to state. His likening of the 
organizational mode to conflict and totalitarianism is not an avenue I would like to travel very far 
down, though any critique of dominant modes of capitalism would probably share many 
similarities.  
 Do the poor fare any better in a differential mode of association? In Fei’s account of the 
history of Chinese society, this question is redundant. Poverty is a defining feature of 
agrarianism, one that had a profound effect on the evolution of Chinese societies through the 
ages. Poverty was the reason that people formed inclusive relational networks. Families and 
THE MUL Tl-YEAR PROGRAM and FINANCIAL PLAN and EXECUTIVE BUDGET For the 192
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Message-FB17-19-PFP.pdf.  
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communities were largely self-sufficient, and there was little excess that could be used for 
establishing a system of capital commerce. This deters the potential for a powerful state but puts 
it at a disadvantage against adversaries that have such potential. Agrarian societies lack a 
centralized power structure capable of defending them from a common result of ancient warfare: 
the loss of land. Fei writes: 
When I was doing a survey among Yao tribes in the mountainous regions of 
Guangxi province, I often noticed that ethnic Chinese people (hanren) had 
occupied the land of the Yao but had never enslaved them. There were certainly a 
lot of reasons for this; but in my view, the major one was that the place was just 
too poor, and those Yao tribesmen who planted rice fields could not lower their 
standard of living yet further to become tenants of the Han Chinese. Therefore, 
when the Chinese were in a battle with one of the Yao tribes, the Yao just gave up 
their land and moved. In wars of agrarian societies, the most common pattern is to 
drive out the natives, take over their land, and cultivate it personally. This 
especially happens when a population is large, labor is plentiful, and the available 
arable land is being fully utilized. In studying Chinese history, we often come 
across references to conquerors who “buried tens of thousands of enemies alive.” 
In fact, until quite recently, it was not unusual to encounter groups of roving 
bandits who would kill people with great ferocity. Such a situation is not one that 
an aggressive industrial power would understand… The conquest would be 
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meaningless if the conquerors allowed the defeated to continue farming. In this 
sense, conquest actually means to conquer the land, not the people.  193
In peace and war, agrarian societies never get off the ground, so to speak. They are connected to 
the land and lack the strong central state necessary to organize a cohesive defense, much less an 
offensive. They do not relate abstractly to one another in terms of identity, which precludes 
organization into a powerful but immaterial state. The power of an agrarian society relies on the 
optimization of relationships among a large number of people. But each of these relationships is 
among concrete, unique individuals and has unique valences, which creates a dynamic harmony 
that never fully materializes as a singular social phenomenon. This type of society is, in Fei’s 
words, egocentric, as opposed to generic or reductionistic. The uniqueness of each individual, 
their identity and desires, is maintained in dynamic relationships which preserve difference. The 
result is a harmony that is active as opposed to equanimous, temporal as opposed to universal. 
On this theme, Roger Ames writes: 
Without appeal to some originative principle and the linear teleology that comes 
with it, the world has no grand preassigned design; its governing purpose is a 
localized and temporalized self-sufficiency—a collaboration among the 
participating elements to make the most out of each situation. This is the meaning 
of Confucian harmony (he和).  194
This quote is taken from the context of individual consummate ethical behavior, which Ames 
takes as the basic unit of social morality. At the heart of Chinese society beats a concert of 
 Fei, From the Soil, 112-3.193
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individual efforts. The rhythm is determined by social and natural forces that shape the human 
experience, which each person strives to approximate in order to achieve optimal harmony. This 
is consistent throughout the Ruist socio-historical palimpsest that we have today. It is also 
present in the Kanaka Maoli understanding of each person’s responsibility to the land, on the 
basis of shared needs as well as shared ancestors. Because all things are genealogically related, 
one has a filial responsibility to respect and preserve the entirety of the natural and human 
ecosystem.  The disruption of the relationship between people and the land on which they 195
orient their identities results in a disintegration of cultural and personal identity. Karin Amimoto 
Ingersoll writes, “Loss of land is a particularly critical element of Hawaiian colonization (and 
decolonization) because Kanaka language, economy, politics, and culture are all connected to the 
ʻāina…”  Misguided and racist land reform initiatives paired incriminatingly with a lack of 196
cohesive restorative policy have done the work to existentially and literally unhouse the Kānaka 
Maoli. It seems clear we lack the truly immaterial state so pivotal to Fei’s interpretation of a 
functional Western society. Will Hawaiians be able to negotiate the return of their terrestrial 
identity, and with it their economic and spiritual self-sufficiency, from those for whom the land is 
seen as a biochemical and artillery testing ground? The importance of this critique of American 
neocolonialism cannot be underestimated. The ground of this critique is the sustainability of 
modern agrarian agriculture in a commercial, market-based farming economy. 
 The filial connection between humans and the natural ecosystem is an idea developed by Julia Morgan 195
in her dissertation Mālama, ʻĀina, Kalo, and Hoʻopili: Growing a Third Way Environmental Relationship. 
(Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC, 2016).
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Finding the Way to the Present: Agrarianism in the 20th Century  
 Tracing Chinese identity to current times is not simple or linear. Fei wrote his major 
works while China was on the precipice of its Cultural Revolution, which literally upended 
Chinese society. Fei’s contribution is unique because social science in China was mired in 
Marxist paradigms for several decades after his works were published and subsequently banned. 
A modern theory of agrarianism in China is inseparable from the policies of Communist China 
when urbanites were suddenly uprooted and transplanted into the rural hinterlands of China 
among peasants they were instructed by the state to emulate. In his novel Banished! Han Dong 
describes the journey of a family selected for the “Glorious Banishment” (光荣下放) who 
attempt to “strike root” (扎根) in a rural village. Although the family left their lives and histories 
behind, they do not dwell on the past, but they also do not fully immerse themselves in peasant 
life. They build a house out of modern materials and keep their belongings clean and polished. 
The father, Tao, assists the village workers to drastically increase their farming yields by 
introducing new technology. Tao spends much of his time making a plan for the town to produce 
a surplus that they can sell to the state for money to buy a walking tractor. But there is a danger 
in these efforts to increase the productivity in the peasant village.  
Yu, the team leader, relied heavily on Tao and discussed everything with him. 
Eventually, he handed over most of the team’s work to him so that Tao became 
the de facto team leader. However, when Yu suggested that Tao take over the 
position officially, the latter declined modestly: “We came to be reeducated, to 
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learn from you poor peasants. I’ll do as much as I can for the team, but as an 
advisor. You should stay as head!”  197
Tao knew that he could not come to hold a position of authority in the village. He was there 
because of the top-to-the-bottom demoralizing movement of officials and gentry from urban 
cities to rural villages during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, during this time in rural China 
ideology trumped productivity. These events changed the course of Chinese history in a way that 
is still being sorted out, when most of the gentry was transported to a strange place where their 
lives were halted and left to stagnate among state-sanctioned collectives. 
 In the previous section, I described the agrarian roots of Chinese society, but after the 
events of the 20th century, when hundreds of thousands of families were relocated to rural 
villages, agrarianism took on different meanings. During this time, the ideological, rootless 
system of Communism was grafted onto an agrarian history, and this mutant was nurtured mostly 
by sheer political zeal. Forcing people to live in poverty with no connection to the land or the 
farmer clans had an intentionally corrosive effect on Chinese society. I will not dwell on the 
successes and disasters of communism in China or the more recent embracement of its own 
cultural artifacts. But as I move into the next section, which regards modern peasants, I will step 
away from the Chinese context into a global one because I do not want to invoke an ideological 
debate about contemporary farming practice across the capital/communal divide. Instead, I will 
discuss farming economies along the lines of a neo-classical/subsistence divide, which delineates 
farming practice roughly in terms of developed and developing countries. The poorest people in 
the world are the peasant subsistence farmers, and it is likely that rather than improving their 
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chances for economic solvency, the world economy will leave them behind to live lives of the 
barest existence. They live in a world where they have no power, and their participation in 
purchasing and selling markets is inexorably limited. The limits of their world are defined by 
another world that encompasses it but of which it is not a full part. Their poverty and lack of 
social and economic mobility glue them to the ground from which they can only reap so much. 
They are stuck there, and the world is moving on. This metaphor emerges again and again in this 
dissertation because it haunts the very poor like the worst kind of spectre, the one no one else 
sees. 
  
Agrarianism in the Contemporary World Economy 
 In today’s commercially driven global economy, subsistence farmers do not participate 
fully in the world market. In this section, I will show how the isolation of agrarian subsistence 
farmers whose practices are increasingly untenable is comparable to the debilitating loss of 
relational identity wrought by the colonization of Hawaiʻi and the influence of American 
neoliberal ideology. Agrarian societies, communities, and households are at a massive 
disadvantage among contemporary economic systems because they do not fit into the capitalistic 
paradigm that dominates global farming practices. It is as if they live in a different world. They 
are cut off from the prevailing economic farming apparatus, which has shifted over the last two 
hundred years to the intensification of agricultural land use that cannot be sustained by 
subsistence farming, and they are among the world’s poorest populations. They are poor mainly 
because they do not produce enough surplus to participate in a market economy, purchase 
technologies that increase production, or have the human labor necessary to increase production 
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without modern technologies. On the stage of the world economy, they are invisible. In this 
section I will analyze the modern peasant’s relationship with the prevailing capital market, and I 
will show that although poverty has defined agrarian life for centuries, increasingly intrusive 
capitalist intervention threatens the future of their identity, which is characterized by communal 
values similar to those I discussed above in the context of Chinese differential social association. 
This analysis will be supplemented by the unique colonial scenarios in the Pacific, where even 
though a peasant class did not develop, extreme poverty and lack of self-sufficiency has induced 
the severing of traditional relationships and massive emigration. A large number of unsheltered 
individuals in Hawaiʻi are Pacific Islanders, so this complex issue of poverty, cultural identity, 
societal structure, and the impact of global commercial capitalism on all three must be addressed. 
From the perspective of Pacific Islanders living in the US, all of these concerns must be 
considered in the dazzling light of American exceptionalism, which concedes little to the limiting 
effects of external forces in its preference for mysterious and open vistas of possibility.  
 This section addresses the modern-day peasant, a term that, among other connotations, is 
central to Marxist social philosophy, but I do not intend to engage substantially with the Marxist 
discourse surrounding modern peasants. Instead, I will reference the broader definition used in 
agricultural economic theory. There are a few designators that remain static in characterizing 
modern peasant populations in this context. First, they are farmers, and although many live on 
their own farms with their families, a significant number work as wage laborers for other 
peasants, and others rent their land from peasant land-owners. Most peasant communities are not 
egalitarian; there are differences in social and political status. Second, the majority of modern 
peasants are unlike ancient agrarian communities because they are no longer discrete, self-
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sufficient units in remote rural lands. Their economic activity ranges from very little 
participation in markets, in terms of purchasing inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, and basic 
necessities, and selling farm outputs, to full dependency on the market for solvency and 
sustenance. They cannot construct or manipulate the market, so their participation is always 
incomplete. What they are able to purchase and sell depends on forces that are beyond their 
control and often beyond their ability to become informed of, which depends on technologies 
and communication channels that may not be available to them. Peasants are always in a position 
of subordination to larger market forces because their way of life is no longer a part of the 
farming status quo. Agricultural economist Frank Ellis writes: 
Peasant household production is never a mode of production in itself, it is always 
located in a larger society where a particular dominant mode prevails. This means 
that social reproduction as a whole obeys the rules of the dominant mode of 
production, even if peasants possess a limited ability to reproduce themselves 
independently of that mode.   198
The difference between peasants in a feudal versus a capitalist system is that in the latter their 
role does not have the connotation of being a class. Under a feudal system, their role is quite 
clearly to provide food, but in a capitalist system, defined in economic theory as the neoclassical 
model, their role is not so well defined. Even though peasants may participate in different 
markets, they will never gain complete access to them and will always find themselves at the 
merciless whims of the dominant modes of production and consumption.  
 Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development (Cambridge: 198
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 51.
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 Third, there is an ambiguity between peasant modes of production and consumption, as 
the household is sustained by the farm products it consumes. Surpluses are not simply sold, as 
they are in a commercial farm setting, but are consumed and sometimes saved in case of scarcity. 
As a result, peasant households do not participate fully in commercial markets, and their labor 
and surplus cannot be correlated or quantified in a straightforward way. This vagueness 
complicates the monetization and conversion of inputs and peasant labor into yields and 
surpluses. The costs associated with hiring labor, paying rent on the land, and various modes of 
taxation that are set using the quantified theoretical models of neoclassical commercial farm 
production are levied against peasants in similar ways as commercial farmers, and these must be 
paid in cash, which requires at least some successful participation in the markets. Relatively 
inefficient modes of production put peasants at a disadvantage in terms of market values, as 
increased efficiency among commercial farming families and corporations drives down prices. 
Even though this ancient way of life continues, modern economies do not provide a way of 
sustaining it. Plus, neoclassical farming theory begins with an individual farming unit, a person 
who makes the farming decisions or a corporation with an iterative model of production, which 
implies that every unit must purchase their own inputs and sell the outputs. This individualist 
model of farmer identity undermines the peasant model that relies on communitarian, 
interpersonal connections. The sharing of farm equipment, the pooling of household labour 
during harvest season, and even the equitable use of available resources including irrigation all 
depend on putting the good of the community first.  
 Peasants are diverse and dynamic populations that in recent history have been 
extraordinarily accommodating to the changes brought about by commercial farming practices 
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and the global economy. After the disastrous policies of the Great Leap Forward in China that 
resulted in widespread famine, the peasants were able to push back once they realized the 
importance of their role in balancing the economy during the rural reform era under Deng 
Xiaoping in the 1980s. As a result, farming technologies and privatization improved the 
circumstances of many peasants.  More recently, in Africa, the penetration of microfinance into 199
the villages has allowed peasants to increase their income by engaging in different markets, such 
as handicrafts, as well as local entrepreneurship.  In India, government programs to diversify 200
agriculture educate peasants on how to protect against market fluctuations as well as the 
environmental disaster that comes as a result of decreased biodiversity. Viewing peasants as 
backward and stuck in primitive cultures, ambivalent to the world around them, is shown to be 
an inaccurate remnant of the imperial mind. Instead, modern peasants are transitioning from 
agrarian self-sufficiency to integration in modern markets with great speed. Ellis writes: 
Transition does not mean that peasants are here today and gone tomorrow, that 
they are inevitably and soon to be replaced by other, more ‘modern,' farm 
enterprises. What it does mean is that peasants are never just ‘subsistence’ or 
‘traditional’ cultivators caught in a timeless vacuum. Peasants come from 
somewhere, indeed they were often thrust out of where they were by powerful 
world forces outside their previous experience (e.g. colonialism) and they are 
 For an in-depth study, see Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 199
1979-1989 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
 Though there is concern that those whose projects are not profitable have little recourse to 200
compensatory cash flow, which may strain personal as well as family and village finances. 
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undergoing a continuous process of adaptation to the changing world around 
them.  201
This is an important point in my larger analysis because just as peasants are often assumed to be 
remnants of a forgotten past that have no place in the modern world, the poor are often 
characterized as not having the gumption to carve out a life for themselves among present 
circumstances. These corrosive assumptions ignore the truly pragmatic nature of peasant and 
poor populations, who piece their lives together on the margins of the mainstream, as I will 
discuss in the next section.  
Reflections on Modern Peasants and the Modern Poor 
 When it comes to modern, poor farmers, there is something that falls through the cracks 
between Marxist and neoclassical approaches to agricultural economics that Chinese philosophy 
may be poised to address. The prevailing world economic systems are capitalist, which puts 
Marxian political economy at a disadvantage in practice, but invaluable as a systematic critique. 
The neoclassical model of agricultural economics does not accommodate those who have little 
freedom of choice regarding their participation in the market. The world’s poorest farmers do not 
have the ability to choose according to their own self-interest, which is the bedrock of capitalist, 
individualistic decision making, because their production is limited and the labor they do on 
behalf of their households is not valued in economic markets. Further, the potential for coercion 
and usury is high for those who have the least power, few choices, and are unable to live 
independently of the prevailing economic mode, even though this mode does not assign much 
 Ellis, Peasant Economics, 5.201
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value to their contributions. Put simply, peasants will remain extremely poor, and their inability 
to participate in commercial markets leaves them vulnerable to market swings as well as 
devastating weather conditions.  
 These issues come into sharp focus when considered in the context of ecology. The 
overuse of pesticides, the redirection of waterways, and the increase in agricultural monoculture 
that have come with the intensification of farm production all have profoundly devastating 
effects. They reduce the number of sustainable ecosystems, both above and below the soil, and 
the effects of chemical runoff have killed legions of fish and crippled millions of farm animals. 
The effects on humans may be slower to materialize and measure but one prediction is especially 
salient: ecological disruptions will continue to disproportionately affect the poor populations 
who live in close communion with the land and seas. The life of the poor farmer is increasingly 
tenuous because the commodity they have access to, the land itself, has a different value in the 
prevailing world economy, which operates as if the land and its fertility were infinite resources. 
For the subsistence farmers, there are limitations to what the land can yield, including shortages 
of labor and capital for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers. In order to transition to a more 
economically viable lifestyle, by current parameters, peasants will have to commercialize their 
means of production in order to act as self-interested individuals. But this is shown to be severely 
detrimental to the environment, which, put simply, cannot act on behalf of its own interest. 
Agricultural ethics, a necessary discourse in light of the above, must entertain more than 
capitalist and Marxist theory, as neither directly confronts this issue from the standpoint of 
environmental devastation and its relationship to poverty. Chinese Confucian philosophy offers 
resources to address this problem that are centered by relational, integrated societal structures. 
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These structures do not privilege the autonomy and freedom of the individual, but instead 
contextualize available choices based on actual circumstances. By not separating economic 
concerns from social and political circumstances, people are not grouped according to their class 
or their income bracket as much as they are by those to whom they relate themselves. Although 
in a way this relational grouping would divide people, the separation is more accurately 
described in geographical, spatial terms rather than hierarchical, power-laden terms. When it 
comes to poverty, Confucian philosophy offers a penetrating critique of the prevailing capitalist 
system, even beyond agrarianism and agricultural ethics. It illustrates that focusing on 
individuals reifies the boundaries between them, and the emphasis on freedom limits those who 
have less. This creates a boundary between those for whom doors in life are wide open, or even 
removed from their hinges altogether, and those who struggle to pry open doors made of heavy 
steel.  
 The poor populations of the world live in a reality in which their way of life is threatened 
by economic and political as well as natural forces. It is unlikely that they will be able to cross 
over into a relatively prosperous set of circumstances unless they shed significant parts of their 
identities, and even then they would likely still be in a precarious state. This would put them at 
risk of a different sort of poverty, existential poverty, which is the loss of individual motivation 
and purpose to pursue a meaningful future. While the existential optimist might celebrate the 
farmer’s casting off a role played in bad faith in favor of an open encounter with radical freedom, 
there is more at stake here. Dissolution of self-identity impairs the ability of the imagination to 
form a coherent view of what futures are possible. This undermines the idea that one merely 
chooses what path to follow, or that one is authentic only when they do not mind being seen by 
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others walking along their chosen path. For the peasant as well as other modern populations that 
prize community and subsistence farming, mapping an alternative to their sedimented cultural 
livelihood is not as simple as choosing a different path. For most of the world’s poor who attempt 
this transition, for example, the burgeoning migrant worker population cast adrift far from home 
in search of economic viability, the world offers few alternatives. The vast majority of these 
individuals are exploited, and their human rights and identities are blotted out. Zygmunt Bauman 
writes that the design of modern, organized societies of developed countries produce ‘human 
waste.’ Policy-makers as well as those that stand idly by while the ‘trash’ is carried out accept 
that the system produces waste in the form of human byproducts that have no place within it.  
Rubbish collectors are the unsung heroes of modernity. Day in and day out, they 
refresh and make salient again the borderline between the normality and 
pathology, health and illness, the desirable and the repulsive, the accepted and the 
rejected, the comme il faut and the comme il ne faut pas, the inside and the outside 
of the human universe. That borderline needs their constant vigilance and 
diligence because it is anything but a ‘natural frontier.’ …Quite the contrary, it is 
the boundary that divines, literally conjures up, the difference between them—the 
difference between the admitted and the rejected, the included and the excluded. 
…That Boundary is drawn afresh with every round of garbage collection and 
removal. Its sole existential mode is the incessant activity of separation.  202
 Bauman, Wasted Lives, 28. 202
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The poor, especially those from so-called underdeveloped and colonized countries, exist along 
the margins of the human world far from the concern and compassion of those at the center. They 
live in a different world: the garbage heap swept to its edge. 
 Although I do not explore this avenue in detail, there are many resonances between the 
different contexts I’ve described that divide the poor from the rest of the world and the social 
philosophy of Karl Marx and Marxist critiques of capitalism. The diagnosis for a troubled 
society from the perspective of Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy are indeed similar. 
The lives of the world’s poor are shaped by forces beyond their control, and these forces pin to 
them a limited set of possibilities, few of which include ascension out of poverty. The 
prescriptions, however, are very different. Marxists advocate for struggle and revolution as a 
necessary step for equality, which may sacrifice an entire generation in service to an egalitarian 
future. From the perspective of Confucian Confucian philosophy, though unfortunately not 
Chinese history, this is an untenable requirement. It requires more autonomy and sacrifice than a 
communitarian, family-oriented society is willing to give up. This type of society also 
characterizes many Pacific Islander cultures, as I will discuss in the next section. Historically, 
these populations are characterized by subsistence farming and limited participation in world 
markets. Today, they are dealing with the effects of imperialism and colonialism as well as 
modern notions of self and world that run counter to their historically contextualized identities. I 
will argue that the result that can be seen in increasing numbers of Kānaka Maoli and Pacific 
Islanders living in abject poverty comes by way of the falling away of their cultural norms, 
which has resulted in the dissolution of communal and family bonds and the disintegration of 
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their relational identity. Policies such as the sit-lie ban, I argue, have a profound effect on 
individuals who value community as a part of their social identity. 
The Effects of the Sit-Lie Ban on Hawaiians and Pacific Islander Communities 
 In this final section, I will bring the above discussion of historically relational societies 
and subsistence farming communities back to the contemporary predicament of homelessness in 
Hawaiʻi, which inordinately affects Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander populations. I will begin 
by clarifying the similarities and differences between the concepts included so far in this chapter 
and Hawaiian and Pacific Islander societies. I will focus on the harmonious and inclusive models 
of these societies and the visceral connection to the land, and how the effects of modernization, 
colonization, and the global economic systems have impacted these societies. I will argue that 
they have encouraged rapid changes among these populations that reverberate all of the way 
down to cultural identity. While these populations have been shown to be extremely pragmatic 
and flexible, they are haunted by a history that molds their lives in modern poverty. As a result, 
the most vulnerable among them are very poor and also very unsure about their place in the 
world. The world is moving fast while they struggle to take frustratingly incremental steps to 
keep up. In Hawaiʻi, the City and County of Honolulu began to enforce sit-lie bans in 2013, 
which criminalize sitting, lying down, and placing possessions on public sidewalks, adjacent 
sidewalk areas, and a handful of public areas. These bans spread rapidly to include most of 
Oahu’s most populated areas. I will discuss the impact of these ordinances on the disruption and 
disintegration of community and personal identity among Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. 
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 Before I go further, I would like to expand the concept of Pacific Islander, which I have 
been using as an umbrella term in this chapter for inhabitants of all of the islands in the Pacific 
Ocean between the longitudinal borders of the Americas and Asia, Indonesia, and Australia, not 
including arctic regions. My main focus will be the Hawaiian Islands and the islands placed 
under the trusteeship of the United States by agreements ratified in the wake of World War II and 
updated periodically: The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Republic of 
Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the four districts of Kusaie (Kosrae), Ponape 
(Pohnpei), Truk (Chuuk), and Yap that make up the Federated States of Micronesia. Although the 
people who inhabit these islands are labeled Micronesians, they do not identify as a single group. 
In fact, many of the islands’ inhabitants have multi-generational feuds with their neighbors, and 
until their relatively recent exposure to US-sponsored infrastructure, education, and ports 
offering the trappings of modern life, they rarely traveled even to nearby islands. In this 
dissertation, I refer to these societies as subsistence-based, community-oriented, and relatively 
isolated. Considered this way, they share significant similarities with a likewise idealized 
Hawaiian society. My hope is that rather than reducing these complex historical identities to 
romantic, sun-dappled utopias, framing these cultures along these lines of the two themes I’ve 
explored in this chapter will be a strategy for addressing a modern problem in a modern age.  
Social Harmony and Subsistence Farming in Pre-Contact Hawaiian Society 
 This dissertation is not a study of Polynesian societal structure and will not delve far into 
the anthropological research. For resources, I will look to voices that inform the Hawaiian 
resistance movements that have flourished in the 21st century, who provide a historical account 
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of pre-contact society. I take two risks in this approach. First, I risk forcing all modern 
Polynesian societies, including those now referred to as Micronesian, to fit the mold of pre-
contact Hawaiian society before 1778, when Captain Cook arrived in Hawaiʻi. While there are 
significant differences among these varied cultures, I think that the general points I will make 
here are not too far afield, as they arise from what these cultures may share in common. Second, 
my use of modern Hawaiian sources as the authoritative voice risks silencing the nefarious 
aspects of Polynesian societies including human sacrifice, rape, brutality, and exploitation. Mark 
Alfred Kawika Fontaine provides the helpful distinction ‘anthropological’ and ‘traditional’ to 
address this concern. The former emphasizes academic, historical accounts and studies of 
artifacts to piece together Hawaiian history and the latter focuses on the oral traditions and 
‘cultural repository’ of existing Hawaiian communities, elders, and experts to form a holistic 
view of Hawaiian culture.  I will reference the ‘traditional’ sources in this limited study, 203
focusing on harmonious social inclusion and subsistence. First, I will give a brief introduction to 
the ancient Hawaiian social structure. 
 Ancient Hawaiian society was comprised of a ruling class (aliʻi) and a commoner class 
(makaʻāinana), who were both considered descendants of the many Hawaiian deities, which 
were also considered as ancient ancestors. As a result, everyone belonged to the same genealogy, 
though different family lineages traced back to different deities. The appropriate balance for this 
society, which emphasized harmonious reciprocity among everyone according to their proper 
place, is called pono. While this term includes all elements of a properly functioning society, it 
 Mark Alfred Kawika Fontaine, Two Views of Ancient Hawaiian Society (M.A. Thesis, University of 203
Hawaiʻi at Manoa, 2012), 1-5.
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particularly asserts that the division between different types of people must be upheld to maintain 
functional order. The difference between the elite and the common folk is explained as a 
quantitative difference in concentration of mana, the flow of productive and restorative divine 
energies through the human realm. When those above did not do their part to facilitate this flow 
down to those below, the common folk would suffer the loss of life as well as belief. The flow of 
mana also has an effect on the land and weather, as it is the most basic life force of all things.  204
In order to facilitate this flow, order was created among the people by the creation of different 
levels of rank among the elite and ruling class that were determined according to heredity. The 
commoners were held under the dominion of these ranking individuals and performed all of the 
manual labor necessary to support themselves as well as the aliʻi, and in return, they received the 
promise of their safety and well-being.  
 There are many clear similarities between the concepts of societal organization I included 
in my study of ancient Chinese Confucian society above and this brief account of Hawaiian pre-
contact society, including harmonious and hierarchical social structure and the preeminence of 
familial concerns, which drew up the entire Hawaiian civilization as one extended family and 
celebrated elders in the community as repositories of invaluable social knowledge. There is one 
notable dissimilarity I will briefly mention. First, the Hawaiian view of social harmony is more 
teleological and static than the Chinese conception. Once it is achieved, it is possible for the 
society to remain pono indefinitely in a state of equanimity and peace that would prevent 
fluctuations and upwellings of disorder. This harmony is facilitated by strict laws of conduct, 
 For an in-depth study of these terms see Carolyn Kehaunani Cachola-Abad, The Evolution of 204
Hawaiian Socio-Political Analysis of Hawaiian Oral Traditions (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Hawaiʻi, 2000). 
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kapu, that indicate behaviors to be avoided. These laws had spiritual foundations, and it was 
believed that avoiding kapu behaviors would facilitate harmony among people and the earth. 
This is much different from the rituals and relationships of the Confucian tradition that allow for 
the pragmatic flexibility necessary for Confucian harmony. But there is one important aspect 
they share: a visceral connection to the land and the belief that human actions have an 
extraterrestrial effect on the natural world beyond their ability to cultivate it. In fact, many of the 
Hawaiian deified ancestors were believed to give shape to the world in a way that facilitated 
cultivation.  Successful farming practices were not simply honed skills. They were matters of 205
ritual and worship. Hawaiians are very successful farmers, and metaphors of cultivation, as well 
as the benefits of each type of plant, are threaded all the way through Hawaiian culture. The 
timing of planting and reaping, the treatment of pests and blights, soil amending, and irrigation 
systems were even by today’s standards advanced and clever. But in the wake of contact, 
overthrow, occupation, and statehood, very little of these traditions is seen among the hotels and 
shopping centers or even the towns off the tourist-beaten paths, and most of the farmlands that 
are not protected by trusts have been developed, mono-cultivated, or used for experimental agro-
development. These have drastically changed the landscape of Hawaiʻi, which by virtue of their 
connection with these lands have also undoubtedly affected native Hawaiian cultural identity. 
Their ancient ways of life, which had supported their population for centuries, are not valued by 
the new economic world order, and Hawaiʻi has been transformed to a profitable state by 
 For a study of Hawaiian cultivation practices and beliefs see E.S. Craighill Handy and Elizabeth 205
Handy, Native Planters in Old Hawaiʻi: Their Life, Lore, and Environment (Honolulu: Bishop Museum 
Pr., 1991).
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commodifying its beauty in order to attract tourists and exploiting its location to support U.S. 
military strategy. 
 Increased tourism has also had a dissolving effect on Hawaiian family structure and 
community. It does this in three ways: the claiming of farmland for development, the higher cost 
of living due to increase of capital and infrastructure, and the influx of foreign values which have 
little or no connection to the land, which often results in exploitative and apathetic treatment of 
its resources and meaning. These forces work in concert on the dissolve Hawaiian identity and 
have been tied to increases in divorce, child abuse and neglect, spousal abuse, poor health, 
anxiety, and depression especially among rural Hawaiian families who have had to change their 
daily habits, most entering into some aspect of the service and tourism industry, to accommodate 
the changes in their environment.  The financial hardship among these families in transition has 206
also had a measured effect on family cohesion, as families become unable to support non-
working and underemployed members. The inability for families to adapt to rapidly changing 
circumstances has been shown to decrease the amount of time spent participating in activities 
that contribute to community identity, such as first birthday luaus, and to increase the likelihood 
of suffering from mental illness.  Hawaiians are vulnerable to the change from agrarian to 207
modern ways of life in many intersecting ways, and their overrepresentation among the poor and 
imprisoned populations attests to the limitations that prevent their flourishing. 
 J. Matsuoka and M. Benson, “Economic Change, Family Cohesion, and Mental Health in a Rural 206
Hawaiʻi Community,” Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services Vol. 77, No. 2. 
(1996), 109.




 In this chapter, I drew broad connections between ancient Chinese and pre-contact 
Hawaiian societies in order to address the current problem of homelessness in Hawaiʻi using 
Confucian social prescriptions. This endeavor is valuable if these values can reframe the issue of 
homelessness to reveal a different perspective than that which motivates many approaches in the 
United States. One approach that I find intensely problematic is the sit-lie ban, which prevents 
people from resting or storing items on public sidewalks and the areas around them. In their 
study of the effects of the sit-lie ban, Tai Dunson-Strane and Sarah Soakai distributed a voluntary 
survey to those who were affected by the ban: those who were visibly homeless. The results 
indicated that the majority of the unsheltered individuals living in the areas affected by the 
sweeps were Pacific Islanders, and more than half of these were native Hawaiian.  I believe 208
that the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the social and economic aftermath of its 
colonization is connected to the issue of homelessness in Hawaiʻi. I argue that the most profound 
effect of this disruption has been the disintegration of communal and genealogical bonds. Styles 
of American identity that promote individuality, freedom, and autonomy devalue a relational 
view of the self. Neoliberal forces that accompany economic expansion corrode the 
responsibility of the government to its people. This way of ordering society conflicts deeply with 
traditional Hawaiian beliefs about the world and the place of humans in it.  
 The potential result of this influence on native Hawaiians is isolation, which I believe is a 
crucial determinate of homelessness. Hawaiians who live the inhospitable and despised lives of 
 Dunson-Strane and Soakai, “The Effects of City Sweeps and Sit-Lie Policies on Honolulu’s 208
Houseless,” 14.
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the visible homeless in Hawaiʻi are not simply economically poor. They are existentially poor. 
The concepts that structure their sense of self are not valued in the new world order that 
structures their reality. Moreover, they are forcefully removed from public areas; they simply 
have no place to belong. The profound effect of cultural devastation and the intrusion of Western 
social and economic values on native Hawaiians is discussed in the context of Hawaiian mental 
illness by W.C. Rezentes. Kaumaha Syndrome describes the grief and lack of purposive 
motivation that results from the abrupt disordering of cultural stability and the disruption of 
traditional bonds to family and earth. Haʻole syndrome, the lack of aloha, is a more subjective 
feeling of despair or failure, where one feels a profound emptiness and cannot catch one’s 
spiritual breath.  Pairing these uniquely Hawaiian descriptions of existential poverty with the 209
overrepresentation of native Hawaiians among the poor and imprisoned in Hawaiʻi leads to 
startling realizations about the likelihood of homelessness among Kānaka Maoli. The confluence 
of psychological and economic as well as internal and external limitations is captured by the 
character qiong窮 in classical Chinese texts, as discussed in the previous chapter, and this 
enriched notion of poverty helps to frame homelessness in Hawaiʻi especially among Kānaka 
Maoli.  
 The circumstances that precipitate homelessness should not be normalized. We should be 
searching not only for ways to ameliorate poverty but also ways to recuperate those who are not 
integrated into the fabric of the prevailing social world. Those whose cultural identities appeal to 
social relationality and inclusivity, and whose livelihoods are dependent on the land both 
economically and spiritually are at higher risk of ʻdisintegratingʻ in the sense that they are no 
 Rezentes, Ka Lama Kukui, 67.209
#186
longer integrated into a society that includes and values them and that they experience the 
“ontological vulnerability” of their own identity.  We should not erect boundaries of difference 210
that limit our ability to feel compassion for their tenuous existence—or allow them to be 
constructed by a shadowy garbage collector—because our way of constructing the world is not 
the only way. An appeal to Chinese Confucian philosophy, as I have shown, may benefit our 
treatment of unsheltered individuals in Hawaiʻi by pointing out the harm that may be done by 
ignoring and alienating the basic roots of their cultural identities, namely inclusive communal 
society and subsistence farming practices.  
 In the next chapter, I will consider our ability to relate to one another across different 
cultural contexts. I will use resources from the Zhuangzi, the Xunzi, and the concept of a cipher 
in the existential philosophy of Karl Jaspers to illustrate the possibility of an opening up of the 
world to reveal its unboundedness. A boundless perspective careens past the barriers of facts, 
systems, and beliefs toward the possibility of open-ended explorations of interpersonal 
understanding. I will tie this analysis to the issue of the ethical treatment of many Pacific 
Islanders, as well as Kānaka Maoli, in Hawaiʻi. Their moral norms and cultural expectations 
indicate contrasts with prevailing American moral models. As a result, they are ushered to the 
inhospitable margins of society. How do we bring them into the world that many of us take for 
granted, but in which they must struggle to redefine themselves?  
 This term is used by Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation 210
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
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Chapter Four. Transformative Awareness and the Formation of Solidarity 
 I began this dissertation with the goal of showing how Chinese philosophy provides 
useful strategies for considering, critiquing, and pragmatically correcting contemporary social 
problems, specifically homelessness in Hawaiʻi. I find these philosophical resources suitable for 
this purpose because they focus on the particularity of lived experience as well as the inevitable 
or occasional experience of limitation and hardship. The story recounted in chapter two, which 
describes the plight of Confucius between Chen and Cai and its interpretations in early China, 
indicates the weightiness of limitation and poverty on the minds of early Chinese 
philosophers.  The meaning of the character qiong窮 in these passages, I argued, may connote 211
economic as well as existential limitation. They are either experiencing a lack of money and 
food, a lack of power and influence, or the inability to discern or decide what comes next.  
 This focus on limitation makes early Chinese philosophy a valuable voice in today’s 
discussions about homelessness and extreme poverty. These are elements of the human condition 
that today remain stubbornly unresolved. There is no easy solution for homelessness, just as 
there is no simple way to pinpoint its cause. Rather, there are many interconnected causes as well 
as myriad expressions of the problem. What I have proposed so far is a reconceptualization of 
homelessness as it has occurred in Hawaiʻi, which has both the most diverse population and the 
highest concentration of poor and unsheltered individuals of any state. Its demographics, politics, 
 This weightiness, as I mentioned in chapters one and three, underlies the Hawaiian etymology of the 211
condition Kaumaha Syndrome, which is described by psychologist W.C. Rezentes as the feeling of being 
weighed down by the forces surrounding and suppressing the expression of Hawaiian identity. See 
Rezentes, Ka Lama Kukui, 67.
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and climates mark degrees of difference, which are measured in conversations about whether and 
what sort of aid homeless individuals require and deserve.  
 In chapter three I indicated the different valences of self among agrarian, subsistence 
farmers and cultures, such as Hawaiian and Polynesian cultures, and the global, speculative 
markets and commercial methods of farm production that devalue and in many ways exclude 
subsistence production. Though this distinction may seem distant from concerns surrounding 
poverty and homelessness, communal responsibility and culpability is presumably an integral 
part of the former but not the latter. The other side of this coin is the preponderance of capitalist 
systems and commerce-based attitudes that promote narratives of freedom and autonomy in 
Western, liberal societies. These narratives undermine the relative success of communal, 
subsistence living. 
 The vicissitudes of external circumstances and the dynamics of power in agrarian versus 
commercial agriculture sculpt limited vistas for subsistence and sustainable farmers. I tied these 
concerns to the experience of homelessness in Hawaii especially among Kānaka Maoli and 
Pacific Islanders. I brought in the psychological, existential effects of historical, imperial realities 
as a way to clarify and understand the limited number of choices available to them to facilitate 
their own success. The inapt ascription of sloth shields the misery that would invite compassion. 
Instead of being cared for, their helplessness is considered an embarrassment on their behalf and 
a burden for the rest of us. The most formidable barrier to housing the homeless is seeing those 
experiencing homelessness as unrelatable. This is what Simone Weil described in her ascription 
of le malheur. There are those who exist among us but are not a part of our society. There is a 
#189
connection between being housed and being seen as members of communities held together by 
care and compassion.  
 There is at least one attitude Hawaii shares with those customarily called American, 
which can be attributed to the success of New England Protestant missionaries in converting the 
majority of the Kānaka Maoli in the years leading up to and following the overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom (aided in large part by these missionaries). This attitude was described by 
Max Weber in his critique of modern American society, circa 1910, in The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism. He revealed the underpinning of the still common contemporary refrain 
that the poor, underemployed, and homeless are lazy and unindustrious in a ‘Protestant ethic,' 
which formed a connection between the powerful and wealthy and the blessedness and celestial 
approval bestowed upon them.  This narrative connects prosperity with preferential attention, 212
such that those who are less well off may be blamed for lacking a beneficial relationship with the 
Protestant Christian God. Even in the 21st-century renaissance of Hawaiian traditions and ways 
of knowing, this figment of Hawaiʻi’s imperial past remains, and it complicates efforts to provide 
solutions to those experiencing homelessness today. 
 In this chapter, I will consider what it takes to overcome the existential poverty apparent 
in the fraught, frenetic, penurious, and disconnected experience of many of those experiencing 
homelessness. I will bring together Pre-Qin Chinese philosophical sources and the existential 
philosophy of Karl Jaspers to consider the movement past bleak lack of belonging to the 
reconstitution of meaningfully connected lives. Of course, the opportunity to effect success must 
be met with the right circumstances, but the ability to recognize the opening of opportunity and 
 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Other Writings, 79.212
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the willingness to communicate with the unsettled and unknown must be present as well. 
Transcending the circumstances that precipitate existential poverty requires both a revolution in 
the attitudes and policies that address inequality, which I developed in chapter one, as well as the 
navigation of boundary situations that populate our horizons with conflict and struggle.  
 In the Zhuangzi and the Xunzi, we find stories and allegories about living successfully 
and pleasurably, heeding limitation when appropriate and exceeding it when one can. These ideas 
couple well with Karl Jaspers' theories about existential communication which, though hopeful 
and open-ended, find the limit of what is possible, where foundering is inevitable. The desire to 
reach the limit, for Jaspers, motivates metaphysical communication with the Other of lived, 
embodied experience, Transcendence. Although the limit is not reached, the dynamic experience 
of heightened listening and careful, measured expression is the acme of human possibility. This 
experience frames life as something fundamentally shared, a world shaped by the conversations 
of innumerable partners across landscapes of difference. Philosophizing—Jaspers considers his 
philosophy only possible as a conscious activity—is the starting point for imagining beneficial 
political and social structures. In reality, the conditions of our existence lend to disappointment 
and confusion, and what we would most like to know is precisely that which consistently slips 
from our grasp. But this kind of hardship is also a kind of richness. Jaspers writes, “If I hide the 
boundary situations from myself, stolidly carrying on by force of habit, my life is sheer 
existence.”  As I argued in chapters one and two, existential poverty is the lack of the social 213
capital necessary to be and be seen as an active agent in the formation and navigation of one’s 
relationships and circumstances. Although it is not reducible to economic poverty, it is its 
 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, vol. 3, trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 63.213
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common companion. Poverty detracts from one’s ability and motivation to be aware of the 
changes in one’s environment, even those that may steel against the riptide of hardship that pulls 
into hopelessly dark seas. Awareness, then, is the first step toward reintegration into supportive 
communities and the achievement of beneficial world orientations. In this chapter, I will bring to 
the theme of awareness Chinese philosophical perspectives as well as the philosophizing activity 
of Karl Jaspers. Jaspers' philosophizing contributes to this discussion the psychological 
motivations and deterrents which affect our ability to comprehend and respond to contemporary 
homelessness. 
Philological Considerations: qiong窮/wuqiong無窮 
 There is a dimension of the Chinese character qiong窮 that I have not yet mentioned. In a 
fascinating philological turn, limitation and the ability to see past it are both captured in the 
character qiong窮. In early, canonical Chinese philosophy texts, qiong窮 means to engage in 
deep contemplation and investigation of things until one reaches the limit of the possible. At this 
limit, the differences and distinctions among things give way to a larger, unifying patterning of 
the cosmos. Discernment and awareness, which would allow one to see boundaries as if they 
were not boundaries, are the unique abilities of sages and adepts, who are described as wuqiong
無窮, unlimited and unhindered.  
 The character qiong窮 appears in the accepted text of the Zhuangzi ninety-seven times, 
and twenty-four of these occurrences as part of the compound wuqiong無窮. It describes the 
ability to recognize things as being part of a conjunct unity and the distinctions among things as 
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merely temporary demarcations among events and processes. This ability allows one to plumb 
the depths of possible experience. Sages and adepts have the ability not only to recognize subtle 
and intricate connections, but also to see them as indicative of the boundless turning of things 
into each moment’s unique context. They are thus described in the Zhuangzi as capable of 
stepping off into the infinite.  
若夫乘天地之正，而御六氣之辯，以遊無窮者，彼且惡乎待哉！ 
As for the one who rides the true course between heaven and earth, with the 
changes of the Six Energies for their chariot, to step off into the infinite, is there 
anything that he depends on?  214
These individuals manage to ensconce themselves so completely into the dynamic processes of 
the world that they no longer depend on their knowledge of things as part of a value and 
distinction-laden ontology. They make their way in the world by selectively and pragmatically 
distinguishing among things. They do not rise above the particulars to a universal or conceptual 
realization of infinity. Rather, sages encounter no boundary or limit in their understanding of 
things. Here the contronymic aspect of qiong窮 comes to light. While in the contexts I have 
described so far, this term has meant ‘exhaustion’ and ‘limitation,' and, as a verb, to ‘exhaust,' it 
also means to see past the boundaries to encounter what is possible. So although the term 
connotes the meaning of ‘limit’ it denotes the ‘unlimited’. There are no boundaries among the 
innumerable and complex interwoven threads comprising the tapestry of reality. The pursuit of 
sagely pleasure is toward an unlimited understanding that both measures and mirrors the 
 ICS Concordance to the Zhuangzi, v. 43 (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2000), 1/2/2. Based on 214
the A.C. Graham translation.
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unlimited potential and propensity of things. Michael Nylan writes that the pursuit of this 
pleasure is in answer to a question:  
“How is a person to progress from a first dim awareness of cause-and-effect to 
that exalted condition in which he chooses consistently what will give him most 
pleasure, moving from a state of steady depletion (qiong窮) of the self to the 
fullest state of well-being (also qiong)?”  215
 For Confucians, the practice of rituals and the dedication to learning bring about harmony. 
Continuous self-cultivation ensures that the values instilled by each become habits that do not 
dissipate over time, and the implementation of ritual performance and enhancement of 
educational opportunity by the ruler preserve social parity and balance. The embodiment of 
social grace is, according to Xunzi, the ornamentation of human life that makes human conduct 
beautiful. It enables a society to set its sights beyond mere mutual toleration to seek out the 
pleasure and desirability of one another’s company. Amy Olberding draws from Xunzi to 
emphasize the importance of etiquette in our ability to live a pleasurable life with others. She 
writes that etiquette “ornaments brute desire and emotion and thereby operates as a barrier 
against disgust with our fellows.”  ‘Etiquette’ is the word Olberding chooses to facilitate useful 216
comparisons between modern ethical concerns and the Confucian li禮, or “ritual propriety.” Both 
Confucian rituals and contemporary etiquette are learned through immersion in social education 
and become habitual expressions of societal belonging. Nylan carries this through in her analysis 
of ritual in the Xunzi as “the realm devised by the former sage-kings to forge stronger links in the 
 Michael Nylan, Forthcoming from Zone Books.215
 Amy Olberding, “Etiquette: A Confucian Contribution to Moral Philosophy,” Ethics, January 2016, 216
434.
#194
populace’s mind between pleasure and virtue, so that the people correctly identify ritual 
institutions as “what nourishes” them in their needs.”  Knowing what to do ought to elicit a 217
pleasurable sensation if it has taken proper root in the actor. And this confluence of learning and 
action means that the work of becoming a good person is never finished because it is a creative, 
perpetually novel expression of humanity. This moral performance reaches its epitome in the 




When one can deliberate and be firm, and adds to this fondness for it, then this is 
to be a sage. Thus, tian天 is height’s limit and Earth is depth’s limit. The 
boundless (wuqiong無窮) reach the limit of breadth, and the sages reach the limit 
of dao. And so, learning is precisely learning to be a sage—one does not learn 
solely so as to become a directionless commoner. (based loosely on the Hutton 
trans.)  218
The spatial metaphor of knowledge indicates that it is possible to reach the limit of all that is 
possible. Through broad learning and the affirming performance of the rituals, the sages become 
boundless, and once boundless, they can follow the movement of the cosmos. The performance 
of ritual, Xunzi assures his reader, will “prevent fortunate and unfortunate events from intruding 
 Nylan, Forthcoming from Zone Books.217
 Eric Hutton, trans., Xunzi: The Complete Text (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 205.218
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upon each other.”  Knowledge, in this tradition, does not refer to familiarity with a composition 219
of facts. It is connected and enacted through scripted social performances of propriety. Social 
conformity is never far from the understanding of the cosmos. Learning and understanding are 
essentially moral.  
Ritual and Awareness in the Xunzi 
 The moral performance of successfully navigating one’s circumstances is made possible 
through one’s connections to others. Xunzi goes as far as to say that the best way to improve 
oneself is to be around those who continuously improve themselves through education and ritual. 
In quanxue勸學 “Exhortation to Learn,” Xunzi writes,「學莫便乎近其人」  “For learning, 220
there is no method more suitable than being near a learned person.” This moral magnetism—the 
idea that one may be attracted to the beauty of a person’s actions and bearing as to any other type 
of pleasure—presumes that the development of keen awareness is inseparable from learning 
appropriate forms of behavior. This awareness is not honed to penetrate to particular targets and 
goals. Moral learning does not seek to proscribe bad behavior such that one’s choices are 
narrowed only to the acceptable few. Instead, it emphasizes the wide openness of a well-lived 
life, for the sake of which one learns broadly and experiences creatively. In xiushen修身, Xunzi 
writes「君子貧窮而志廣，隆仁也」  ”Even as they reach the dead end of poverty (pinqiong221
貧窮), distinguished persons’ pursuits are broadened and they appreciate the importance of 
 荀子，禮論：禮者，謹於吉凶不相厭者也。Hutton, Xunzi, 207.219
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi. v. 15. Edited by D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching. Hong Kong: The 220
Commercial Press, 2006, 1/3/21.
 ICS Concordance to the Mengzi, 2/8/13-14.221
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shared humanity.” As discussed in chapter two, moral constancy through both good and bad 
times is a central feature of Confucian morality. Here, I append the idea that this constancy 
includes forming and re-forming oneself in response to the vicissitudes of social harmony as well 
as discord. Confucian moral constancy does not invoke a sense of moral repose, but of moral 
responsiveness. In times of paucity as well as prosperity, untarnished awareness allows one to 
clearly see when the clearly right action ought to be done. The broadening of awareness allows 
for one’s attentions and intentions to be omni-directional. The pluri-perspective that arises from 
consistent and broad moral awareness, coupled with the “repetitious ubiquity” of ritual that a 
Confucian social order prescribes,  pushes knowledge beyond the horizon of presence into the 222
nebulousness of prescience. The study of social and seasonal patterning cultivates intuitiveness, 
which in turn codes felicitous expectations. This is the context of the last passage from the 
xiangdang鄉黨 chapter from the Lunyu論語: 
色斯舉矣，翔而後集。曰：「山梁雌雉，時哉！時哉！」子路共之，三嗅而
作。  223
“As they came up, it soared and then landed ahead of them. Confucius said “Here 
on the mountain bridge there is a pheasant hen. Of course there is! It is the 
season!” Zilu gestured at it, then ‘whoosh, whoosh, whoosh’ and it was gone.” 
This passage is interpreted by Ames and Hall as showing the connection between the social and 
natural worlds.  Someone with Confucius’ observational acuity and deep knowledge of nature’s 224
 Olberding, Etiquette, 433. She makes the point that with the basic social norms firmly in place, one’s 222
intentions and actions couple precisely with others’ perception and expectation. This smooths out the 
ridges that disrupt moral flow.
 Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 141.223
 Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 246, endnote 160.224
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revolutions would expect to see the pheasant in that place and at that time. Naturally, the bird 
would take flight as they approached. The passage would have a different meaning if the wild 
bird allowed itself to be caught in its own environs with plenty of warning.  It is likely that 225
Confucius and Zilu had over-wintered and, now that spring had arrived, they were making calls. 
Metaphors of new beginnings and the end of difficult times are elicited by reference to the 
emergence of the pheasant from its winter absence, which according to the Liji, is when it 
transforms into an oyster.  This passage illustrates Confucius’s vast, variegated knowledge that 226
unveils the world, clearing it of inconsistency and cinching it together with “one continuous 
strand.”  227
 Xunzi, like Confucius, understood that awareness and action are part and parcel of moral 
achievement.  In order for society to accommodate everyone—people old and young, from far 228
 This translation follows Ames and Hall’s, which suggests that the passage does not include the two of 225
them catching and eating the pheasant. The difference in interpretation concerns the character xiu嗅, 
which is commonly translated as ‘to smell’ or ‘to sniff’. I suggest here an onomatopoeic interpretation.
「水始冰，地始凍。雉入大水為蜃。虹藏不見。」 ICS Concordance to the Liji, 6/87226
 From the Ames and Hall translation of the Analects 4.15:「我到一以貫之。」227
 荀子，王制： 水火有氣而無生，草木有生而無知，禽獸有知而無義，人有氣、有生、有知，亦228
且有義，故最為天下貴也。 “Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life. Plants and trees 
possess life, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack a sense of morality and justice. 
Humans possess vital breath, life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice. It is for 
this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world.” Knoblock, Xunzi, 104.
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and near, with poor and plentiful resources—everyone first must find their appropriate place.  229
Even the institutions put in place to make sure no one is left with less than they need, what we 
now refer to in an impersonal and general way as ‘welfare,’ have as their foundation the unique 
performances of individual and contextualized moral actors who consider themselves culpable 
for societal imbalances. To guard against the existence of poverty, everyone must moderate their 
fancies. The moral training required to see others’ hardships as inextricable from the wellbeing of 
the society and all of its inhabitants is a crucial element of Xunzi’s philosophy. People are born 
with the desire to accumulate wealth and power, even if it is at the expense of others. Moral 
training, beginning in childhood, is the only way to deter further growth of this inborn tendency. 
Moral training in the rules of propriety, li禮, facilitates the division into social classes. Shirley 
Chan adds,  
“When men recognize their positions and duties, guided by the rules of propriety, 
they are expected to fulfill their roles and make contributions to the economy. By 
doing so, order, coexistence, and abundance will be ensured. When this happens, 
not only is the economic problem of scarcity essentially solved, but through it 
men gain satisfaction through fulfilling their roles properly.”  230
 荀子，王制：人何以能群？曰：分。分何以能行？曰：義。故義以分則和，和則一，一則多229
力，多力則彊，彊則勝物。 “Why can man form a society? I say it is due to the division of society into 
classes. How can social divisions be translated into behavior? I say it is because of humans’ sense of 
morality and justice. Thus, if their sense of morality and justice is used to divide society into classes, 
concord will result. If there is concord between the classes, unity will result; if there is unity, great 
physical power will result; if there is real strength, all objects can be overcome.” Knoblock, Xunzi, 104.
 Chan, “Equilibrium in Classical Confucian “Economy”,” 105.230
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The coexistence and abundance promised by a well-ordered society do not stop at the limits of 
human affairs. They penetrate into and propel the proper patterning of nature.  Henry 231
Rosemont brings in the agricultural context of Xunzi’s advice to a would-be king, which 
emphasizes the connection between a harmonious cosmos and a world ordered by human activity 
to promote human existence. On this reading, a harmonious society does not necessarily have a 
cosmological implication of a larger order, but a practical one of harnessing nature to provide the 
safety and sufficiency required and desired by humans. This harmony can be achieved even in 
the face of natural disasters. Rosemont writes,  
“Xunzi believed that the state existed because man was a social animal who could 
not survive without societal institutions because cooperative economic efforts in 
the form of public works projects were necessary to guarantee that flood or 
drought would not wreak havoc with the crops each year. In this way each man’s 
work makes a contribution to the state and thereby everyone else, and hence on 
Xunzi’s grounds every citizen of the state is entitled to and must receive benefits 
from his membership therein.”   232
A society that benefits materially from coercion and enslavement, which brings and keeps people 
in poverty, is not a real society. Cooperation and inclusivity are required in order to attain the 
social harmony that Xunzi prescribes. Each member of the society must cultivate the moral 
 荀子，王制：故序四時，裁萬物，兼利天下，無它故焉，得之分義也。 “Thus, that [humans] put 231
the four seasons in their proper sequence, control the myriad of things, universally benefit the whole 
world, is due to no other cause than that they have developed social classes from their sense of morality 
and justice.” Knoblock, Xunzi, 104.
 Henry Rosemont, Jr., “State and Society in the Xunzi,” Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 232
ed. T.C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 5.
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awareness to act according to the social scripts (li禮), which dictate mutually and ubiquitously 
beneficial social relationships. Michael Nylan indicates that the emphasis here is not on everyone 
accepting what is right and good according to a king’s edict, but on their awareness that it will 
bring them pleasure. She writes, 
The well-governed polity, then, requires more than each component of society 
fulfilling its specific functions, like cogs in a wheel. It requires also that each 
person experience a zest for his calling, sensing that it is well suited to his 
capacities and predilections. All humans, "from the Son of Heaven on down to the 
commoner," want to "maximize their capacities, attain their goals, and take secure 
pleasure in their activities.” Like a fish in its element (a metaphor employed by 
Xunzi, as well as by Zhuangzi), each person is pleased with his situation, since his 
particular position "is not too much [or] ... too little for him.” 
While it would be a stretch to say that Xunzi advocates for a contemporary ideal of social justice, 
his prescribed social arrangement presumes parity as well as culpability. These moral attitudes 
stem from the enculturated awareness that moral education instills in everyone the virtuosic 
ability to act, react, and enact appropriately. Moral improvisation and the internalization of the 
Confucian five virtues allow one to achieve cheng誠, translated by Ames and Hall as ‘creativity’ 
and John Knoblock as ‘truthfulness’. I will keep ‘creativity’ in order to preserve a dual meaning 
of novelty and creation, but I will add ‘transformative’ to bring in the concepts of awareness and 




For the distinguished person concerned with nurturing their heart-mind, there is 
nothing greater than transformative creativity. If one can achieve transformative 
creativity, then there will be no other tasks that attract attention. Transformative 
creativity manifests one’s focus on authoritative conduct to bring about justice 
and on being truly adept to propel it into motion.  Once it is manifest, it can be 234
understood. Once it is understood, it can be used to bring about changes. 
This concept of transformative creativity, cheng誠, will inform the rest of this chapter. It brings 
together moral knowledge and motivation to bring about amenable changes in one’s 
circumstances. On Xunzi’s view, moral knowledge includes prescient awareness of the cyclical, 
natural patterns that shape the world. Such knowledge stems from an open-ended view of an 
unsettled future. It is an understanding not of the way things are, but the way that they could 
most beneficially be. When one reaches the moral stage of transformative creativity, one can, 




 ICS Concordance to the Xunzi. Knoblock section 3.9a.233
 Following Ames and Hall’s translation of ren仁 as ‘authoritative conduct’ and shan善 as ‘truly adept’. 234
See The Analects of Confucius, 48-51, 57-58.
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Thus, the utmost creativity is ceaseless. Unceasing, it is enduring; enduring, it is 
effective; effective, it reaches far into the distance; reaching far into the distance, 
it is broad and thick; being broad and thick, it is high and brilliant. Its breadth and 
thickness enable it to bear up everything; its height and brilliance enable it to 
envelop everything; reaching far into the distance enables it to realize all events. 
Broad and thick, it is companion to the earth; high and brilliant, it is companion to 
the heavens; far-reaching and enduring, it is without limit. This process of utmost 
creativity is in full display without manifesting itself, changes without moving, 
and realizes without doing anything.  235
This evocation of unhindered, expansive movement brings this discussion back to the beginning 
of the discussion of the Xunzi as well as to themes shared with the Zhuangzi, to which I will now 
turn. Both of these texts and their corresponding traditions describe the importance of expansive, 
transformative awareness that gives way to prescient knowledge of the way circumstances 
change and the ability to act in a timely way. The ability to navigate propitious and unpropitious 
circumstances with the same grace, as I have discussed in previous chapters, is central to the 
Chinese philosophical traditions that have their root in the Warring States Period. The ability to 
become unbounded (wuqiong無窮) allows one to transcend obstruction in pursuit of unclouded 
awareness and smooth traveling. Note that these philosophies do not seek ways to avoid hard 
times. Circumstances that shape human lives are wrapped up in the cyclical, swinging movement 
of the cosmos, and the inevitability of their pressing cannot be deterred or doubted. The solution 
 Roger Ames and David Hall, Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of 235
the Zhongyong (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 107.
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is to be prepared to guard against the penetrating existential effects of these boundary situations. 
In the Zhuangzi and the work of Neo-Daoist philosopher Guo Xiang (252-312CE), the sage is 
described as transcending boundaries by metaphorically rising above them. They whirl up into 
the unbounded and progress unabated regardless of their circumstances. 
Whirling into the Infinite: Boundlessness in the Zhuangzi  
 The unbounded (wuqiong無窮 or wuji無極) in the Zhuangzi is not something that exists 
on its own terms or as a positive ontological or metaphysical entity. Instead, its description relies 
on the productive use of metaphor and allegory, as well as a nuanced conception of negativity, to 
speak to the ability of a select few to seemingly effortlessly navigate the vicissitudes of human 
circumstances. The patterned flow of change is unlimited in its expression and diversity, but 
humans have a limited perspective that occludes and obscures much of it. The grasping at what 
can never be fully understood, the infinite plenitude of individual transformation and the 
encompassing of these realities by one thing mutually shared, only takes hold of the slippery 
slithering tail of what is already and eternally in motion. To become unbounded necessitates 
unhindered movement.   
 Many of the philosophically rich concepts in the Chinese philosophical traditions 
emphasize the ceaseless movement of the cosmos that propels perpetual changes. The flourishing 
of the myriad things depends on motion and is hindered by stagnation, obstruction, and 
exhaustion. In the Daoist tradition, the unbounded, unfettered movement of all things to where 
they are, which is always where they ought to be, describes the cosmos in its purest, primordial 
state of existence. It is against this backdrop that humans consider their limitations and 
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shortcomings, which cause them to dis-integrate from the manifold harmonized flux (dao道). 
Falling away from the enlivening motion of things, one may begin to take what is false as true 
and the loopy for the logical. The Zhuangzi is rife with cautions against knowledge that is based 
on forging distinctions among things and affirming them timeless. The sage rebuffs the 
limitations imposed by knowing, affirming, and saying and as a result moves unhindered from 
the actual to the possible. It is natural that humans encounter hardship because the ephemeral 
shifts in cosmic emphasis cast some things in darkness, but the sage has prescient awareness that 
precludes existential destitution even in the most pressing times.  
 There are several inherent preconceptions regarding philosophical exploration of the 
world that are different in the context of Chinese philosophy versus Western traditions. One is 
the absence of an underlying mathematical structure or metaphor that would support the 
translation of wuqiong無窮 as straightforwardly “infinite”. The inalienable somaticity of pre-Qin 
and Han Chinese philosophy does not allow for the reduction of things, events, people, or 
histories into countable, discrete, homogenous units or unities.  As a result, abstract thinking, 236
especially in Lao-Zhuang or philosophical Daoist thought, relies on metaphors of expansiveness 
and unhindered, varied understanding. The emphasis on the unbounded refuses the basic 
premises of mathematical thinking of the infinite, namely identity and differentiation, as well as 
the formation of boundaries among things. But this tradition is not without a conception of 
 This, of course, does not mean that those of ancient China did not or could not count. Rather, my point 236
is that things were not grouped based on an underlying homogeneity. For example, it is unproblematic for 
a person to say that they have two children, but how they are counted, namely, as older son and younger 
sister, retains their heterogeneity.
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multitude, or perhaps more accurately, multiplicity. Consider this passage from the Qiwulun齊物






The way things are is not divided up, and talk about it has never been objectively 
true. Once there is an identity ascribed to something, a boundary is drawn around 
it. Allow me to describe this boundary. You can draw them here or there to 
differentiate things, you can even them out or indicate a preference for one over 
the other, you can use them to divide things into smaller pieces and show how to 
discriminate between them, or you can use them to promote contention and fuel 
disputes. These are what I call the eight intellectual modes of efficacy. The sage 
lives according to what is liminal to the cosmos, where there is no impetus for 
discursive boundary-drawing. The sage is discursive within the bounds of the 
cosmos, but does not assess the value of these differentiations… Therefore when 
things are divided up, there remains something undivided; when there are 
discriminations among things, there remains something intact… The sage holds 
fast to these irreconcilable realities while the masses get caught up with 
convincing one another that the boundaries are real. Which is why I say that 
getting caught up in distinctions blinds a person. 
 Translation is mine, based on the ICS Concordance to the Zhuangzi, 2/5/26-30,  237
#206
This passage is one of many instances of ontological relativity in the text. Things may appear one 
way and then another, or one person may see something differently than another sees, and there 
is no convincing and concrete way to assess the truth or validity of either state or claim. When 
among the common folk in the everyday world, the sage recognizes the practical convenience of 
boundedness, even to the point of social savvy, but only tenuously. The deeper awareness for the 
sage is the spectacle of undifferentiated, valueless change. Of course, the context of this concern 
for the bounded world and the unbounded are, on the surface, political. The Zhuangzi disdains 
the ritualized conduct and moral assertions of the Confucians and Mohists, whom he sees as 
stubbornly projecting their standards onto the world. But there is something more interesting 
going on here. We have the notion of unboundedness linked to a distinction between inside (nei
內) and outside (wai外). The Zhuangzi indicates that the sage may wander around the outside 
into the boundless. Here the unhindered has a spatial connotation. There is an area outside of 
divided up, classified, valued things, where knowledge is broadened to include the diversity, 
multiplicity, and the changes of things perpetually in motion. 
  The Zhuangzi and the Neo-Daoist philosopher Guo Xiang describe unboundedness as a 
form of unity that preserves difference. Unboundedness is not an abstraction from the world but 
a literal description of its myriad events and inhabitants. These are not countable because they 
are transient and dissimilar. They do not combine to form a unity, but rather are unified in their 
combinations. Such a conception of the unbounded reveals the relationship of the margins to the 
middle and the value of the useless. It also forges psychological protections against the effects of 
pernicious circumstances not by preventing them, but by deterring the corrosive effects that often 
accompany distressing times. The sage looks beyond the obstructions—noticing them but 
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‘forgetting’ to heed their deleterious effects on personal striving—so as to gird the existential 
wealth of broadly applied knowing against the effects of living in dire straits. Sages stake 
themselves outside of the bounds and merge into the changes. 
Transformative Awareness in Daoist and Neo-Daoist Texts 
 If we collect and review the passages from the Zhuangzi that describe the ability of the 
sage to roam outside of the boundaries of the human world, we may come to the conclusion that 
the sage is unconcerned with the world and even a little disdainful of those caught up in its 
turning. From the perspective of those inside the sage is incomprehensible. We find in the first 
chapter of the Zhuangzi an encounter with the madman of Chu, who describes to a bewildered 
Confucian the man who rides the wind, drinks only dew, and roams beyond the human world. 
The following is the A.C. Graham translation: 
[H]e talked big but there was no sense in it, he left the firm ground and never 
came back. I was amazed and frightened by his words, which streamed on into the 
infinite like the Milky Way, wild extravagances, nothing to do with man as he 
really is.  238
Because he holds fast to his principles, the Confucian, hearing of a man who can “merge the 
myriad things and make them one” and gives no cares to how to properly rule an empire, must 
dismiss the words of the madman as nonsense. Even though the empire has been led to ruin, the 
Confucian must hold tightly to the necessity of rulership. Readers of the Zhuangzi have a 
difficult time agreeing with the Confucian, of course, because the text privileges the viewpoint of 
 Graham, Chuang-tzü, 46.238
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the Zhuangzian sage. The sage surveys the muddled mire of human strivings and sees in their 
oppositions and definitions the futility of perspectival certainty. From outside, the sage has no 
problem seeing difference as sameness. The witty and impassioned arguing among men, in a 
single Gestalt shift, sounds like the chirping of birds, and their vehement disagreements are 
reduced to a stream of inane chatter.  
 The sage is able to traverse the boundary surrounding human affairs and achieve a view 
of absolute inclusivity. There is only one way the world is. But the bounded world is subject to 
inevitability and causality in a way that the unbounded is not. Those who are ensnared by the 
bounded, proficient in office, politics, or sorcery though they may be, will never ascend into the 
unity of the unbounded, which depends on nothing to be or define it. From the Zhuangzi: 
若夫乘天地之正，而御六氣之辯，以遊無窮者，彼且惡乎待哉！  239
As for those who ride up to the distinct path between heaven and earth and 
harness the opposing forces of the six energies (yin, yang, wind, rain, dark, light) 
to ride off into the unbounded, where can one find anything they depend on? 
In ascending into the unbounded, the sage becomes unbounded. Brook Ziporyn puts forward the 
phrase ‘vanishing (into) things,' as “the obliteration of borders, which is to say, the mutual 
externality of things” to describe this phenomenon,  which is a pivotal topic in Guo Xiang’s 240
commentary on the Zhuangzi. Ziporyn writes: 
By such total vanishing (into) the chaos of chance, one is constantly still and 
constantly one: “He who vanishes (into) things is entangled and disturbed when 
 Translation is mine, based on the ICS Concordance to the Zhuangzi, 1/2/1-2.239
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they are so, and yet has never ceased to be placid.” …as is so often the case, the 
ideal man is modeled after the Tao itself. Guo’s Tao is nothing, and hence the 
spontaneity of all particular things: it is everywhere and nowhere.   241
Guo’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi preserves radical diversity and complexity. He gets around 
the pervading presence of a singular dao, and the implication of its totalizing oneness, by 
relieving it of ontological positivity. Heeding the instruction from the Daodejing that dao cannot 
be named, Guo insists that it does not exist, at least in the way that named things may. Rather, 
dao is what allows all things to flourish according to their unique proclivities. The ephemeral 
combinations and interconnections among things are what elicit the presence of dao. Dao exists 
only in the momentum of change, and can only be seen in the traces left behind, inauthentic 
because their existences are artificially prolonged. Traces, according to Guo, are what moralists 
use to construct the boundaries of society and propriety and hold fast to the distinctions among 
people and the value of ritual practices and items. Those who take traces as real shape the world 
by generating limits. These limits narrow perspectives on inclusivity by emphasizing the 
differences among things, and they are the scaffolding of any prevailing social arrangement. As 
was vogue among Han Dynasty commentators, Guo did not incriminate all societal 
organizations, but rather he sought an arrangement that was not discordant with what could 
conceivably naturally come about. Building and maintaining lasting social mores, traditions, and 
expectations promotes harmony in the inner, human world. According to Guo, the outer world is 
neither affected nor perturbed by human artifice. Rather than focus the more eremitic and 
aporetic elements of the Lao-Zhuang Daoist tradition, Guo syncretized the bureaucratic and the 
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natural by inscribing a border meant to be transcended.  Ziporyn writes of this act of 242
intellectual liberty:  
  The unity of the inner and the outer, of social morality and spontaneity, is 
founded on the unity of interdependence and independence, which in turn is 
founded on the unity of oneness and multiplicity, of constancy and change. By 
means of this elaborate machinery, Guo was able to consent completely to the 
existing social order.  243
The sense of oneness that Guo Xiang posits does not imply simplicity or singularity, nor is there 
a sense of tabulation in the collected experiences of the world. There is no mathematical 
metaphor of addition in the metaphysics ascribed to the Zhuangzi by Guo Xiang. It is difficult to 
count stuff that is never still and always transforming. An attempt to count it would number a 
quality it does not have, namely, determinate, self-sufficient unity. The infinite, then, is defined 
from within a metaphysics not fixated on mathematical positivity or unity within certain 
increments of space and time. Guo insists that the infinite is the removal of limits, which 
gradually reveals the world that is incapable of being limited. In this “outer” world even one’s 
own ability to make distinctions and divisions among things becomes an object for dissolution. 
What is at stake is linguistic more than mystical. The transcending Guo speaks of is over 
believing that things can really be opposites, not that one sees everything as the same. There are 
no fundamental oppositions accounted for in the ontology of either the inner or outer world, and 
 This idea of transcending can be connected to a pivotal aspect of Jaspers’ periechontology, which will 242
be discussed in what follows.
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there is no distinction wide enough to step through except the one between linguistic versus real 
distinctions. And in the realm of the unbounded, what real distinctions could remain?  
As Guo puts it, “He who roams in [the realm of] no smallness and no largeness is 
inexhaustible (wuqiong); he who vanishes (into) no-death and no-life is limitless 
(wuji).”   244
Sages reform the world by fully immersing themselves in it. In a world where we are so muddled 
and mired, why do we revisit the Zhuangzi in times of distress? 
 The appeal in the Zhuangzi to the useless sage, the inhabitant of the hospitable infinite, 
undermines the divisions among the valuable and the worthless. Zhuangists and Neo-Daoists 
sought a dramatically open and extended concept of unbounded inclusivity, one that resists the 
idea of totality altogether. More than preserving diversity in unity, they can be interpreted as 
insisting on multiplicity and complexity and as rebuffing the simplification of human society 
down to a set of established rituals. David Wong writes: 
The Chuang Tzu urges us to “forget (wang)” morality. This does not mean that we 
are to lose all awareness of moral categories or that we should not use them in 
guiding conduct. We must allow for the characteristic hyperbole of Taoism. What 
it does mean is that we should not make respect for rules the primary foundation 
of respect for human beings. We should cultivate the part of us that spontaneously 
identifies with others, the state of consciousness in which the boundaries between 
self and others fall away. That state is tz’u [慈], sometimes translated as 
“compassion” or “deep love.” Tz’u gives rise to unpremeditated aid to others 
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when they are in distress, not aid given because it is a moral duty. The idea is that 
once we are able to suspend looking at people through our evaluative categories, 
we will be able to accept them for what they are, see them as beings like 
ourselves, and care for them as we care for ourselves.  245
In the end, each of the philosophies discussed, Xunzian Confucianism and Zhuangzian Neo-
Daoism, indicate a connection between unbounded, transformative awareness and an inclusive, 
compassionate society. Abstracting from this, we can describe the movement from actual, lived 
experience, which is subjected to the vicissitudes of fortune and misfortune to unbounded and 
prescient awareness of the auspicious and inauspicious, and on to the transcending of existential 
roadblocks that threaten self-certainty. From there, one may begin to appreciate and find pleasure 
in their surroundings and even in putting the things around them in order. If we begin with the 
belief that human needs are simple and easily met, then variegated and broad understanding of 
the cosmos easily accommodates social harmony. Both the Zhuangzi and the Xunzi emphasize 
the connection between awareness that allows one to have a transformative effect both on oneself 
and the surrounding society. Naturally, this would not be such a prevalent theme in Pre-Qin 
Chinese philosophy if it were something easily achieved. In order to accommodate boundary 
situations, in which the limitations one encounters are unweildy even if they are anticipated, one 
must strive to be open to what is happening in order to react appropriately. Michael Nylan writes, 
The goal for Zhuangzi is not to produce new knowledge, but to produce a person 
open to new experiences, and therefore prepared to live life fully. His Dao adept 
goes beyond "what he knew and how he knew,”[33] developing a knack for 
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accommodating new things. He is more inclined to drink in scenes whole, since 
he has fewer expectations than usual.  246
Cultivating such a mindset would mollify the misery of a precipitously calamitous shift of 
circumstances. If one learns to understand the world broadly, then the unfolding of the particular 
is seen not as bounded or binding. Rather, it is yet another of endless opportunities to improve 
one’s response.  
 As I bring the concept of transformative awareness to the study of homelessness in 
Hawaiʻi, I am careful not to simplify the political and economic circumstances that have 
contributed to this problem in an attempt to tease out what a cultivated, broad understanding 
would make of such distressing circumstances. Hawaiʻi’s unhoused individuals may not have the 
choice, the desire, or the social and material support for a roam into the boundless, for such an 
endeavor is thwarted by the struggle to maintain the barest survival. The boundary situations that 
threaten existential self-certainty are not easily transcended. The plodding, dismal existence of 
those whose presence is actively disdained by those around them and whose society builds literal 
and lawful boundaries to wipe away their humanity provides few footholds to ascend up and 
over the obstructions in their paths. We must seek to understand the effect that boundary 
situations have on those whose lives are defined by them. For a discussion of transcending 
boundary situations to facilitate self-understanding and thriving, I turn now to Karl Jaspers. 
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Boundary Situations in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers 
 Perhaps it is a feature of human life that misfortune, misunderstanding, and missed 
opportunities shape our experiences day to day. This is the reason that we seek to cultivate 
prosperity, clarity, and dexterity. We run into problems when the circumstances to which we are 
inextricably beholden take the wind out of our sails and give way to stagnant, dreary days. I have 
mentioned previously that the risk of economic poverty is existential destitution, which corrodes 
the awareness necessary to effectively navigate one’s circumstances and handicaps the ability to 
transform one’s surroundings. There is little doubt that we all encounter situations that threaten 
our self-certainty and call into question our choices, but are these situations remotely similar to 
those that the unsheltered face? We call difficult times ‘pressing’ because there is something 
weighty and suffocating, external and forceful, about the restriction of freedom and choice. In a 
sense, there is something inhuman about it, which slides into the identity of those living hard-
pressed lives. Those who live rough on the sidewalks of urban Hawaiʻi reside among the waste 
that tumbles out of overfilled trash cans and the critters that make a home of it. They live lives 
with little privacy and become used to being seen as a social disappointment, and a hopeless case 
that withers compassion. Their refrain, “I never thought I’d end up this way.” implies the 
obvious: no one chooses this kind of life. As I mentioned in my discussion of Simone Weil in 
chapter two, every day is like paying a penance of the crime of continuing to exist. But in the 
case of the unsheltered, the “prison” is secured by labyrinthine passages and blind alleys rather 
than doors and locks.  
 The concept of transformative awareness, discussed in the context of Chinese philosophy 
above, presumes pendulous shifts in circumstance, so it offers prescriptive advice for 
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maneuvering around and over obstacles that crop up during hard times. I think that most hardship 
is attributable to swings in fortune, but I bring Karl Jaspers into the discussion to address the 
possibility of sustained and unmitigated hardship, such as one might find among those 
considered ‘chronically homeless’ by contemporary standards.  
 Karl Jaspers begins his search for existential self-sufficiency with the proviso that the 
possibility of failure is never far away, but neither is the possibility of successful self-
actualization. Jaspers writes: 
Knowledge about things increases my care, anxiety, and suffering; it paralyses 
and shows the senselessness and hopelessness of everything. When one 
investigates such representations, consciousness must seem like a disaster… 
Consciousness can fault, and can be used in faulty forms; it then becomes a 
source of particular untruth. However, this is possible only because it is the source 
of particular truth.  
 For consciousness is not only something adventitious but also something 
that awakens, impels upward, makes for development, and becomes the condition 
of new experience derived from all modes of the Encompassing.  247
This way of describing knowledge is perhaps the obverse of the themes discussed in the context 
of Chinese philosophy, which indicate that broadening knowledge leads to less strife. But 
Jaspers’ philosophizing deploys a different metaphor for movement. While the Chinese 
philosophers discussed above emphasized the increasing ease of movement as one becomes 
unbounded (wuqiong無窮), my reading of Jaspers illustrates the need for grit and grip, in 
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keeping with the metaphor of friction that propels movement. When consciousness stumbles, the 
experience of uncertainty and regret are the grit that offers enough resistance for us to regain our 
bearings. The desire to grip what may pull us out of difficult situations is the meeting of our 
intentions and the timing that underlies prosperous or impoverished circumstances. Only with 
both can we achieve the friction necessary to travel forward in the movement of Philosophizing, 
which moves us through the stages he describes in his periechontology. 
Jaspers’ Periechontology 
 The Encompassing (das Umgreifende) is, in Jaspers’ philosophizing, the comprehensive 
and inclusive horizon of what humans are and what they may become as well as the world as it is 
given and what it may become. Humans are blessed with the ability to group particular 
occurrences according to recognizable features.  What humans may become is Existenz, who 248
cultivate their character and tune their awareness to invite communication from others and the 
world. The world (Welt) “is that which is without our being it and which remains in its ground 
when we comprehend its appearance that emerges from it.”  But what the world may become is 249
presented to us through Ciphers that point toward something beyond the frenetic and disordered 
events on which our consciousness founders. These Ciphers indicate the existence of 
Transcendence. The Cipher appears to Existenz as a question posed to thinking. How the 
message is received is then reflected upon, and knowledge of the world is broadened. For 
Jaspers, Ciphers are filtered through the experiences of life that supersede the mundane. Jaspers: 
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In my actions, in opposition, success, failure and loss, and finally in my thinking, 
which comprehends all this and in turn its condition, I have the experience in 
which I perceive the cipher… I learn from what happens to me by my attitude 
toward it. My wrestling with myself and with things is a wrestling for 
transcendence which appears to me as cipher only in this immanence.  250
The existence of Existenz, as it relies solely upon the movement of philosophizing, is much 
different from that of Transcendence, which is pursued through communication with Existenz. 
The pursuit of the meaning of Transcendence is the invocation of the movement of Existenz 
toward authenticity. Philosophizing allows the mind to entertain the possibility of knowledge that 
is not cognizable, removing the firm ground from beneath the shipwreck. “The bottomless-ness 
of world-being,” Jaspers writes, “must become manifest to us so that we may gain the truth of 
the cognition of the world.”  In this way, the mind is liberated from the causal relationships of 251
the apparent world, and through this movement the idea of freedom is palpable. Freedom, for 
Jaspers, is an openness of a mind oriented toward Transcendence that allows it to momentarily 
shine through the finite and contingent happenings of the world.   252
Existential Communication in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophizing 
 The communication between Existenz and Transcendence tethers each person to the 
world in a unique way. It is the way that individuals develop awareness of what guides the 
 Ehrlich et al., Karl Jaspers, 311. (From Philosophie).250
 Ehrlich et al., Karl Jaspers, 169. (From Von der Warheit).251
 Ehrlich et al., Karl Jaspers, 170. (From Von der Warheit).252
#218
movement of things in their surroundings and the movement of consciousness toward felicitous 
coupling with a world that is never fully revealed. Ronny Miron writes: 
Existenz, according to Jaspers, is anchored in the world’s existence (Dasein) by 
its “situation-being” (Situationsein), which consists of the freedom to fulfill one’s 
possibilities and the inescapable necessity stemming from reality’s factuality. The 
idea of “Situation-being” reduces the meaning of the world to the personal 
perspective of Existenz and uncovers a profound truth about the way Existenz 
experiences the world, i.e., a person by no means experiences the entirety of the 
world, but only some of its dimensions in which s/he is directly involved… The 
establishing of the idea of Existenz retains, then, at the same time the particularity 
of the subjective meaning, but in addition to that, the awareness of situation that it 
is surrounded by a world. Consequently, the idea of Existenz marks the shift to the 
understanding of the self as a worldly being.253
This awareness moves one beyond an understanding of the world in terms of cause and effect, 
which posits a distance between the observer and the observed. The communication between 
Existenz and Transcendence allows for receptivity and disclosure on behalf of one’s experience 
and one’s world, respectively. Our lives are woven into the world around us, but the enlivening 
of the world through the interpretation of its ciphers brings out the subtle, intricate patterns in the 
fabric. As the patterns emerge, the lines between the present and the possible merge into them as 
well. The movement of philosophizing is not simply struggling to know what the world is. It 
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reveals the limit of what is possible to achieve. It also reveals the limitations that prevent such 
desirable possibilities.  
 The limitations that are inevitable for Jaspers’ philosophizing are hitches in the 
movement of Existenz toward Transcendence. They take place in the situations that define 
existence as well as Existenz. But not all situations unfold the way that we would prefer, and 
there is no way to prepare for or avoid them. Jaspers writes: 
Situations like the following: that I am always in situations; that I cannot live 
without struggling and suffering; that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die—these 
are what I call boundary situations. They never change, except in appearance. 
There is no way to survey them in existence, no way to see anything behind them. 
They are like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder. We cannot modify 
them; all that we can do is to make them lucid, but without explaining or deducing 
them from something else. They go with existence itself.  254
Boundary situations (Grenzsituationen), according to Jaspers, allow us “to become the Existenz 
we potentially are,”  but they can also “crush [consciousness’s] unelucidated existence into a 255
dull, helplessly musing stupor.”  They are, according to Sarah Bakewell, the “moments when 256
one finds oneself constrained or boxed in by what is happening, but at the same time pushed by 
these events towards the limits or outer edge of normal experience.”  These situations belie our 257
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rational understanding of the world. There is a unique porousness to them, and our experience is 
communication between a possibility we choose for ourselves—to be better, more courageous, 
more open—and a world that refuses to be reduced to a tidy set of suppositions.  
 Suffering is inevitable. It is also the ground of Existenz. If existence did not disclose the 
possibility for Existenz, which opens experience up to possibility, it would raise “the specter of 
an endless life without potential, without effect and communication. I have died, and it is thus 
that I must live forever; I do not live, and so my possible Existenz suffers the agony of being 
unable to die. The peace of radical nonbeing would be a deliverance from this horror of continual 
death.”  For Jaspers, if we do not commit ourselves to the pain of communicating with that 258
which can never be fully understood, and to the irresolute impossibility of a full translation of the 
ground of our being, then boundary situations, such as the inevitability of our own deaths, will 
doubly crush us. We will physically expire, but our fear and inability to think beyond this 
inevitable consequence of living will extinguish us long before that. When the possibility of 
Existenz is closed off, the world becomes unpredictable and inhospitable. Without it, we attempt 
to steel ourselves against the relentless onslaught of existence, and we exhaust what hope we 
have dealing with each disappointment. Defiantly surrendering to reality and being open and 
receptive to turns in fate is the only way to keep open the possibility of Existenz and the 
existential communication only it can initiate. Jaspers writes: 
For transcendence wants me to yield in the reality of existence. If in defiance I 
spurned fortune as fleeting and delusive, surrender makes me feel that what 
everyone is to receive in due time must not be disdained. If in defiance I scorned 
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misfortune, if it makes me loathe all existence, surrender demands that I stand the 
trial: this was laid upon me; I must bear it and I will, until I perish. But what I 
experience in yielding is not the blind luck of existence but one of conquered 
defiance, a luck still beclouded by possible and imminent calamities and thus of a 
depth that is alien to mere existence. And neither is it simply wretched suffering, 
but a suffering as deep as the defiance that was overcome, so that the sufferer may 
still see a reflection of the radiant bliss possible in existence otherwise. In its 
place all being is existence; I ought not to withdraw from mine. Surrender is a 
readiness to live, no matter how, to accept life whatever happens.   259
For Jaspers, there is no way to relieve the existential suffering of living in a world that does not 
disclose meaning to those most desirous of it. These twists of fate that close off prosperous, 
propitious futures threaten our willingness to live and communicate authentically. But if we 
accept the inevitability of these dark times, and refuse to let them negatively affect our 
motivation to continue to improve ourselves, then we will prevent the boundaries from closing in 
on our possibilities. To bring in a theme developed earlier in this dissertation, this is how we 
avert existential destitution during the most trying times. We have the most of ourselves at stake 
when we are suffering. For Jaspers, preventing oneself from becoming Existenz has the result of 
getting swept away with the calamity that generates human misery. Without Existenz, the fact 
that an individual is suffering, even if it is myself, cannot be disassociated from suffering as a 
whole. The possibility of existential communication, which resolves to courageously withstand 
suffering in solidarity with other Existenzen, requires the interpretation of boundary situations as 
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particularized and unique. Only when suffering is understood to belong to someone does it 
generate the grist and grip that move Existenz toward realization. Jaspers writes: 
The endless frictions, deceptions, discomfitures, and possibilities in my relations 
with others, those difficulties in which I come to experience myself, are either 
consequences of pure nature as downright otherness, the hard mutual 
impediments of unexistential existence, or they are the darkness of a possible 
Existenz that has yet to open itself to elucidation by offering to communicate 
existentially.  260
Once we realize that the experience of our suffering is particular and unique to our experience, 
we can begin to live in spite of it. For Jaspers, we do not, of our own conscious volition, begin 
our experience of the solidarity reserved for beings born both to thrive and suffer. This is a form 
of existential communication only enacted through the realization of Existenz, among Existenzen. 
But there is a stop between interpersonal communication for Jaspers. The impulse to 
communicate arises first from the experience of a boundary situation, which reveals a 
metaphysical otherness in the composition of our world. The experience of suffering is first and 
only our own. We comprehend our solidarity as Existenz reaching through difficulties toward 
actualization. Ronny Miron writes: 
Jaspers’s perception of communication, which was not dependent on the 
constitution of real relations with the other, but largely on its contribution to the 
broader self-understanding of Existenz and its preparation for forming its relation 
toward transcendence. Existenz stands alone in the face of the boundary 
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situations, and this is not only an expression of the essence of these situations 
where a person has no support or escape, but it indirectly implies that the 
perception of communication in Jasper’s thought did not deal mainly with 
relationships between people, but was a metaphysical category.  261
Here is where I think Jaspers has much to offer to the discussion about homelessness. He brings 
to light the reasons why appeals to compassion on behalf of the unsheltered are rebuffed by the 
various political, social, and economic realities that stand in place of their individual identities. 
In a sense, we do not see others until we see that they are also suffering, and we cannot see 
suffering until we embrace ours. But, and this is pivotal for Jaspers’ philosophizing, we must also 
see that they are fellow emerging Existenz. By cultivating ourselves in the experience of 
suffering, we reach out into our situations to cognize Transcendence. We open ourselves up to 
communication that comes from outside, and it reveals, momentarily, the furthest limits of our 
possible experience. This is only possible through the experience of boundary situations. 
Suffering is something that happens to us. But seen another way, it is an opportunity for 
understanding presented to us as an invitation to engage fully with the world.  
The Boundary Situation of Suffering and the Emergence of Existential Solidarity 
 In addition to death, which we must accept as a biological, physical fact of existence, 
suffering is something we have no choice to avoid. Suffering is a fact of existence and necessary 
for the emergence of Existenz. Jaspers writes: 
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If I act as if suffering were avoidable rather than definitive, I am not yet in the 
boundary situation. I regard the sufferings of man as numerically endless indeed, 
but not necessarily part of his existence—as particular sufferings, not affecting the 
whole of existence.  262
Jaspers presents us with a stunning revelation: there is no end to suffering. It cannot be abolished 
or prevented, and even if it could, it ought not to be. For Jaspers, the desire for metaphysics that 
draws us out of our conceptual understanding of a predictable world is what defines our efforts to 
achieve communication, which gives way to solidarity, which gives way to beneficial, 
benevolent politics. 
 Individuals experiencing homelessness in Hawaiʻi are suffering. Their lives are framed 
by circumstances that they had little hand in creating and little efficacy to shift. The depth of 
their suffering is not entirely comprehensible to those who step over them on the sidewalk and 
who eye them nervously when they step into offices and restaurants. Those of us who are at least 
moderately comfortably housed do not see very much of ourselves in them. At worst, we deny 
their suffering by vilifying their choices, and heap shame and blame on them. Perhaps we do not 
think of them as individuals who each have a historicity that, if we could read it, would bring 
them back into our compassionate awareness. We can come to know the circumstances that 
precipitated their difficulties in the form of legislation, international power struggles, and public 
opinion, which derogates their humanity, distracts their awareness, and blunts their ability to 
respond to shifts in fortune. Quite simply, if we see them as nodes of raw and bottomless 
existential suffering, we do not know how to respond. We realize that we are at our worst when 
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we do not respond at all, and yet we go on with our lives. For Jaspers, this indicates a turning 
away from Existenz. In these cases, we consider their suffering only as long as they are before us. 
Their suffering is finite, and so is our concern for them. The suffering they press upon us we 
merely incorporate into the incomprehensible whole of the world, which we can never turn fully 
toward. Jaspers writes: 
For all my efforts to remove sufferings, I should have the bounds of their removal 
clearly in mind; instead, I give up not only clarity but the rational and effective 
struggle against my sufferings when in a blind rage I attribute them all to other 
people’s malice and stupidity and comfort myself with the passive thought that all 
it takes to end my suffering is the destruction of the guilty. Or, in another man’s 
case, I evade suffering by keeping my distance, by withdrawing in good time if 
his misery becomes incurable. Thus, by rigidity and silent treatment, I widen the 
gulf that yawns between the fortunate and the suffering. I grow indifferent and 
inconsiderate; indeed, I despise and finally loathe the sufferer, just as some 
animals will torture their sick fellows to death.  263
If we do not engage suffering as a boundary situation, then it will not speak to potential Existenz. 
If we do not allow ourselves to offer up consolatory justifications for another day spent not 
helping those who are struggling, but instead keep the suffering present and festering, then we 
will incorporate it into our communication with the circumstances that shape our lives. In order 
to feel the depth of another’s suffering, we must imagine the awakening in them of Existenz. If 
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we do not see them as also struggling to communicate with the meaning that emanates from the 
situations they share with their world, we cannot find the solidarity necessary to help them. 
 In order to effect and recognize the mode of communication Jaspers believes to be 
necessary for solidarity, there are moral attitudes each Existenz cultivates. Jaspers uses the 
concept of communication metaphorically to describe the relationship between the 
Encompassing that we are and the Encompassing that is the world we are in. Interpersonal 
communication, then, is not merely the exchanging of words. It is the cultivation of the 
individual, which prepares and motivates them to influence their surroundings. One experiences 
solidarity with those around them when they find commonality in their search for more than the 
mundane, brutal givenness of the world. Kurt Salamun groups the moral attitudes from among 
the Jaspers' passages about existential communication to bring to the fore the necessity of a 
certain type of orientation to legitimize preferable ways to live with and for others. As I will 
show in what follows, the goal of these moral attitudes is not dissimilar to the transformative 
awareness that I used to describe the transcending of limitation prescribed by the Xunzi and the 
Zhuangzi. 
Moral Attitudes for Existential Communication and the Arrival of Compassion 
 If we catalog the attitudes that many who are not homeless feel in the face of the 
suffering of those who are unsheltered, we will find compassion as well as frustration. Human 
needs for living are shared by all of us, and we understand that the lack of these makes life 
incredibly difficult. We become frustrated at our inability to chip away at this stubborn problem. 
Occasionally, we are pushed back by frightening, bewildering behaviors and venomous words, 
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and we are frustrated that they are not trying or not able to be like we are. Then we are frustrated 
with ourselves for desiring distance from their exposed, desperate mortality. Jasper presents us, 
honest though flawed, with a choice. Blame and shame them to assuage your own guilt or engage 
with the struggle of forcing their existence into yours. If you choose the former, then you will 
become closed off from the parts of the world that include them and incapable of bridging the 
distance. If you choose the latter, then boundary situations will crop up to allow for the ascension 
of Existenz. These situations, according to Salamun’s interpretation of Jaspers' philosophy, 
cultivate five moral attitudes that are essential for the formation of interpersonal relationships 
and beneficial political arrangements.  
 The first attitude is the “willingness and ability to bear loneliness and the dignity of 
solitude.”  What we face in our daily lives is a maelstrom of events and expectations. We risk 264
humiliation as well as happiness.  But it is only by cultivating this attitude that we can set the 265
stage for self-introspection. We must seek ourselves before we seek others. In a way, this readies 
us for others, but not, Salamun assures us, in the messaging of the “psycho- and human 
relationship-industries.”  We do not necessarily have to love ourselves to love others. The 266
relationship we have with ourselves is a well-intentioned struggle to remain dignified in our own 
eyes. Only from the position of the will to solitude can we emerge as Existenz. 
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 Jaspers writes, “When a man is unhappy, being himself will be easier than when he is happy. 265
Paradoxically, he has to risk to be happy. The being that dares appear in happiness cannot reveal its depth 
as mere glowing vitality. Not until Existenz has reached the level it needs to maintain itself in happiness 
can happiness turn into a phenomenon of being.” Jaspers, Philosophy, vol. 2, 203.
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 The second attitude is “a kind of openness and frankness, which enables a person to 
communicate with another person without prejudice and masked purposes.  We must hold all 267
of our habits up to the harsh light of our own best interests, even if we risk losing fragments of 
the selves we find solace, but not justification, in being. The third attitude is “an intellectual 
integrity and truthfulness which allows an openness to criticize one’s own failings and 
dogmatized opinions with equal efforts than failings and dogmatized opinions of others.”  In 268
order to ready oneself for existential communication, one must be willing to engage in the 
breaking down of prejudices and corrosive biases. The fourth attitude is “a real intention to 
accept the communication partner in his (her) own personal freedom and specific possibility of 
self-realization…”  Despite the obvious power imbalances among the unhoused and the 269
housed, Jaspers presses us to accept the depth of possible Existenz in everyone. This forms the 
possibility of authentic solidarity in mutually recognized freedom. The fifth attitude is the “non-
egoistic intention, to help the communication partner to realize his (her) Existenz without using 
the other as a mere instrument for one’s own purpose of self-realization.”  According to 270
Salamun, only once these conditions are met can Karl Jaspers efforts to elucidate Existenz meet 
the conditions of the modern world. Salamun writes: 
While his existentialism deals mainly with private aspects of individual self-
realization, with subtle emotions, feelings, and personal moral attitudes in 
boundary situations and intimate relationships between two persons, like friends, 
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a pair of lovers, husband and wife, father or mother and child, teacher and student, 
and so on, Jaspers’ political philosophy deals with public affairs, and some of the 
essential political problems of our age.  271
Quite frankly, if we do not take the possibility of Existenz as driving those around us, then we 
will not cultivate the solidarity necessary to band together through the disruptive tumult of 
difficult times. 
 All of the philosophers mentioned in this chapter were concerned with the deleterious 
effect of suffering on the pursuit of meaning and morality. While Jaspers contributions are of 
course more abstract than the focus on ritualized conduct in the Xunzi, and more 
straightforwardly emotionally wrought than the Zhuangzian sages’ merging into the changes, the 
pressing onto boundaries until they give way to the limit of human experience is something that 
for Jaspers, Xunzi, and Zhuangzi was the foundation of social cooperation and harmony. 
Existential communication, for Jaspers, weaves the net that will prevent the fatal free fall of 
existential destitution. This also finds a counterpart in the Chinese philosophical perspectives I 
discussed: there is no way to thrive alone. Isolation precludes the ability to flourish. Loneliness 
cannot support the full weight of our existential bounty. Jaspers writes: 
First, loneliness is the irremovable pole without which there is no communication. 
Second, loneliness as the possibility of an empty I is a conception of intrinsic 
nonbeing at the brink of the abyss from which my historic decision to 
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communicate brings me back to reality. Third, loneliness is my present lack of 
communicative ties to others, and the uncertainty whether this can be helped.  272
We all must deal with the irrepressible fact that there is something in us that sacrifices itself to 
form relationships with others. The only way to make ourselves available to others is to make 
ourselves vulnerable. The relationships that sustain us depend, even in the relational context of 
Confucian moral philosophy, on our ability to cultivate ourselves. This activity preens our 
attitudes and expectations so that they form a smooth, interlocking matrix. We do this activity so 
that others may recognize and respect us, and that we are not ruffled by the situations we find 
ourselves in. For Jaspers, loneliness is a part of life that is demonstrated not only by the solitude 
in which we contemplate ourselves but also by our fear of being misunderstood and the guilt of 
mishandling the trust placed in us. Since we do not have the option of sustaining ourselves by 
ourselves, we shove off from the familiar shores of our unsustainable solipsism onto tilting, open 
seas of possibility. Our paradoxical search for comfort in the others that are also the cause of so 
much of our suffering forms currents for existential communication. The search reveals smooth 
waters when we understand our situations enough to respond according to ingrained social habits 
and adopted political forms. But otherwise, we founder on the jagged rocks hidden just far 
enough beneath the water to be unexpected. The suddenness of confronting elements of the 
human condition that we cannot comprehend jars the movement of Existenz. Jasper defines this 
moment, when we fail utterly to comprehend and respond appropriately to our situation, as 
foundering (Scheitern). 
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Foundering, the Emergence of Complicity, and the Denial of Guilt 
 Karl Jaspers' philosophizing is based on the possibility of the communication between 
Existenz, authentic self-becoming, and Transcendence, the expression of the world’s 
metaphysical possibilities in the context of our situational experience. We are capable of seeing 
more of the world than the series of causes which produce its physical and material certainties. 
Limiting ourselves to understanding the world this way disables our potential to understand the 
subtle, liminal, and tenuous presence of what is beyond our limited experience of the world. If 
we refuse to open up the possibility of Existenz, then we do not encounter the boundary 
situations through which we glimpse the furthest limits of what is possible. If we refuse to 
consider the possibility of Existenz, we will react to those suffering as if they do not have the 
temporal fortitude to continue to exist when we turn away from them. 
 Jaspers indicates that we have a choice to resist the call of Transcendence to the Existenz 
that we may become. We could conceivably choose to ignore the suffering of others and discount 
the disclosure of our particular situations as opportunities to shift our expectations and 
possibilities. We could close ourselves off to the depth of boundary situations, but there is a 
hitch. Our conscious way of cognizing the world generates limits that circumscribe our 
understanding of it. Every time we seek more than scientific and conceptual knowledge can 
describe, we will bump up against these limits. We will seek an answer that we will fail to be 
able to give. This foundering shows us how much of the world we do not and perhaps cannot 
know. It rebuffs our confidence that we do not need Existenz and the suffering it brings. 
Foundering brings all of the pain of the boundary situation and more because it is not in any way 
self-affirming. Rather, it shows us that we are not who we think we are. This is the case even if 
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we do nothing in an attempt to avoid and absolve ourselves of guilt. For Jaspers, we are only 
fully who we may become if we accept the inevitability of guilt. Jaspers writes: 
My active entrance into my life will thus deprive others, will let entanglements 
sully the soul, and will hurt the possible Existenz which I reject in my exclusive 
realization. When these consequences of my actions shock me, I may well think 
of avoiding guilt by not entering into the world at all. By doing nothing I would 
deprive nobody and would stay pure, and by lingering in universal possibility I 
would reject no particular one. But inaction itself is a kind of action. It is action 
by omission, and it has consequences… A refusal to enter into the world is a 
refusal to meet the challenge of reality which darkly demands that I dare and find 
out what will happen. In my situation I bear the responsibility for what occurs 
because I do not intervene; if I can do something and don’t do it, I am guilty of 
the consequences of my inaction. There are consequences whether I act or fail to 
act, and in each case I cannot help being guilty.  273
For Jaspers, the experience of guilt ought to be a boundary situation for possible Existenz. It is a 
calling to think through the cipher which reveals more than we knew was there. Simply put, we 
feel that the concrete, cognoscible experience does not describe what is really at stake. When we 
see that people are struggling against seemingly insurmountable obstacles, such as those 
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struggling with chronic homelessness,  and we educate ourselves on the circumstances that 274
precipitate homelessness and the demographics of those experiencing homelessness, we are 
shocked, horrified, and dismayed. It does not make sense because it ought not to exist. We 
founder on the solidity of something impossible to understand as merely a summation of fact. We 
ask ourselves ‘How culpable am I in perpetuating the suffering of the most vulnerable?’ How we 
answer this question is how we justify ourselves to ourselves. We either choose to accept our 
complicity as part of the guilt we are never really without so that it becomes a boundary situation 
for possible Existenz or we do not accept the guilt and seek to eliminate the boundary situation.  
 Jaspers describes three ways to shirk the guilt that arises in foundering. The first is to 
evade it by appealing to it as a simple fact. Jaspers: 
“I can untruthfully say: that’s the way it is, and I can’t change it; I’m not to blame 
for the existence being as it is; if it involves inescapable guilt, that’s not my fault
—so it makes no difference whether the guilt falls on me, since I’m guiltlessly 
guilty anyway, as a matter of principle.   275
This attitude is behind a common refrain in conversations about homelessness in Hawaiʻi: 
‘Homelessness is just part of life in Hawaiʻi. Maybe it’s the climate. They must come here 
because it’s warm.’ The attempted evasion of complicity and personal guilt are complicated, 
however, by the added foundering of attempting to conceptualize the effects of colonialism on 
 Chronic homelessness is a technical term in policy literature about state-sponsored approaches to 274
homelessness. Although ‘chronic’ refers to a persistent state of homelessness, the connotation of chronic 
illness brings in a useful dimension. Those who are ill rarely choose to be ill, just as those who are 
homeless rarely choose to be homeless. Plus, homelessness increases the likelihood of illness caused by 
stress as well as infection due to unsanitary living conditions.
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the Kānaka Maoli who comprise the highest proportion of those experiencing homelessness in 
Hawaiʻi. There are plenty of people in Hawaiʻi who are willing to commit the atrocities to 
history, even though the remnants shape the lives of everyone living in Hawaiʻi today. Jaspers 
compels us not to commit ourselves to forgetting, even in the hope of a harmonious future. 
Instead, we must allow it to be the boundary situation to call to our better, active, engaged selves 
every time it appears to us. Boundary situations are not overcome or annihilated by Existenz. 
They are revealed by our situation and only when we cultivate awareness can they draw us 
toward broad understanding of our world.  
 The second way that we may avoid the boundary situation revealed in our foundering is 
to commit to an abstract idea of external self-correction. Jaspers writes that “I may, for instance, 
calculate that the services we mutually render and the benefits we derive from each other even 
out, and that exploitation is canceled by law and order.”  This attitude can be connected to the 276
public responses to homelessness that prompted the sit-lie bans in Honolulu. It is defined by the 
belief that the systems we have created to support those living in our society will flex to 
accommodate everyone in the way it deems fit. This undermines our personal connection to the 
tragedy. It also prevents us from questioning the motives and motivation of public, lawful action. 
Appeals to universal dictums of law and civility do the work of undermining those suffering 
from homelessness. We do not loiter. We maintain hygienic standards. When we identify 
ourselves as one of the (reasonable, rational, and respectable) many, and we do not allow the 
boundary situation of the depth of human suffering to reach the trigger of our sympathy, we deny 
ourselves the possibility of Existenz. 
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 The third way to eliminate the boundary situation is to believe that out guilt connects 
only to specific and transitory situations. This is perhaps the most insidious of the three because 
it culminates in the belief that guilt is avoidable. Jaspers writes, “Either, I think, I have incurred a 
specific guilt, a guilt I can name and might also have avoided, or I am not aware of any guilt and 
may have a good conscience.”  We see this denial of ourselves when we think, ‘I will not walk 277
past the park today, there are too many homeless people there, and it hurts me to see.’ We 
associate the foundering that unseats us every time we confront the reality of homelessness with 
the immediacy of our emotional response. Gathering those feelings together, we tie our guilt 
around them, then put them aside. We hope not to feel that guilt today, so we avoid the situation 
that would give rise to it. This is a refusal to experience the depth of our possible Existenz. For 
Jaspers, this is us merely playing the part of being human beings. Jaspers writes: 
For Existenz in boundary situations, these untrue concealments are impossible. 
This means that deep down in me a foothold is lost: I am myself, but guilt-laden. 
Now the only way I can live is the tension of seeking to lift myself up. It is not a 
matter of guiltlessness any more, but of really avoiding whatever guilt I can 
avoid, so as to come to the profound, intrinsic, unavoidable guilt—without 
coming to rest there either. Responsibility mounts to its existential pathos of 
accepting that inevitable guilt, which we usually shun only to be thoughtlessly 
and passively entangled in some paltry guilt. The benefits of exploitation will now 
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impose obligations of performance. Impurity becomes a challenge to will only the 
most lucid reality, to give a clear voice to original volition.  278
In order to indulge in the unavoidable guilt that drives us to be better, we must become better so 
that we have less to feel guilty about. For Jaspers, there is something incredibly formative about 
struggling to deal with suffering, loss, and guilt. The circumstances that elicit these responses 
show us the depth of our situations not apparent to our mundane modes of understanding. We do 
not understand homelessness the way that we understand the antibiotic-resistant bacteria that we 
know are killing them. The meaning of their life-threatening and preventable infections yawns 
open, refusing to be sutured with our conceptual understanding. The meaning of it is unbounded 
and intensely sickening. We can live with the guilt that arises from the boundary situations we 
seek to plumb, but we cannot live with the guilt of denying our complicity without lying to 
ourselves.  
 Through the experience of foundering and the encounter with the boundary situations, we 
allow our world to be refined and even remade. When we deal with the inevitability of suffering 
in our lives, we are not making gains in increased understanding in the world. We are working 
toward the creation of a perpetually new one. We question our own understanding, the 
framework we hang our identity on, and the structure of our shared experiences when we become 
Existenz in the boundary situation. There is more at stake than whether and what we know. The 
decisions we make and the world we would like to bring about depend on our willingness to fail 
to understand. Hansjörg A. Salmony writes: 
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Jaspers ist Denken jederzeit mehr als ein Umgang mit Begriffen: nämlich eine 
innere Praxis, in der der Denkende sich findet oder sich selbst ausbleibt. Was er 
denkt und wie er es denkt, entscheidet deshalb in jedem Augenblick über das Heil 
der Seele und über das der Welt.   279
For Jaspers, thinking goes beyond handling concepts: it is an inner practice in 
which the thinker finds or misses themselves. What they think and how they think 
it, therefore, at each moment decides the well-being of their soul and the world. 
How well we deal with situations that push us painfully beyond the boundaries of what we know 
and expect from the world determines our openness to existential communication. Solidarity is 
only possible once we make ourselves into suitably cultivated and available selves. Then we may 
become undeniably and compassionately bound to one another.  
 In the middle of the mire of human existence is a flower that blooms when nurtured, as a 
point of hope. The flower depends on the humus surrounding its roots. The reality of life is 
simple and given. The flower will bloom and then wither. Perhaps we can take this as a metaphor 
for the evanescence of our own lives. But perhaps we ought not to, because we yearn for 
permanence in a way that the flower does not and cannot satisfy. Perhaps a more apt kinship is 
with the dirt. We are a mess of vivacity and death but also the only hope for the effortless beauty 
we are driven to find. Donna Haraway urges us to consider a world framed by kinship with the 
soil in her description of Terropolis: 
Terropolis exists in the… web of always-too-much connection, where response-
ability must be cobbled together, not in the existentialist and bond-less, lonely, 
 H.A. Salmony, “Karl Jaspers: seine Persönlichkeit und seine Philosophie,” Universitas Zeitschrift für 279
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur v. 24 issue 5 (May 1969), 490. Translation is my own.
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Man-making gap theorized by Heidegger and his followers. Terrapolis is rich in 
world, inoculated against post-humanism but rich in com-post, inoculated against 
human exceptionalism but rich in humus… This Terrapolis is not the home world 
for the human as Homo… but for the human that is transmogrified in etymological 
Indo-European sleight of tongue into guman, that worker of and in the soil.  280
Cultivated soil houses billions of symbiotic organisms, and imbalances are devastating and 
difficult to correct. The interconnectedness of a healthy holobiome is a suitable metaphor for 
realistic human growth. And it is something that sustainability-driven cultures and agrarian 
farmers have encoded into their understanding of the world around them. 
 If we accept the responsibility of handling ourselves and the importance of our being 
born into beneficial relationships with the potential for formative, cooperative bonds with others 
and our world, then we will not be deterred by the magnitude of suffering. We will be enlivened 
to create a world in which we provide what we need to ourselves. Our crises bring transformative 
awareness to the limits of human experience.  
 Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham: Duke 280
University Press, 2016), 11. 
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Conclusion 
 As a social issue, homelessness is unlike any other. It is connected to many types and 
severities of malady, which creates a diverse population of people experiencing homelessness. It 
is a problem that cannot be reduced to one set of circumstances or dissolved with one solution. It 
has different facets that face forward depending on whether it is viewed from an economic, 
political, social, cultural, or medical point of view. This necessitates various and simultaneous 
approaches in order to ameliorate the factors that contribute to homelessness and assist those 
experiencing it. In addition, all of these are specifically contextualized by the concrete situation 
where they occur. In this dissertation, I have sought to describe the situation as it is occurring in 
Hawaiʻi, especially in Honolulu where City and County ordinances and prolonged State of 
Emergency declaration have placed homelessness squarely at the center of local politics. This is 
not unique to Honolulu, of course, but this dissertation is intended to be an example of a 
methodology for doing applied comparative philosophy, where one particular, localized context 
is required.  
 I began by orientating the contemporary problem of homelessness in Hawaiʻi around 
three factors that have shaped the political landscape and the public conversation: the sit-lie ban 
in urban areas on the Island of Oahu, the mass immigration of Pacific Islanders from Palau, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia as part of the Compacts 
of Free Association, and the Housing First initiative undertaken via partnerships between city, 
state, and private entities. Each of these issues was used to characterize a different, though non-
exclusive, population of people experiencing homelessness as well as a philosophical approach 
to understanding each type of experience. Each led me to dwell in different philosophical 
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traditions and consider comparative approaches to understanding these circumstances. I also 
introduced the Chinese character qiong窮 as the basis for my exposition of ‘existential 
destitution’.  
 In chapter two I used resources from Pre-Qin Chinese philosophy to form a distinction 
between existential and economic poverty. The Ruist儒 tradition is especially well-suited for this 
purpose because through the renditions of Confucius trapped between Chen and Cai there is a 
concern for the corrosive effects of poverty on the ability to cultivate and sustain beneficial 
moral habits as well as an awareness of impending changes that could be harnessed to facilitate a 
shift in fortune. I argued that the constitutive connections that are formed in supportive 
communities and benevolent social arrangements prevent the isolation that disrupts one’s ability 
to form and carry out plans for positive changes. Housing First programs could be seen as 
bridging the gap between the housed and unhoused. Those among the latter often find themselves 
outside of the realm of social concern. Their poverty is often seen as something beyond 
circumstance. But if we do not move to reconstrue poverty as a foreboding warning of the 
possibility of existential destitution, the result would be what Simone Weil describes as le 
malheur. The utter collapse of the person into their suffering leaves them with no social currency 
with which to build interpersonal relationships.  
 In chapter three I built on the foundation of the formation and maintenance of 
relationships discussed in chapter two. I brought in the historical context of Chinese philosophy 
and intellectual history describing the common folk and the necessity of their care in facilitating 
harmony. Their lives were primarily agrarian, and their understanding was grounded in the 
experience of working the land and living in accordance with rituals and rites. This perspective is 
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necessary for fully understanding what ‘poverty’ means in the context of early Chinese 
philosophy. Fei Xiaotong brought out the differences in how agrarian societies, such as those in 
pre-industrialized China, relate to one another as compared to Western societies that are not 
structured on the basis of particular locations. In agrarian societies, which in this chapter I 
aligned with subsistence farming and sustainable, communal living among indigenous cultures, 
such as the Kānaka Maoli, the disruption of the relationship between humans and the land they 
inhabit is devastating. The theft or coerced sale of land severs both the economic ties to the land 
and the meaningful, constitutive ties to one’s livelihood as well as one’s ancestors. I claimed that 
if we are to make meaningful progress on ameliorating homelessness in Hawaiʻi, we must focus 
our efforts on understanding the reasons and history behind the high proportion of Kānaka Maoli 
among Hawaiʻi’s unsheltered and houseless populations. This means looking deeply and 
introspectively, in accordance with a Xunzi’s advice to seek all corners,  into the issues 281
surrounding land reform and the enforcement of the sit-lie bans, which dissolve the relationships 
between people and the land with which they identify and threaten the basis of interpersonal 
relationships. 
 In chapter four I brought in the last piece of the puzzle: forming ourselves into 
compassionate, aware, and proactive people in the face of such an inscrutable and complex issue 
as homelessness. I began this chapter by appealing to concepts of comprehensive attention and 
transformative awareness in the Xunzi and the Zhuangzi. Each text lays tracks toward the moral 
goal of dispelling boundaries (qiong窮) to form a comprehensive and inclusive (wuqiong無窮) 
 「凡⼈之患，蔽於⼀曲⽽闇於⼤理」”The affliction most people have is they are obsessed with one 281
corner and cannot see the big picture.” ICS Concordance to the Xunzi, 21/102/5.
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view of the world. This view requires multiple foci of awareness: 1) The necessity of 
interpersonal human relationships; 2) The supportive and nurturing relationships between 
humans and the land; 3) The natural cycles that dictate appropriately timed, seasonal human 
affairs; 4) The patterning of the world that brings about circumstances of prosperity and peril; 5) 
the gathering together of the diverse multitudes by broad, boundless knowing; and 6) a 
heightened sense of personal efficacy rooted in prescient awareness of impending change. Any 
person willing to cultivate this comprehensive awareness will see themselves as responsible for 
those around them and complicit in any harm that may descend. The transformative aspect, for 
Xunzi, was as much a result of moral training and rote memorization as it was moral 
improvisation and the visceral pull of the world on our attention. When we see the world as one, 
we will not seek to exclude anyone from being a part of it. When we see things in perpetual and 
cyclical motion, we will not find any problem insoluble or immovable. 
 What prevents us from tapping into the transformative awareness of which we are all 
capable? This question is startlingly similar to those we ask ourselves and each other about how 
we ought to respond to the obvious and preventable suffering of those experiencing 
homelessness and houselessness. I brought in the philosophizing of Karl Jaspers to address the 
psychological reactions to extreme suffering that seem to render problems too incomprehensible 
and too large to fix. I used his theory of the ‘boundary situation,' in which we see more than we 
can understand in a world usually so amenable to our conceptual sense-making, to shed light on 
the suffering we feel in response to the suffering of others. We are met with the limit of our 
knowledge, experience, and selves when we encounter those suffering from homelessness. At 
worst, we may see them as ‘existentially destitute,' or without the ability or motivation to form 
#
connections with other people and the world. If we do not see them as fellow seekers of Existenz, 
then we will not feel the solidarity necessary to seed compassion and sympathy. The awareness 
that we, as Existenz, bring to our relationships with others is the openness of communication 
across swaths of difference. We can imagine ourselves in communication with better versions of 
ourselves, better relationships with another and our non-human kin, and a better and radically 
shared world. But we must first become aware of our world, which is riddled with 
incomprehensible and unexpected calamity, by educating ourselves in the circumstances that 
create and perpetuate our most pressing social problems. For Jaspers, this is the necessity of our 
perpetual suffering. It is the only choice we have if we seek to improve ourselves and our futures. 
This is suffering that we choose and a struggle that defines our willingness to be tethered to 
otherness across the expanse of the unknown. As it is suffering we choose to willingly undergo, 
it is not like the suffering experienced by those whom, by dint of terrible circumstances 
brimming with harrowing choices, we avoid, judge, shame, and blame. For, according to Jaspers, 
this suffering prevents the structure necessary to support formative suffering. They do not have 
the existential capital to experience the boundary situation as an opportunity to improve. For 
those that are existentially destitute, the limits of their world relentlessly press in and down, the 
opposite of what Jaspers, Xunzi, and Zhuangzi prescribe: out (wai外) and up. 
 This dissertation sought to redraw the limits of our understanding of homelessness by 
viewing the contributors, concepts, laws, and opinions surrounding it through comparative 
philosophical perspectives. By developing a running theme of ‘existential destitution’ I drew a 
narrow focus around how and why these individuals are excluded from the shelter necessary to 
human survival in the midst of affluence and robust ideas of social justice that characterize the 
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political and social realities in Hawaiʻi. As we continue to shape ourselves and our societies, we 
ought to heed the appeals to inclusion, compassion, and culpability if we hope to truly plumb 
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